Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, Appellant, v. ANGELO GIAMBRONE, Appellee. No. 2D2025-0115 July 29, 2026 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Melissa M. Polo, Judge. Stephen M. Todd, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Tampa, for Appellant. Michael C. Minardi of Minardi Law, PLLC, Tampa, for Appellee. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Foster H. Swartz, Solicitor General Fellow, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Acting Solicitor General, and Jason J. Muehlhoff, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae. LABRIT, Judge. Hillsborough County appeals a final judgment that awards Mr. Angelo Giambrone back pay and compensatory damages, and also prospectively prohibits the County from "discriminating against"—and requires the County to "provide an accommodation" to—any employee who presents a medical marijuana card after testing positive for marijuana, so long as there is "no evidence" the employee used, or was under the influence of, medical marijuana at work, on County property, or in a County vehicle. The underlying summary judgment order rests on three core premises: (1) that a medical marijuana card qualifies as "Prescription or Nonprescription Medication" under the governing collective bargaining agreement (CBA), such that a Medical Review Officer (MRO) was required to "verify the test as negative"; (2) that Florida's medical marijuana constitutional amendment affirmatively requires "Qualified Patients" to be allowed to use medical marijuana off- site and correspondingly requires employers to accommodate that use; and (3) that, as a result, the County could not discipline Mr. Giambrone based on a positive test absent proof of on-duty impairment. Those premises cannot be squared with the governing texts or with the limited role of the judiciary in adjudicating individual employment disputes. Therefore, we reverse.1 I. Background A. Facts and Procedural History In the order granting Mr. Giambrone's motion for summary judgment, the trial court relied on the following undisputed facts. Mr. Giambrone worked for Hillsborough County Fire Rescue as a firefighter paramedic. On February 26, 2019, he was selected for a random urine drug test, and the County received the results on March 1, 2019, showing a positive test for marijuana. The County did not select Mr. Giambrone for testing because of any workplace incident; the trial court 1 We emphasize at the outset the narrowness of our decision: this appeal turns on the interaction between Florida's constitutional and statutory framework for medical marijuana and the County's drug-free workplace policy as applied to employees covered by this particular CBA. How other employers, or employees subject to different CBAs or different policies, may address medical marijuana is not before us. 2 found the screening "was strictly random," and it also found, based on the County's admissions, no evidence that (a) Mr. Giambrone used or possessed marijuana on work premises or during work hours; (b) Mr. Giambrone had any work performance evaluations alleging impairment; or (c) Mr. Giambrone's employment record reflected any prior complaint or suspicion of impairment. The County placed him on unpaid administrative leave based on the positive test, and he has remained on that status through the inception of this appeal. After being placed on unpaid administrative leave, Mr. Giambrone filed this civil action against the County. Mr. Giambrone's complaint asserted (1) a Florida Civil Rights Act claim premised on a failure to accommodate, (2) a "wrongful termination" claim premised on the County's refusal to accept the medical marijuana card as justification for the positive result under the County's drug-free workplace policy and the CBA, (3) a claim alleging failure to update the County's drug-free workplace policy, and (4) a breach of contract claim alleging violations of the County policy and the CBA. After discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment, and in December 2024, the trial court entered an order granting Mr. Giambrone's amended motion for final summary judgment and denying the County's motion. Thereafter, the trial court entered a final judgment that granted Mr. Giambrone relief on the pleaded counts and, in addition, awarded broad prospective relief directed beyond the individual dispute—mandating that the County must "provide an accommodation to employees who present a valid State of Florida Medical Marijuana Card after testing positive for marijuana" so long as there is "no evidence" of on-duty use, possession, or working "under the influence." 3 B. The Governing Texts At all relevant times, Mr. Giambrone's employment was governed by the CBA,2 which contains a detailed "Substance Abuse Policy." Section 40.1(A) of the CBA broadly prohibits all employees from using, possessing, or being under the influence of a drug while at work, on County property, in a County vehicle, or while displaying a County logo. Notably, the CBA also prohibits employees from engaging in the same conduct "at any time while employed by Hillsborough County Fire Rescue, other than alcohol or prescribed medications." The CBA defines "Drugs" to mean cannabinoids as well as alcohol and other listed substances (including various prescription drugs such as opiates and benzodiazepines) and their metabolites—reflecting a negotiated testing regime that extends well beyond criminally prohibited substances. The CBA separately prohibits all employees "from reporting to work when it is determined that the employee is Impaired," and it defines "Impaired" to mean "a confirmed positive drug test" based on any testing described in the agreement. The CBA provides for "Random Drug Testing," under which up to five employees may be selected each pay period, and provides that "[a]ll Employees will be placed on paid administrative leave until a Confirmation Test can be performed and/or a valid result is obtained." For a "First Time Confirmed Positive Drug Test," the CBA contemplates a referral to treatment and rehabilitation, placement on leave without pay during the program, and a required return-to-work drug test, and it 2 The CBA is between the Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners and the International Association of Firefighters, Local 2294. An express purpose of the CBA is to "set forth the entire agreement between the parties concerning wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment" for firefighters employed by the County. 4 provides that "[a] negative test result must be obtained prior to an employee returning to work," followed by "Follow-up Drug Testing." The CBA also defines "Prescription or Nonprescription Medication" as "a drug or medication obtained pursuant to a prescription as defined by s[ection] 893.02 or a medication that is authorized pursuant to federal or state law for general distribution and use without a prescription in the treatment of human diseases, ailments, or injuries." The referenced statute, section 893.02(24), Florida Statutes (2019), in turn, defines a "Prescription" as an order that, among other things, "is intended to be dispensed by a person authorized by the laws of this state to do so, and [which] meets the requirements of s[ection] 893.04." In addition to the CBA, the County maintained a countywide drug- free workplace policy3 that sets drug and alcohol testing procedures, including reasonable suspicion testing, postaccident and postinjury testing, and random testing for certain safety-sensitive positions. Under the policy's "Over the Counter or Prescription Drugs" provision, employees and applicants "should confidentially report the use of prescription or nonprescription medications to the County's Medical Review Officer (MRO) when contacted by the MRO," and they have an opportunity to "contest or explain the result to the MRO within five working days after written notification of the positive test result." The policy provides that if the employee's explanation or challenge is "unsatisfactory to the MRO, the MRO shall report a positive test result back to the employer" but "[i]f an employee or job applicant has provided an adequate explanation regarding prescription or non-prescription drug 3 As the trial court correctly noted, the drug-free workplace policy and the CBA are contracts that bind both the County and Mr. Giambrone. 5 use that may affect the test results, the MRO will verify the test as negative and report back to the employer." The "Failure to Comply With Policy" section provides that the County "retains the absolute right to terminate an employee for first-time verified positive test results . . . without offering the benefit of a rehabilitation program," and it states that participation in a rehabilitation program "does not restrict" the County's right to discipline the employee "up to and including termination, even for a single violation." Where rehabilitation is offered following a first-time positive, the policy provides that the employee "will be immediately removed from work" and may return only after completing recommended treatment and obtaining "a negative test result on a return-to-duty drug test," followed by unannounced follow-up testing; it further states that rehabilitation "will not be offered for a second time positive" and that the employee "will be terminated from employment." Florida's constitutional and statutory medical marijuana provisions are jugular to resolution of this dispute. The Florida Constitution provides that "[t]he medical use of marijuana by a qualifying patient . . . is not subject to criminal or civil liability or sanctions under Florida law," but it also states that "[n]othing in the section requires the violation of federal law or purports to give immunity under federal law" and that "[n]othing in the section shall require any accommodation of any on-site medical use of marijuana in any . . . place of . . . employment." Art. X, § 29(a)(1), (c)(5), (c)(6), Fla. Const. The implementing statute similarly provides, in its "Applicability" subsection, that it "does not limit the ability of an employer to establish, continue, or enforce a drug-free workplace program or policy . . . [and it] does not require an employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any workplace or any 6 employee working while under the influence of marijuana"; the statute further provides that it "does not create a cause of action against an employer for wrongful discharge or discrimination." § 381.986(15)(a)–(c), Fla. Stat. (2019). II. The Summary Judgment Rests on Legal Error A. Standard of Review We review the entry of summary judgment de novo. See Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000). Contract interpretation is a question of law and is likewise reviewed de novo. See Fitness Int'l, LLC v. 93 FLRPT, LLC, 361 So. 3d 914, 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023). B. Medical Marijuana Is Neither a Prescription nor a Nonprescription Medication Under the CBA The trial court determined that medical marijuana is "considered a prescription or akin to a prescription, as it is an order for drugs written by a licensed doctor . . . [and] nowhere in [the CBA] is medical marijuana enumerated as distinct from all other prescribed medications." As the County correctly argues, the trial court reversibly erred in so concluding, and that error permeates the order on review. The trial court's CBA analysis starts in the right place—the CBA's definition of "Prescription or Nonprescription Medication"—but then departs from the actual words of that definition. As the trial court recognized, section 40.2(L) of the CBA defines "Prescription or Nonprescription Medication" as "a drug or medication obtained pursuant to a prescription as defined by s[ection] 893.02 or a medication that is authorized pursuant to federal or state law for general distribution and use without a prescription in the treatment of human diseases, ailments, or injuries." Treating this provision as a "broad definition" that "encompasses medications authorized under federal or Florida law," the trial court ultimately 7 concluded that medical marijuana is a medication authorized for general distribution because Florida has "over 880 thousand [medical marijuana] patients" and "over 650 retail stores to distribute medical marijuana." As we will explain, marijuana is neither a medication "obtained pursuant to a prescription as defined by s[ection] 893.02," nor one that is authorized by "federal or state law for general distribution and use without a prescription." 1. Medical Marijuana Is Not a Prescription Medication Under the CBA Medical marijuana does not fit within the first clause of section 40.2(L) of the CBA because it is not "a drug or medication obtained pursuant to a prescription as defined by s[ection] 893.02." Section 893.02(24) defines a "Prescription" as an order for drugs or medicinal supplies that, among other things, is "intended to be dispensed by a person authorized by the laws of this state to do so, and [which] meets the requirements of s[ection] 893.04." Under ordinary rules governing incorporation by cross-reference, the reference to section 893.04 is part of what the defined term means; it is not surplus. See, e.g., Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 78 So. 693, 698 (Fla. 1918) ("In the construction of such statutes the statute referred to is treated and considered as if it were incorporated into and formed part of that which makes the reference."). The statutory definition therefore requires, as a condition of qualifying as a "prescription," that the order be one that can "meet[] the requirements of s[ection] 893.04." That matters because section 893.04 creates a pharmacist dispensing framework: it authorizes "[a] pharmacist"4 to dispense 4 Under section 893.02(19), " 'Pharmacist' means a person who is licensed pursuant to chapter 465 to practice the profession of pharmacy in this state." 8 controlled substances "upon a written, oral, or electronic prescription," and it then imposes the detailed requirements governing that prescription dispensing system. See Cohn v. Dep't of Prof'l Regul., 477 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) ("A pharmacist . . . may dispense controlled substances upon a written or oral prescription." (emphasis omitted) (quoting § 893.04(1))); see also § 893.04(1)(b)–(g), (2)(a)–(f) (requiring, among other things, that prescriptions be dated and signed when issued, include specified identifying information, be retained on file, and comply with refill and quantity limits). When the contractual definition uses "prescription as defined by s[ection] 893.02" and section 893.02(24) requires that the prescription "meet[] the requirements of s[ection] 893.04," the combined effect is to define a "prescription" as an order that is legally capable of being dispensed by a pharmacist licensed under chapter 465 in compliance with section 893.04. Medical marijuana does not pass through that system; it is dispensed through a separate regime specifically created for that purpose. The trial court attempted to avoid this conclusion by declaring that a medical marijuana treatment center "fits the definition of [a] Special Pharmacy" under section 465.003(11)(a)4, Florida Statutes (2019). But that label cannot be reconciled with the governing statutory text. Chapter 465 defines a "special pharmacy" as a location where "medicinal drugs are compounded, dispensed, stored, or sold." See § 465.003(11)(a)4. "Medicinal drugs," in turn, are limited to "prescription" or "legend" drugs that federal or state law requires to be dispensed "only on a prescription." See § 465.003(8). And chapter 465's operative definitions confirm that this is a pharmacist-centered prescription system: "dispense" means "the transfer of possession" of a 9 medicinal drug "by a pharmacist," see § 465.003(6), and a "pharmacist" is a person licensed under chapter 465, see § 465.003(10). Medical marijuana does not operate within that framework. Florida law defines "medical use" of marijuana as conduct "authorized by a physician certification," not a prescription, see § 381.986(1)(j), and the legislature expressly provided that a licensed medical marijuana treatment center and its employees "are not subject to licensure or regulation under chapter 465" for "dispensing" marijuana. § 381.986(14)(e). The trial court's "special pharmacy" finding thus collapses two distinct statutory regimes—one built around pharmacist dispensed prescription drugs, the other built around physician certification and licensed treatment centers—and it cannot supply the predicate for treating medical marijuana as a chapter 465 "pharmacy" product in the first place. The upshot is straightforward, and it follows from the statutory architecture the parties incorporated. Section 40.2(L)'s first clause is keyed to a "prescription as defined by s[ection] 893.02," and that definition in turn requires an order that is legally capable of being dispensed through the pharmacist-centered system described in section 893.04. Medical marijuana is obtained by physician certification and dispensed through licensed treatment centers under a separate statutory regime—not by pharmacists pursuant to section 893.04—and the trial court's attempt to recharacterize a medical marijuana treatment center as a "special pharmacy" under chapter 465 cannot rewrite those threshold statutory definitions. Accordingly, even if a medical marijuana authorization card resembles a prescription in function or appearance, it 10 is not a "prescription" as the CBA defines that term by incorporation, and it therefore cannot satisfy section 40.2(L)'s first clause.5 2. Medical Marijuana Is Not a Nonprescription Medication Under the CBA Turning to the second clause of section 40.2(L), the trial court's reasoning replaces that clause's limiting words—"general distribution and use without a prescription"—with a very different concept: widespread participation in a regulated program. The second clause is not satisfied by showing that a medication is "authorized" in any sense; the CBA requires that the medication be authorized under state or federal law "for general distribution and use without a prescription." Medical marijuana is not authorized for "general distribution and use without a prescription" under federal law; to the contrary, federal law wholly prohibits such conduct with respect to marijuana. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2018); 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2018); see also Beckman v. Collier Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, No. 2:24-cv-585-JES-DNF, 2026 WL 91580, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2026) (summarizing that under the Controlled Substances Act "mere possession of marijuana is a federal crime everywhere in the United States").6 Nor is medical marijuana authorized 5 Other courts construing analogous medical marijuana regimes have likewise recognized the same basic point: a medical marijuana registry card or physician "authorization" is not a "prescription," and marijuana's federal classification precludes it from being "prescribed" in the ordinary controlled substances sense. See Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 262 P.3d 970, 974 (Colo. App. 2011) (observing that "[m]arijuana, in contrast, remains a Schedule I controlled substance under the applicable federal statute and consequently cannot be prescribed" and concluding that medical use by an employee holding a registry card "is not pursuant to a prescription"). 6 After oral argument, but before issuance of this opinion, the Acting Attorney General for the United States issued a final rule, effective April 28, 2026, placing FDA-approved drug products containing 11 pursuant to Florida law for "general distribution and use without a prescription"; it is dispensed through a patient-specific regime limited to "medical use by a qualified patient." See Baxter v. State, 389 So. 3d 803, marijuana and marijuana subject to a state medical marijuana license into federal schedule III. See Schedules of Controlled Substances: Rescheduling of Food and Drug Administration Approved Products Containing Marijuana From Schedule I to Schedule III; Corresponding Change to Permit Requirements, 91 Fed. Reg. 22,714, 22,714–15, 22,719 (Apr. 28, 2026) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1300, 1301, 1308, 1312). We are aware of that change, but it does not alter our analysis for two independent reasons. First, even under the new federal rule, state licensed medical marijuana is still not authorized for general distribution and use in the manner contemplated by section 40.2(L)'s nonprescription clause. It remains limited to medical purposes, to users authorized by state law, and to dispensing through licensed entities under a controlled regulatory regime. See 91 Fed. Reg. at 22,721-22 (creating a registration framework for state licensees and providing that registrants may dispense marijuana only to individuals "authorized by state law to possess marijuana . . . for medical purposes"); id. at 22,722 (providing that a state-law "certification or other document" sufficient to obtain marijuana for medical purposes will suffice to permit dispensing). That is not the same thing as an over-the-counter drug made available for general public distribution and use without individualized medical authorization. Indeed, schedule III drugs ordinarily remain subject to a prescription- based dispensing framework. See 21 U.S.C. § 829(b) (2018) (providing that, absent direct dispensing by a practitioner, no schedule III or IV prescription drug "may be dispensed without a written or oral prescription"); 21 U.S.C. § 829(d) (separately addressing "[n]on- prescription drugs with abuse potential"). Second, and in any event, this civil controversy is governed by the law in effect when the cause of action arose, not by a later federal rule change that occurred while the appeal was pending. Cf. Abner v. Lyft Fla., Inc., 422 So. 3d 1226, 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) ("We apply the law in effect at the time the cause of action accrued."). When the events underlying this dispute occurred in 2019 and when this action was filed in 2020, marijuana remained in federal schedule I and federal law did not authorize its use in any circumstance. Thus, the intervening federal rescheduling does not affect the disposition of this appeal. 12 809–10 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (en banc) (emphasis omitted) (quoting § 381.986(g), Fla. Stat. (2021)). A category limited to medications authorized "for general distribution and use without a prescription" cannot be read as a catchall for any medication that is lawful or available in Florida. That interpretation would deprive the limiting phrase "for general distribution and use without a prescription" of any work to do—effectively rewriting the second clause into "any medication authorized under state law"—and would largely collapse the CBA's two-part definition by making the separate "prescription as defined by s[ection] 893.02" prong unnecessary in practice. See Publix Super Mkts., Inc. v. Wilder Corp. of Del., 876 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (rejecting a construction that would make contractual language "absolutely useless" and reiterating that courts must "construe contracts in such a way as to give reasonable meaning to all provisions" (quoting Hardwick Props., Inc. v. Newbern, 711 So. 2d 35, 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998))). 3. The MRO Was Not Required to Report the Test as Negative Once section 40.2(L) is read as written, the rest of the trial court's CBA analysis crumbles. The order states that after the positive test, Mr. Giambrone "timely provided the MRO with his state issued medical marijuana card as justification of the positive test result," and it treats that card as requiring the MRO to "verify the test as negative." And the "verification as negative" mechanism is triggered when the employee provides an "adequate explanation regarding prescription or non- prescription drug use." But a medical marijuana card is neither "a prescription as defined by s[ection] 893.02" nor evidence that marijuana is "authorized . . . for general distribution and use without a prescription." 13 In sum, the trial court's conclusion that the County was contractually obligated to treat a positive test as negative rests on a premise that is wholly unsupported and is in fact contradicted by the CBA's text. Judgment cannot be sustained on a judicial rewriting of unambiguous definitions. See Lambert v. Berkley S. Condo. Ass'n, 680 So. 2d 588, 590 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) ("[W]hen a document's language is clear, a court cannot indulge in construction or interpretation of its plain meaning." (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Krathen, 471 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985))). C. The Trial Court Improperly Narrowed the CBA's Drug Prohibitions The trial court did not limit its analysis to the definition of "Prescription" and "Nonprescription." It also construed the CBA's substance abuse prohibitions in a manner that materially narrows their scope. The order states that the "plain language" of section 40.1(A) of the CBA "only prevents" employees from using substances or illegal drugs in four circumstances: while at work, on County property, in County vehicles, or while reporting to work "under the influence." Under the trial court's lights, the policy is essentially cabined to on-duty conduct or the employee's condition at the start of a shift; absent proof of on-duty use or contemporaneous impairment, the employer's rules would not be triggered. But, as the County correctly notes, that construction is irreconcilable with the operative text the trial court itself quoted. The quoted prohibition is not limited to on-duty use. It prohibits a broad range of conduct—use, possession, consumption, purchase, sale, distribution, transfer, and being "under the influence" of a "[d]rug"—and then lists multiple independent settings in which that prohibition applies. Subsections (1) through (3) of section 40.1(A) address the 14 settings the trial court emphasized. The same provision, however, includes an additional and distinct prohibition in subsection (5): employees are prohibited from using drugs "at any time while employed by Hillsborough County Fire Rescue, other than alcohol or prescribed medications." The trial court's repeated characterization of section 40.1(A) as a "workplace only" rule nullifies subsection (5) and impermissibly ignores the "at any time while employed" language. That approach is not permissible as a matter of interpretation. Courts must construe text so as to give effect to all of its material terms, rather than adopting a reading that renders an express clause inoperative. See Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 876 So. 2d at 654. And the "at any time while employed" language is not an idle appendage. In a public safety setting—and particularly for first responders who may be subject to call-back and emergency deployment—such language reasonably reflects an expectation of continuous fitness and readiness, not merely the absence of observed impairment during scheduled duty hours. The order's analysis, by imposing a workplace-only limitation that the text does not contain, substitutes the trial court's narrower rule for the broader rule adopted in the CBA. D. The Florida Constitution and Section 381.986 Do Not Create an Accommodation Mandate The trial court's constitutional analysis reflects a similar inversion of the actual operative text. Quoting the limitation clause of article X, section 29(c)(6) of the Florida Constitution—"[n]othing in this section shall require any accommodation of any on-site medical use of marijuana in any . . . place of education or employment, or of smoking medical marijuana in any public place"—the trial court reasoned that the constitutional provision "therefore requires people be able to use medical marijuana in private." The order goes further, stating, "The pertinent 15 section requires that 'Qualified Patients' be allowed to use medical marijuana off site and employers are required to make accommodations," invoking expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See Crews v. Fla. Pub. Emps. Council 79, AFSCME, 113 So. 3d 1063, 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (describing expressio unius as "the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of the other" (citing Smalley Transp. Co. v. Moed's Transfer Co., 373 So. 2d 55, 56 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979))). That is precisely backwards. What the trial court did was manufacture an affirmative accommodation mandate solely by negative implication: because article X, section 29(c)(6) says that nothing in the amendment "shall require any accommodation" of medical use in a place of employment, the court reasoned that the amendment therefore requires employers to accommodate off-duty use. But the expressio unius canon is not a spell for transmogrifying a no-duty clause into a yes-duty command. At most, it is a cautious inference that applies only in narrow settings—where the thing specified can reasonably be treated as an exhaustive expression of "all that shares in the grant or the prohibition involved." See Alachua County v. Watson, 333 So. 3d 162, 172 (Fla. 2022) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (2012)); see also Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 381 (2013) ("The force of any negative implication . . . depends on context."); Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (explaining that the expressio unius canon "has force only when the items expressed are members of an 'associated group or series' " (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002))). And the caution is heightened—not relaxed—when the court is asked to find implied commands in constitutional text. See Taylor v. 16 Dorsey, 19 So. 2d 876, 881 (Fla. 1944) (explaining expressio unius "should be sparingly used in construing the constitution"). Here, the relevant sentence is not an "associated group or series" of accommodation rules inviting an inference about what employers must permit when employees are off-site. It is a limitation clause—written in the negative—that removes any affirmative mandate to accommodate medical use. Courts have rejected precisely the move the trial court here made: bootstrapping a positive obligation from a "nothing . . . shall be construed as requiring" disclaimer. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985) ("We think that this section simply does not give rise to the negative implication which respondents seek to draw from it."). And our supreme court has recently cautioned against using expressio unius as an "editorial device" to manufacture rights or duties that the text does not actually grant. See Fla. Atl. Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Harbor Branch Oceanographic Inst. Found., Inc., 423 So. 3d 842, 851 (Fla. 2025). Applied here, the trial court's negative implication reasoning does not interpret the amendment; it rewrites it. Florida's implementing statute underscores the same point. Section 381.986 expressly preserves employer authority: it "does not limit the ability of an employer to establish, continue, or enforce a drug- free workplace program or policy." § 381.986(15)(a). Subsection (15)(b) then adds two distinct no-duty rules, phrased in the disjunctive: the statute "does not require an employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any workplace or any employee working while under the influence of marijuana." § 381.986(15)(b) (emphasis added). The first clause speaks to accommodation of the "medical use of marijuana" as a workplace matter—i.e., as a term or condition of employment within the employer's workplace regime. The legislature did 17 not say "on-site"; it chose the broader formulation "in any workplace," which naturally aligns with subsection (15)(a)'s preservation of an employer's ability to "establish, continue, or enforce" a drug-free workplace "program or policy." Read in that context, "in any workplace" is not fairly understood as a mere geographic limitation; it refers to the employer's workplace rules governing fitness for duty—including testing, return-to-duty requirements, and discipline—and makes clear that the statute does not compel employers to create a medical marijuana exception to those rules. The second clause of subsection (15)(b) does separate work. It does not address the employer's right to refuse accommodation of medical marijuana use generally; it provides that an employer is not required to accommodate "any employee working while under the influence of marijuana." § 381.986(15)(b). That phrasing captures performance of work wherever it occurs—including on-site work, off-site responses, travel between locations, operation of vehicles, and other duties that may occur outside a fixed "workplace" in the geographic sense. Treating either clause as merely a restatement of the other would collapse materially different language and would, in practical effect, delete one of the statute's two disjunctive limitations. Florida courts do not construe statutes by reading one clause out of existence simply because another clause addresses a related subject. Instead, we apply the whole text and antisurplusage principles: we "give effect to 'every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible,' " and we avoid interpretations that render a coequal provision "meaningless." See Edwards v. Thomas, 229 So. 3d 277, 284–85 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Quarantello v. Leroy, 977 So. 2d 648, 651–52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)); Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 365–68 18 (Fla. 2005). That admonition has real bite here because the two clauses use different objects and do different work: the first speaks to the "medical use of marijuana" as a workplace accommodation issue, while the second separately addresses accommodating "any employee working while under the influence." See § 381.986(15)(b). Reading either clause as surplus is not harmonization; it is judicial excision. The better reading—and the one consistent with the statute's plain text and structure—is that the legislature preserved an employer's discretion to refuse accommodation of medical marijuana at all in the workplace and separately preserved an employer's discretion to refuse accommodation for an employee working under the influence. See § 381.986(15)(b). Even if we assume that the first clause of section 381.986(15)(b)— "does not require an employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any workplace"—were limited to on-site workplace accommodation, that assumption would not displace the bargained-for, more restrictive substance abuse rules that were adopted for this safety- sensitive bargaining unit. Here, the CBA expressly governs the "terms and conditions of employment" for firefighters like Mr. Giambrone and prohibits drug use "at any time while employed" by Fire Rescue.7 Employers must implement such ratified CBA terms even when they are more specific—and therefore more restrictive—than other generally applicable employment rules. See, e.g., Hillsborough Cnty. Gov't Emps. Ass'n v. Hillsborough Cnty. Aviation Auth., 522 So. 2d 358, 363 (Fla. 1988) (holding that "a public employer must implement a ratified 7 In the instant case, Mr. Giambrone testified that, during the time he was actively employed, he smoked "a half a joint to a joint two to three times a day." 19 collective bargaining agreement with respect to wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment" and explaining that "[t]he art of collective bargaining is one of give and take" and that employees may "forfeit some benefit to which they were otherwise entitled in order to gain" others). And once the parties have made that bargain, courts do not recalibrate it based on their own view of what would be a better policy outcome. When the contract language is clear, "the contracting parties are bound by those terms, and a court is powerless to rewrite the contract to make it more reasonable or advantageous for one of the contracting parties." See Emergency Assocs. of Tampa, P.A. v. Sassano, 664 So. 2d 1000, 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (citing Med. Ctr. Health Plan v. Brick, 572 So. 2d 548, 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)). Nor does article X, section 29 transform a state law protection against Florida criminal or civil sanctions into a constitutional entitlement to hold a particular public safety job on judicially rewritten terms. The County relies heavily on the First District's decision in Velez Ortiz v. Department of Corrections, 368 So. 3d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023), which is instructive on this point. There, the court emphasized that it was not deciding "the extent of a qualified patient's right to use medicinal marijuana," but rather "whether Mr. Velez Ortiz has a right to use medicinal marijuana while being employed as a correctional officer." Id. at 34 n.2. The court held the termination lawful because continued marijuana use was incompatible with the statutory conditions of correctional officer certification, including the obligation to maintain "good moral character." Id. at 34–35.8 While the certification 8 Florida imposes a similar character-based qualification on firefighters. See § 633.412(4), Fla. Stat. (2019) (requiring firefighter 20 requirements and operational demands of correctional officers differ from those of fire rescue employees, the underlying principle carries force here: Florida's medical marijuana provisions do not constitutionalize continued public employment, and they do not prohibit an employer—or a collectively bargained-for agreement—from imposing and enforcing stringent fitness-for-duty standards in a safety-sensitive setting. E. The Trial Court's Interpretative Chain Breaks at Every Link Stepping back, the trial court's order depends on an interpretive chain that breaks at every link. It first expands the CBA's definition of "Prescription or Nonprescription Medication" beyond the limiting language the parties chose—treating a registry-based authorization for restricted patient dispensing as the equivalent of a "prescription" under chapter 893 or as an over-the-counter medication "authorized . . . for general distribution and use without a prescription." It then narrows the operative prohibitions by treating the substance abuse restrictions as essentially applicable in the physical workplace only, notwithstanding the additional "at any time while employed" prohibition and the parties' bargained-for definition of "Impaired" a