AvMed, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 12, 2026
Docket3D2025-1634
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed November 12, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D25-1634
Lower Tribunal No. 25-13430-CA-01
________________
AvMed, Inc.,
Appellant,
vs.
Miami-Dade County, and
Aetna Life Insurance Company,
Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Peter R.
Lopez, Judge.
Mark Ferrer & Hayden, and Etan Mark, Jordan Scott Nadel, and Yaniv
Adar, for appellant.
Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and David
M. Murray, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee Miami-Dade County.
Foley & Lardner LLP, and Benjamin James Grossman, Mallory Alyssa
Neumann, and Robert Hillard Hosay (Tallahassee), for appellee Aetna Life
Insurance Company.
Before LINDSEY, LOBREE and GOODEN, JJ.
GOODEN, J.
This case concerns whether section 112.08, Florida Statutes, requires
Appellee Miami-Dade County to competitively bid its contract for the
professional administrator of its self-insured healthcare plan. We hold that it
does not and affirm. 1
I.
Florida law authorizes Miami-Dade County to provide health insurance
for its about 30,000 employees, retirees, and their families. See §
112.08(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2025). To do so, the County may either purchase
insurance or self-insure a plan. Id.
Since 2008, the County has chosen the second option and self-insured
its group healthcare program. Under the plan, the County is tasked with
designing and funding the program and for paying members’ eligible medical
expenses. No insurance carrier assumes responsibility for those payments.
From the program’s inception, Appellant AvMed, Inc. has served as its
professional administrator. AvMed processes claims, provides customer
service, and performs reporting and other administrative functions. The
County pays AvMed administrative fees for these services. Over the years,
1
We affirm AvMed’s other arguments without further comment.
2
the County has awarded AvMed the contract through competitive bidding or
a bid waiver. AvMed’s most recent contract was set to expire on December
31, 2025.
In early 2025, the County issued a request for proposals seeking
“proposals from qualified organizations interested in providing full
administrative services, for the County’s Self-Funded Group Healthcare
Program (Program) including pharmacy benefits management, disease
management and well program services.” The request contained a “Local
Preference” provision stating that if a local proposer’s ranking was within five
percent of a higher-ranked non-local proposer, the local proposal “shall have
the opportunity to proceed to negotiations and the Competitive Selection
Committee will recommend that a contract be negotiated with said local
Proposer.” Gallagher Benefit Services, Inc. was retained to provide an
independent analysis of the proposals.
The County received proposals from AvMed, Appellee Aetna, and two
others. AvMed is a local vendor, while Aetna is not. Gallagher reviewed the
proposals and found that Aetna’s proposal would save the County at least
$40 million annually.
The Competitive Selection Committee held an evaluation meeting and
heard oral presentations from AvMed and Aetna. It thereafter scored the two
3
proposals. Aetna scored higher than AvMed in every category. But AvMed’s
total combined score was within five percent of Aetna’s score, triggering the
local preference provision. The Committee recommended that the County
proceed to negotiations with AvMed. The Committee, however, expressed
concerns about awarding the contract to AvMed based on the County’s
experience with the company.
In light of the statements from the Committee, the Strategic
Procurement Department invited AvMed and Aetna to submit best and final
offers. Both companies did so. Aetna again offered the lower cost proposal,
which would save the County substantial monies.
The County Mayor recommended that the Board of County
Commissioners waive competitive bidding and award the contract to Aetna.
Before acting on that recommendation, the Board requested a second
independent analysis of the proposals. The County, therefore, engaged Aon
Consulting, Inc. to conduct the analysis.
Aon concluded that Aetna’s proposal was more favorable to the County
and was $45.5 million less expensive than AvMed’s proposal. The Board of
County Commissioners then held a special meeting at which it heard
presentations from Aetna, AvMed, Gallagher, and Aon. By a 7-2 vote, the
Board approved the bid waiver and awarded Aetna the contract.
4
Meanwhile, AvMed filed suit against the County and Aetna. It sought
a declaratory judgment that the County could not award the contract outside
of a competitive process, injunctive relief to enjoin the County awarding the
contract to Aetna without competitive bidding, and a petition for writ of
mandamus requiring the County to comply with the bidding requirements of
section 112.08, Florida Statutes. AvMed also filed an emergency motion for
temporary injunction. The trial court temporarily stayed proceedings until the
Board awarded the contract.
When the Board did so, AvMed amended its complaint and renewed
its request for a temporary injunction. The County and Aetna opposed,
arguing that section 112.08(2)(a), Florida Statutes, does not require local
governments to competitively procure a contract to administer a self-insured
plan. They maintained that the Board acted within its authority in awarding
the contract to Aetna and that AvMed could not establish the elements
necessary for injunctive relief.
After an evidentiary hearing at which the parties presented argument
and documentary evidence, the trial court denied AvMed’s motion for
temporary injunction, request for declaratory relief, and petition for writ of
mandamus. The trial court concluded that the County’s contract with a
professional administrator is not a “contract for insurance,” and therefore, is
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not subject to be competitively bid under section 112.08(2)(a), Florida
Statutes. The trial court also concluded that, even though the County had
initiated a competitive procurement process, it had authority to waive the
bidding requirement. The trial court dismissed the action. This appeal
followed.
II.
We usually review orders denying temporary injunctions under an
abuse of discretion standard. But if there is a legal issue, such as contract
or statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. Telemundo Media, LLC v.
Mintz, 194 So. 3d 434, 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). This is one of those cases.
III.
“[A] temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be
granted only sparingly.” Heslop v. Moore, 716 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA
1998). “Thus, the moving party must demonstrate: (1) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a clear legal right or interest in the
subject matter of the suit; and (3) the likelihood of immediate and irreparable
harm because of the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law.” Id. If any
of these elements are not met, the motion must be denied.
Focusing on the first element, AvMed asserts that the trial court erred
in ruling that section 112.08, Florida Statutes, does not require competitive
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bidding in this case. It contends that self-insured plans, such as this, are
“contracts of insurance,” which are required to be competitively bid. The
County and Aetna both dispute this interpretation. Therefore, we must
determine the reach of the competitive bidding requirements in section
112.08, Florida Statutes.
A.
“The legislature has accorded counties broad self-governing powers.”
Lowe v. Broward Cnty., 766 So. 2d 1199, 1204 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). These
broad powers include the “authority to employ personnel” and “enter into
contractual obligations.” § 125.01(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2025). “The authority to
employ personnel includes, but is not limited to, the authority to determine
benefits available to different types of personnel,” including “insurance
coverage.” Id. Section 112.08, Florida Statutes, prescribes the procedures
and options for providing those benefits.
Section 112.08, Florida Statutes, was first enacted in 1941. Ch. 20852,
§ 1, Laws of Fla. (1941). As initially enacted, it allowed local governments
to contract with an insurance company for a group insurance plan for its
employees. Id. It then authorized the local government to deduct insurance
premiums from participating employees’ wages. Id. at § 3.
7
The statute was substantially rewritten in 1976. Ch. 76-208, Laws of
Fla. (1976). Among other things, the amendment expanded the options
available to local governments by authorizing them to contract with
professional administrators and to provide self-insured healthcare plans. Id.
The amendment also established competitive bidding requirements for
contracts of insurance. Id. Much of the language from this amendment—
especially that pertinent to this appeal—is still in the statute today. 2
Presently, section 112.08 reads, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any general law or special act to the contrary,
every local governmental unit is authorized to provide and pay
out of its available funds for all or part of the premium for life,
health, accident, hospitalization, legal expense, or annuity
insurance, or all or any kinds of such insurance, for the officers
and employees of the local governmental unit and for health,
accident, hospitalization, and legal expense insurance for the
dependents of such officers and employees upon a group
insurance plan and, to that end, to enter into contracts with
insurance companies or professional administrators to provide
such insurance or with a corporation not for profit whose
membership consists entirely of local governmental units
authorized to enter into risk management consortiums under this
subsection. Before entering any contract for insurance, the local
governmental unit shall advertise for competitive bids; and such
contract shall be let upon the basis of such bids. If a contracting
health insurance provider becomes financially impaired as
determined by the Office of Insurance Regulation of the Financial
Services Commission or otherwise fails or refuses to provide the
contracted-for coverage or coverages, the local government may
purchase insurance, enter into risk management programs, or
2
In 1984, the Legislature added additional subsections concerning self-
insurance. Ch. 84-307, §§ 1, 2, Laws of Fla. (1984).
8
contract with third-party administrators and may make such
acquisitions by advertising for competitive bids or by direct
negotiations and contract. The local governmental unit may
undertake simultaneous negotiations with those companies
which have submitted reasonable and timely bids and are found
by the local governmental unit to be fully qualified and capable
of meeting all servicing requirements. Each local governmental
unit may self-insure any plan for health, accident, and
hospitalization coverage or enter into a risk management
consortium to provide such coverage, subject to approval based
on actuarial soundness by the Office of Insurance Regulation;
and each shall contract with an insurance company or
professional administrator qualified and approved by the office or
with a corporation not for profit whose membership consists
entirely of local governmental units authorized to enter into a risk
management consortium under this subsection to administer
such a plan.
§ 112.08(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2025).
AvMed focuses heavily on the first two sentences. It ties the
Legislature’s mention of “professional administrators” in the first sentence to
the immediately following requirement of competitive bidding. In AvMed’s
view, whenever a local government employs a professional administrator,
the resulting contract must be competitively bid. But that reading considers
the opening sentences in isolation and ignores the remainder of the text, its
structure, and the context provided by its other provisions. See Antonin
Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167
(2012) (explaining that “the whole-text canon . . . calls on the judicial
interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the
9
physical and logical relation of its many parts.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Revival
Chiropractic, LLC, 385 So. 3d 107, 113 (Fla. 2024) (“Provisions in the texts
of statutes and contracts cannot be viewed in isolation from the full textual
context of which they are a part.”).
When the statute is read as a whole, it becomes clear that section
112.08, Florida Statutes, treats purchased insurance contracts and self-
insured healthcare plans differently and recognizes that a professional
administrator may perform different functions in those distinct arrangements.
The structure of subsection (2)(a) reinforces this distinction. It addresses
three related, but distinct subjects.
The first two sentences concern the purchase of insurance. They
authorize a local government to pay premiums for health insurance from its
available funds and “to enter into contracts with insurance companies or
professional administrators to provide such insurance. . . .” Id. It is in this
context that the Legislature imposes the competitive bidding requirement:
“[b]efore entering any contract for insurance, the local governmental unit
shall advertise for competitive bids; and such contract shall be let upon the
basis of such bids.” Id. By its express terms, that requirement applies to a
“contract for insurance.”
10
The subsection next addresses what a local government may do if its
contracting insurance provider becomes financially impaired. In that
circumstance, the Legislature gives the local government a choice: it may
obtain replacement coverage through competitive bidding or through direct
negotiations and contract. Id. Thus, even within the same subsection, the
Legislature expressly identifies circumstances in which competitive bidding
is required and circumstances in which direct negotiation is permitted.
Lastly, the subsection turns to self-insurance. It provides that the local
government may “self-insure any plan for health, accident, and
hospitalization coverage. . . .” Id. In doing so, it can contract with a
professional administrator to manage this plan. The professional
administrator must be approved and qualified by the Office of Insurance
Regulation. Subsection (2)(b), in turn, prescribes the process for obtaining
the Office’s approval of the self-insured plan, including submission of the
plan and an actuarial certification and a determination by the Office that the
plan is designed to provide sufficient revenues to pay current and future
liabilities. Id. at § (2)(b). Notably absent is any requirement of competitive
bidding.
Given these differences, the Legislature knew how to require
competitive bidding when it intended to do so. It did so in the provision
11
governing a “contract for insurance.” It also addressed competitive bidding
and direct negotiation when a contracting insurance carrier fails. But when
the Legislature authorized self-insured plans, it did not repeat the competitive
bidding requirement. Instead, it imposed a different set of safeguards:
actuarial review and approval by the Office of Insurance Regulation and the
use of a qualified and approved administrator.
This distinction matters. “Where the legislature has included a specific
provision in one part of a statute and omitted it in another part, we must
conclude that it knows how to say what it means, and its failure to do so is
intentional.” Paragon Health Servs., Inc. v. Cent. Palm Beach Cmty. Mental
Health Ctr., Inc., 859 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). See also
Myers v. Hawkins, 362 So. 2d 926, 929 (Fla. 1978) (“We presume that the
language differentiation was intentional.”); Scalia & Garner, supra, at 170
(“[W]here the document has used one term in one place, and a materially
different term in another, the presumption is that the different term denotes
a different idea.”). And “we will not imply it where it has been excluded.”
Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911, 914 (Fla.
1995).
Reading the competitive bidding requirement into the self-insured
provision would add a requirement that the Legislature did not include. See
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Coates v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 365 So. 3d 353, 354 (Fla. 2023)
(“[W]e do not add words to a statute in the guise of interpreting it.”). It would
further disregard the Legislature’s decision to regulate self-insured plans
through a different mechanism—mandatory actuarial review and approval by
the Office of Insurance Regulation. See Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach
Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 456 (Fla. 1992) (“It is a cardinal rule
of statutory interpretation that courts should avoid readings that would render
part of a statute meaningless.”).
The statute’s treatment of professional administrators further confirms
that their mere involvement does not transform a contract for administration
into a “contract for insurance.” Section 112.08, Florida Statutes,
contemplates the use of professional administrators in different contexts. A
professional administrator may be engaged to obtain the insurance
purchased by the local government from an insurance company. Or, a
professional administrator may be engaged to manage the self-insured plan.
See generally § 626.88(1), Fla. Stat. (2025). The fact that the Legislature
used the same term—professional administrator—in these different contexts
does not expand the separate competitive bidding requirement beyond the
“contract for insurance” to which the Legislature expressly attached it.
13
AvMed also urges us to consider section 110.123, Florida Statutes,
which governs the State’s group healthcare program. But that statute does
not support AvMed’s interpretation. It uses materially broader language. In
a subsection addressing both insurance contracts and self-insured plans,
section 110.123 requires competitive bidding “[b]efore entering into any
contract. . . .” § 110.123(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (2025). Section 112.08, Florida
Statutes, contains no comparable language. Instead, it limits its competitive-
bidding requirement to a “contract for insurance.” The Legislature’s use of
broader language in section 110.123, Florida Statutes, again confirms that it
knew how to require competitive bidding when it intended to do so. It simply
did not use that language in section 112.08, Florida Statutes.
Accordingly, the plain language and structure of section 112.08,
Florida Statutes, leads us to one conclusion: the competitive bidding
requirement applies only when a local government enters a “contract for
insurance.” It does not apply when the local government contracts with a
professional administrator to administer a self-insured healthcare plan.
B.
Even still, AvMed maintains that a self-insured plan is a contract for
insurance. Not so. See Young v. Progressive Se. Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 80,
85 (Fla. 2000) (“[S]elf-insurance does not constitute insurance in any
14
traditional form.”) (citation and emphasis omitted); State Comprehensive
Health Ass’n v. Carmichael, 706 So. 2d 319, 321 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“[S]elf-
insurance has not been considered a policy of insurance.”); Lipof v. Fla.
Power & Light Co., 558 So. 2d 1067, 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (“Self-
insurance is not considered a ‘policy’ of insurance. . . .”). See also Fla. Auto.
Dealers Self-Insurers Fund v. Plantation AMC/Jeep, Inc., 566 So. 2d 558,
559 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
Era-appropriate dictionaries confirm the distinction between the two.
See City of Doral v. Cabrera, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1234, at *9 (Fla. 3d DCA
June 17, 2026) (“Next, we consult era-appropriate dictionaries.”); Scalia &
Garner, supra, at 78 (“Words must be given the meaning they had when the
text was adopted.”). A “contract of insurance” is “[a]ny contract by which one
of the parties for a valuable consideration, known as a premium, assumes a
risk of loss or liability that rests upon the other, pursuant to a plan for the
distribution of such risk. . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary 295 (5th ed. 1979). See
also Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 643 (3d ed. 1969) (“A contract whereby one
person undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability
arising from an unknown or contingent event.”); Webster’s New Twentieth
Century Dictionary Unabridged 953 (2d. ed. 1971) (defining “insurance” as
“a contract whereby, in return for a fixed payment (premium), the insurer
15
guarantees the insured that a certain sum will be paid for a specified loss:
usually called an insurance policy.”); American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 370 (1981) (defining “insurance” as “2. A contract binding
a company to indemnify an insured party against specified loss.”). 3 By
contrast, “self-insured” plans are those in which the entity “places aside in a
fund sufficient sums to cover liability losses that may be sustained.” Black’s
Law Dictionary 724 (5th ed. 1979). See also Ballentine’s Law Dictionary
1158 (3d. ed. 1969) (“An employer engaging to make compensation
payments directly to the injured employee in lieu of carrying insurance, he
being required, as a condition of dispensing with an insurance carrier to
furnish satisfactory proof of financial ability. . . .”); The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 1113 (2d Coll. ed. 1982) (defining “self-
insurance” as “Insurance of oneself or one’s possessions against possible
loss by regularly setting aside funds.”).
In any event, self-insured plans and contracts of insurance are
fundamentally different. Self-insured plans involve risk retention. Young,
753 So. 2d at 85. The “company, governmental entity or individual chooses
3
These definitions are consistent with the definition contained within the
Insurance Code, which was enacted in 1959. See § 624.02, Fla. Stat.
(2025) (“‘Insurance’ is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify
another or pay or allow a specified amount or a determinable benefit upon
determinable contingencies.”).
16
not to purchase insurance but rather retains the risk of loss. In order to
protect against losses, the self-insured will often set aside funds on a regular
basis to provide its own pool from which losses will be paid.” Id. (citing
Appleman on Insurance § 1.3, at 10 (2d ed. 1996)). On the other hand, a
contract of insurance involves the assumption of risk by one party and an
undertaking to indemnify another against loss. See 1 Couch on Ins. § 1:9
(2026) (“The primary requisite essential to a contract of insurance is the
assumption of a risk of loss and the undertaking to indemnify the insured
against such loss.”); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 73 (1959) (The “true underwriting of risks, the one
earmark of insurance as it has commonly been conceived of in popular
understanding and usage.”); Prof’l Lens Plan, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ins., 387 So.
2d 548, 550 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (including as an element of insurance an
assumption of the risk by the insurer).
Here, the County retains the risk of paying its employees’ eligible
medical expenses. No insurance carrier undertakes to indemnify the County
or assumes responsibility for those claims. The professional administrator,
in turn, provides administrative services, claims processing, customer
service, and reporting for a fee. The County’s contract does not transfer the
17
risk of loss to another or require another to indemnify the County against that
loss. It is a contract for administrative services—not a contract for insurance.
IV.
Section 112.08, Florida Statutes, requires competitive bidding if a local
government is purchasing insurance—whether directly from an insurer or
indirectly through a plan administrator. It does not require competitive
bidding for the local government to contract with a professional administrator
to manage its self-insured plan. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s order
of dismissal. AvMed did not meet the elements to obtain a temporary
injunction.
Affirmed.
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