Full Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed April 22, 2020. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D19-1912 Lower Tribunal No. 18-22140 ________________ Nerissa Jenkins (Curry), Appellant, vs. Jesse Jenkins Jr., Appellee. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Maria Elena Verde, Judge. Nerissa Jenkins (Curry), in proper person. Appellee precluded from filing an answer brief and from oral argument. Before EMAS, C.J., and SALTER and LOBREE, JJ. PER CURIAM. Nerissa Curry (formerly known as Nerissa Jenkins; “Ms. Curry”) appeals the final judgment dissolving her marriage to Jesse Jenkins Jr. (“Mr. Jenkins”). Ms. Curry has filed a pro se initial brief. Mr. Jenkins was given an opportunity to file an answer brief but did not do so and has been precluded from doing so and from oral argument. Ms. Curry’s contentions express unhappiness and anger regarding the process and outcome of her dissolution. In carefully reviewing the record and her initial brief, we do find one point requiring an amendment to the final judgment. The trial court found that the marriage was of “short-term” duration. As argued by Ms. Curry and confirmed by the dates of the marriage and the filing of the petition for dissolution, the marriage was presumptively a “moderate-term” marriage. Section 61.08(4), Florida Statutes (2018). The record contains nothing to rebut that presumption. The amendment on that point, however, does not alter the substance or correctness of the other findings and conclusions within the final judgment.1 The home acquired by Ms. Curry before the marriage was sold and the proceeds were received and disbursed by her. There was no competent evidence presented regarding any employment or assets as to Mr. Jenkins. The parties’ two children had attained their majority before the dissolution proceeding, so that child support and parental timesharing were not before the court. 1 “As a ‘gray area’ or ‘moderate-term marriage’ under section 61.08(4), there is no presumption for or against permanent alimony.” Addie v. Coale, 120 So. 3d 44, 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). 2 Ms. Curry’s argument that the parties’ adult children were dependent upon her and needed an extended period of child support, which she proposed should be paid by Mr. Jenkins, finds no support in the applicable statutory or decisional law. Finally, and as is unfortunately often the case when both parties to a dissolution action have modest financial resources, neither party to the dissolution action arranged for a court reporter to transcribe the non-jury trial, and neither party provided or proposed a statement of the proceedings as permitted by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200(b)(5). This precludes a more detailed review of the trial court’s factual determinations. Prymus v. Prymus, 753 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (affirming final judgment of dissolution because the “[the appellant] has not provided us with a transcript, or proper substitute of the final hearing below”). We affirm the final judgment in all respects except the conclusion regarding the short-term duration of the marriage. We remand the case to the trial court to amend the final judgment as specified above. That amendment is ministerial based on the absence of any record evidence supporting an award of alimony, and may be accomplished without the need for further notice or hearing. Affirmed in part and remanded with instructions. 3