Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT JESSICA STOUT, Appellant, v. LORETTA CASSITY, trustee for the Loretta Cassity Revocable Trust, and LORETTA CASSITY, individually, Appellees. No. 2D2025-1111 August 28, 2026 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Amy M. Williams, Judge. Jessie L. Harrell of The Harrell Firm, Jacksonville, for Appellant. Caryn L. Bellus of Kubicki Draper, P.A., Miami, for Appellees. KHOUZAM, Judge. Following a jury trial, Tenant/Plaintiff Jessica Stout timely appeals a final judgment entered in favor of Landlord/Defendant Loretta Cassity, both in her individual capacity and as trustee for her trust. On appeal, Tenant frames two issues, challenging the exclusion of evidence at trial and the denial of a postverdict juror interview. We agree with Tenant that the trial court erred in both rulings. Although in the particular posture of this case a reversal on the evidentiary issue moots the juror interview issue, we write to explain our reasoning on both. BACKGROUND Tenant rented a residential unit from Landlord. The first time it rained after moving in, Tenant reported hearing a dripping sound from the ceiling. In response, Landlord's son performed some maintenance and repair work, although the parties dispute the nature and extent of it. Later, after a heavy storm, Tenant reported to Landlord a leak from the kitchen ceiling. Landlord's son came to inspect the leak. Although the parties also dispute the nature and extent of the leak, there is no dispute that at least some water came out in Landlord's son's presence. Either to investigate the leak or to drain accumulated water, Landlord's son grabbed a broom handle and poked a hole in the ceiling. Once again, the parties dispute how much water came out of the new hole. But everyone agrees that Landlord's son left shortly thereafter, without performing any further investigation or maintenance. The parties also dispute whether Landlord's son warned Tenant about potential danger from the ceiling with the new hole. Landlord contended her son said, "Don't walk under it, and I'll be back tomorrow to patch the hole," whereas Tenant denied that any warnings were given. A few minutes after Landlord's son left, Tenant was standing in the kitchen when a portion of the ceiling collapsed and fell on her head. Tenant does not remember the collapse itself, but her fiancée found her lying on the floor on her back, covered in ceiling debris. He helped her up, cleaned her off, and took her to the emergency room. Yet again, the parties dispute the nature and extent of the material that fell from the ceiling, as well as the nature and extent of the resulting injuries. 2 I. Juror Interview At trial, the court performed the initial voir dire questioning. In doing so, it emphasized the importance of full and open honesty by the prospective jurors. Among other things, the court explained: There are no right or wrong answers to the questions that will be asked of you. The only thing I ask is that you answer the questions as frankly and as honestly and as completely as you can. You have taken an oath to answer all questions truthfully and completely and you must do so. Remaining silent when you have information you should have disclosed is a violation of that oath as well. (Emphasis added.) The court repeated this point several times. When the court first asked if any members of the panel could not be fair and impartial, several people disclosed that they were biased either for, or against, landlords. Each was ultimately stricken for cause. Tenant's counsel began his questioning by again emphasizing the importance of honesty and openness. He acknowledged that the prospective jurors might experience some anxiety from being so open with strangers in court, but asked them to do so anyway because the process "demands brutal honesty." When counsel asked the venire members if they could do so, nobody expressed disagreement. Later during the questioning, Tenant's counsel asked: "Anyone have any experience in being a landlord or in property management? Anybody have experience in those fields?" One prospective juror answered affirmatively, candidly admitting that she "tend[ed] to have a little bias toward one side over the other." After further questioning, counsel thanked the prospective juror, "because that's exactly the sort of honesty I ask for." She was ultimately stricken for cause. Tenant's counsel asked if anyone else had similar feelings, and another prospective juror responded. During follow-up questioning, this 3 prospective juror disclosed that he owned property that was presently being rented and that it was a valid concern whether his experience in renting property out to others might tilt the scales in one direction or another. This prospective juror was also later stricken for cause. Tenant's counsel then asked for "[a]nyone else with property management experience?" Another prospective juror answered that she had owned two or three rental properties and had "seen good tenants and not so good tenants. Good landlords and not so good landlords." During follow up questioning, she maintained that her experience "on the landlord side" had not tilted the scales in either direction. Tenant ultimately exercised a peremptory strike on this prospective juror. After these exchanges, Tenant's counsel asked yet again for "[a]nybody else with property management experience?" Another prospective juror disclosed that he had previously rented out a condominium for one year before selling it. When asked, he said that his brief experience had not involved any issues "that would cause the scales to tilt one way or the other." He ultimately served on the jury. At no point during these several exchanges specifically seeking and discussing experience renting out property did Juror 335 respond, much less did she suggest that the questions were relevant to her. Rather, Juror 335's only comment during voir dire regarding landlords was when Landlord's counsel asked if she was comfortable that Landlord's duty to maintain property was only "[t]hat it doesn't have to be perfect, it has to be reasonably safe." Juror 335 agreed, and sat on the panel for trial. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for Landlord. Shortly thereafter, the empaneled jury members volunteered to answer questions by the parties. When asked why the verdict was for no liability to Landlord, Juror 335 disclosed for the first time that she had previously 4 been a landlord, but had remained quiet during questioning on that subject because she believed she was not biased and could be fair. Now aware for the first time of Juror 335's history as a landlord, Tenant moved for a juror interview and, if necessary, a new trial. The motion for juror interview identified Juror 335 by her name, but did not include her address. Tenant supported the motions with two affidavits from witnesses to the postverdict exchange. The court summarily denied relief, without waiting for Landlord to respond. II. Expert Evidence The pretrial order did not require the preparation of any expert reports. Rather, in that regard it expressly obligated the parties only to produce copies of any written reports that retained experts had prepared. In September 2024, several months before trial was set to begin, Tenant disclosed as an expert witness R.J. Koning, a state certified contractor with expertise in building matters including roofing and plumbing. Tenant disclosed Mr. Koning was to testify to "his opinions regarding the ceiling collapse, the weight of the ceiling section that collapsed in wet conditions, and the condition of the ceiling upon examination." Tenant also disclosed that he would "testify that the condition of the ceiling collapse was a result of this incident." Landlord did not seek to depose Mr. Koning. Rather, a month later in October, Landlord served expert interrogatories and requests for production. Tenant objected, including on the basis that Landlord had already far exceeded the total number of permissible interrogatories, without having sought leave to request more. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.340(a)(3) ("The interrogatories must not exceed 30, including all subparts, unless the court permits a larger number on motion and notice 5 and for good cause."). Landlord did not challenge Tenant's objections at that time, nor did Landlord seek leave to exceed thirty interrogatories. Prior to a November 2024 arbitration, Tenant produced a two-page document titled "Formal compendium of confidential data." The short, generously spaced document summarizes Mr. Koning's understanding of the facts, his investigation, and some conclusions. It does not call itself a "report," nor does it say that it sets forth Mr. Koning's trial opinions. What it does say is that the structure had two ceilings: an original upper ceiling and a second lower one installed some time later, with a 3/4-inch gap between them. Mr. Koning determined that the "two ceilings . . . allowed a substantial amount of water to chamber within this . . . void and the photographic evidence indicates this was the point of collapse." It also estimates that "the weight of the ceiling section when it collapsed in a wet condition [was] a minimum of 240 pounds." Once again, Landlord did not seek to depose Mr. Koning, nor did Landlord request leave to submit further interrogatories. Rather, roughly three months later in February 2025—less than two weeks before trial— Landlord filed an "emergency" motion to compel responses to the expert discovery served back in October 2024. Tenant responded, again identifying that Landlord had already exceeded the permissible number of interrogatories but had not sought leave for more. Tenant also identified that Landlord could have obtained this information by deposing Mr. Koning, but for whatever reason had declined to do so. Tenant maintained that, consequently, any risk of surprise to Landlord was self-imposed by failure to timely and properly seek discovery. 1 1 Our record does not contain an order ruling on this motion, but neither party has suggested that it was granted. 6 Then, just four days before trial, Landlord moved to strike Mr. Koning's testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Landlord contended that Mr. Koning's opinions as stated in the two-page document were mere assumptions and unreliable. The court heard Landlord's Daubert motion before jury selection. After Tenant pointed out that Landlord had declined to depose Mr. Koning, Landlord responded without citation to any authority that "the defense is under no obligation to take Mr. Koning's deposition when he's done a report." According to Landlord, once Tenant produced the two- page document, Landlord's duty to seek expert discovery ceased, and anything not included therein was inadmissible at trial as undisclosed. Landlord maintained: "[I]t is not [our] obligation to go take the deposition and [flesh] out his opinions for him. He chose to write a report." The court declined to strike Mr. Koning as a witness, but ruled that his opinions on the weight of the ceiling debris must be proffered outside the presence of the jury. The parties then agreed that Landlord would depose Mr. Koning during an already-scheduled one-day break in trial. After deposing Mr. Koning during trial, when he was called to testify Landlord continued to complain of surprise in the form of "what I would consider to be new opinions." Tenant responded that Mr. Koning had long ago been properly disclosed and that the two-page "compendium" was not a "report"; there had never been a request or a directive to prepare or produce one. Tenant reiterated once again that Landlord had never engaged in any proper discovery on these points, despite having had ample information and opportunity to do so. Ultimately, the trial court limited Mr. Koning's testimony to the contents of the two-page document shared in advance of arbitration. 7 Even then, the court construed the document narrowly, for example excluding any testimony "that the double ceiling is faulty" even though Mr. Koning's document had expressly stated that the double ceiling was what had allowed water to accumulate and was the point of collapse. In its initial ruling, the court said that it would permit Mr. Koning to discuss the poke-hole in the bottom ceiling because that fact was in the document and had also come out before the jury. But, when Mr. Koning began to testify that ordinarily that would be accomplished by drilling a hole into the ceiling rather than poking one with a broom handle, the court sustained Landlord's objection on the basis that it was also a new opinion because it was not stated in the document. Likewise, Landlord objected when Mr. Koning was asked about the effect of the major storm that preceded the ceiling collapse. Calling it "about the third violation of the Court's ruling about his report," Landlord said such testimony must be excluded as undisclosed, even though the document stated that the collapse occurred "after a rain event" and even though Landlord's counsel said she knew Mr. Koning's opinion on the matter from the deposition taken earlier during trial. The trial court rejected Tenant's response that this could have been the object of proper discovery and that Mr. Koning "is certainly well qualified as a roofing expert to indicate whether or not [the storm] should have played any part in this." According to the court, there was no "notification to the defense of a discussion by this witness of the weather." The court also said such testimony "tends to make him look like a causation witness . . . which he has not been notified to be a causation expert." The court made this ruling about a lack of notification on causation even though Landlord's earlier Daubert argument had expressly challenged Mr. Koning as a causation witness. 8 Under these rulings, Tenant was precluded from arguing to the jury that there was a problem in allowing water accumulation between the two ceilings, that Landlord's son exacerbated the problem by poking a hole in the lower ceiling with a broom handle, or that Landlord's son should have taken different steps to address the issue. Rather, the closing arguments on liability focused on prior leaks and whether Landlord should have replaced the roof based on its age. After the jury found for Landlord, the trial court entered final judgment in her favor, and this appeal timely followed. ANALYSIS I. Juror Interview "The standard of review for an order on a motion for juror interviews is abuse of discretion." Pembroke Lakes Mall Ltd. v. McGruder, 137 So. 3d 418, 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Sterling v. Feldbaum, 980 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)). A trial court abuses its discretion in denying a motion for juror interview where the moving party establishes a right to such relief. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Lawrence, 65 So. 3d 52, 56 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). "The Florida Constitution guarantees civil litigants the right of trial by an impartial jury." Frogel v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 305 So. 3d 793, 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (citing art. I, § 22, Fla. Const. ("The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate.")). To protect this right, trial courts are obligated to excuse any prospective jurors for whom there is a reasonable doubt about their impartiality. See id. at 798 (citing Irimi v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 So. 3d 789, 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)). The mechanism that allows litigants to discover and investigate potential juror bias is voir dire. "The purpose of voir dire is to 'obtain a 9 fair and impartial jury, whose minds are free of all interest, bias, or prejudice . . . .' " Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 13 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Ferreiro v. State, 936 So. 2d 1140, 1142 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)). To that end, "[l]awyers representing clients in litigation are entitled to ask, and receive truthful and complete responses to, the relevant questions which they pose to prospective jurors." Roberts ex rel. Est. of Roberts v. Tejada, 814 So. 2d 334, 342 (Fla. 2002) (citing Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185, 192 (Fla. 1953)). Doing so allows litigants "to evaluate this information in determining whether to seek to excuse prospective jurors on peremptory challenge or for cause." Id. In turn, Florida law has long held that prospective jurors have an integral duty to answer questions fully and truthfully in voir dire: It is the duty of a juror to make full and truthful answers to such questions as are asked him, neither falsely stating any fact, nor concealing any material matter, since full knowledge of all material and relevant matters is essential to the fair and just exercise of the right to challenge either peremptorily or for cause. De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. 1995) (quoting Loftin, 67 So. 2d at 192). A prospective juror's failure to disclose relevant information requested in voir dire is a breach of this duty that materially impedes the discovery of bias, thereby risking violating a constitutional right. See id. ("A juror who falsely misrepresents his interest or situation, or conceals a material fact relevant to the controversy, is guilty of misconduct, and such misconduct, is prejudicial to the party, for it impairs his right to challenge." (quoting Loftin, 67 So. 2d at 192)). Our supreme court has explained that "[i]n determining whether a juror's nondisclosure of information during voir dire warrants a new trial, courts have generally utilized a three-part test." Id. (citing Skiles v. 10 Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 267 So. 2d 379, 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)). The three prongs of this test are: First, the complaining party must establish that the information is relevant and material to jury service in the case. Second, that the juror concealed the information during questioning. Lastly, that the failure to disclose the information was not attributable to the complaining party's lack of diligence. Id. (citing Skiles, 267 So. 2d at 380). But "[i]n contrast to what is needed to prove entitlement to a new trial, a party seeking only a juror interview must set forth sworn factual allegations that, if true, would require a trial court to order a new trial." Lawrence, 65 So. 3d at 56 (citing Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Maler, 579 So. 2d 97, 100 (Fla. 1991)). "A juror interview is warranted if the moving party demonstrates reasonable grounds to believe that nondisclosure of relevant and material information occurred." Id. "When such reasonable grounds exist, it is appropriate to conduct a juror interview so that the court has the evidentiary predicate necessary to decide whether a new trial is warranted." Id.; see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(h) ("A party who believes that grounds for legal challenge to a verdict exist may move for an order permitting an interview of a juror or jurors to determine whether the verdict is subject to the challenge."). It is true that, in order to protect the jury process and the jurors themselves, "Florida law has long recognized that post-verdict juror interviews are strongly disfavored and should be rare." Huether v. Baroni, 394 So. 3d 1245, 1249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (citing Child.'s Med. Ctr., P.A. v. Kim, 221 So. 3d 664, 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)). But "even though Florida law rightly makes post-verdict juror interviews rare, where adequate proof suggests that a juror has acted improperly and contrary to lawful instructions of the trial court, an 11 interview of the offending juror is appropriate." Id. at 1251 (citing Hillsboro Mgmt., LLC v. Pagono, 112 So. 3d 620, 624 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)); see also De La Rosa, 659 So. 2d at 241 (collecting some of the "numerous" reversals "for jury interviews or new trials, where . . . information relevant to jury service was not disclosed"). Here, the trial court should have granted the juror interview because Tenant satisfied all three prongs of the De La Rosa test. With respect to the first question, materiality: No "bright line" test for materiality has been established and materiality must be based on the facts and circumstances of each case. Nondisclosure is considered material if it is substantial and important so that if the facts were known, [a party] may have been influenced to peremptorily challenge the juror from the jury. Roberts, 814 So. 2d at 341 (citations omitted) (quoting Garnett v. McClellan, 767 So. 2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)). This was a landlord/tenant case with many disputed facts. Particularly given the exclusion of expert evidence discussed in the second issue, the resolution of multiple material factual questions came down to "he said/she said" contests between the parties' lay witnesses. Given these circumstances, Tenant's counsel spent several pages of the voir dire transcript asking potential jurors about landlord and property management experience that might have yielded some bias. Two of these potential jurors were removed for cause, and Tenant also exercised her last peremptory challenge on another prospective juror who disclosed landlord experience. With that strike, Juror 335 moved onto the panel, despite later disclosing similar (but unspecified) experience. As the voir dire transcript makes clear, Tenant's counsel considered juror experience as a landlord material enough to raise repeatedly and follow up on extensively. Further, he then actually 12 exercised a peremptory challenge as to one person with landlord experience, even though she expressly disclaimed any resulting bias. In the context of this case, that was reasonable, and we conclude that Juror 335's history as a landlord was relevant and material. The next prong, concealment, is straightforward on this record. That is, Tenant's affidavits establish that Juror 335 volunteered—after trial—that she had concealed her own history as a landlord during voir dire by deciding to remain quiet when asked about it. Not only was that an admission of concealment, but also, of violating the oath the venire took to be open and truthful, which the court had thoroughly explained. Likewise, the final prong was also satisfied, as the concealment was not due to any lack of diligence by Tenant. Tenant's counsel expressly and repeatedly asked for landlord or property management experience. And, the resulting colloquies—which probed the responding prospective jurors' experiences as landlords—further confirmed what information was being sought. See, e.g., Hillsboro, 112 So. 3d at 624 (focusing on "whether the explanations provided by the judge and counsel regarding the kinds of responses which were sought would reasonably have been understood by the subject jurors to encompass the undisclosed information" (quoting Roberts, 814 So. 2d at 343)). Unlike other issues such as litigation history, Landlord has not suggested this information about Juror 335's history was otherwise available to Tenant. On appeal, Landlord contends that Tenant's juror interview motion was facially invalid because it lacked Juror 335's address. Landlord points to rule 1.431(h), which states that a motion for juror interview "must state the name and address of each juror to be interviewed." Landlord has not cited—and we have not found—any authority holding that omitting a juror's address automatically dooms a motion for 13 juror interview, much less in circumstances like the one here where the opposing party has not alleged any difficulty in identifying the juror or any other potential prejudice from the omission. Further, the same rule Landlord invokes also states that a judge must enter an order on the motion only "[a]fter notice and hearing." Id. No such hearing occurred here; instead, the court summarily denied Tenant's motion without waiting for a response from Landlord. This was error. At bottom, the trial court erred by denying the motion to allow Tenant to explore, for the first time, Juror 335's concealed history as a landlord, disclosed only after returning a verdict in Landlord's favor. If our ruling on the expert evidence issue did not require a new trial, then we would reverse and remand for a juror interview. II. Expert Evidence Tenant also contends that the trial court erroneously limited Mr. Koning's testimony to the contents of the two-page document and, even then, only a narrow reading of it. Tenant asserts that any surprise to Landlord about the expert's opinions was self-imposed by Landlord's failure to engage in any timely, proper discovery on them. Landlord responds that the trial court correctly excluded the testimony because the document was a "report" that was required to include every opinion he might give. According to Landlord, once Tenant produced the two-page document, Landlord's expert discovery obligations ceased, and anything not included therein was improperly disclosed and thus constituted unfair surprise under Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981). As we now explain, we agree with Tenant. The exclusion of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Thorne, 110 So. 3d 66, 70-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (citing First Republic Corp. of Am. v. Hayes, 431 So. 2d 624, 626-27 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)). The same is true for orders denying motions for new trial. Campbell v. Griffith, 971 So. 2d 232, 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Here, there is no dispute that Tenant timely and properly disclosed Mr. Koning as an expert witness, including the areas of his expertise and the subject matter of his testimony. Nor is there any dispute that, months before trial, Tenant produced the two-page document outlining Mr. Koning's "opinions concerning what caused the ceiling to collapse." Likewise, there is no dispute that, after receiving these disclosures, Landlord made no attempt to depose Mr. Koning before the trial began. Further, it is undisputed that, although Landlord did serve some pretrial interrogatories addressing Mr. Koning, Landlord had by then already exceeded the total number of interrogatories permitted by the rules of procedure and never sought leave of court to serve more. Against this backdrop, Landlord's claim of unfair surprise rings hollow. Landlord had every opportunity to timely and properly seek discovery about Mr. Koning's opinions, but for whatever reason declined to do so. Then, even after actually deposing Mr. Koning during trial, Landlord continued to claim surprise about his opinions on the ceiling collapse, which the trial court credited. This was error. Although neither the parties' briefs nor our independent research have revealed any authorities with these particular facts, we find two cases instructive on the issue of the exclusion of Mr. Koning's testimony. In Dos Santos v. Carlson, 806 So. 2d 539, 540-41 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), the defendant made an insufficient expert disclosure that was too "cryptic" to satisfy the pretrial order. The issue was not raised until trial, where the court excluded the expert on the basis that defendant had also failed a continuing obligation to update discovery. Id. at 540. 15 Though the Third District explained that no such continuing obligation exists, its reversing opinion focused instead on the plaintiff's discovery conduct. Id. at 540-41. Acknowledging that the defendant's disclosure had been deficient, the court said, "However, it is incumbent upon opposing counsel to raise a timely objection." Id. at 540. The Third District explained that, once the defendant made the deficient disclosure, the plaintiff could have deposed the expert, could have propounded interrogatories, and could have engaged in proper pretrial motions practice to exclude or narrow the opinions for trial. Id. at 540-41. "But he could not quietly sit back in blissful ignorance, then successfully deprive the opponent of a crucial witness." Id. at 541. More recent is the Fourth District's decision in Aponte v. Wal-Mart Stores East, 417 So. 3d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025). There, after the plaintiff had timely disclosed a treating doctor to testify as both a fact and expert witness, on the first day of trial the defendant moved to strike some of the doctor's testimony, claiming surprise by the doctor's deposition because it included opinions formed after a second examination of the plaintiff. Id. at 18. The trial court agreed in part and limited the doctor's testimony to only the first examination. Id. In reversing and remanding for a new trial, the Fourth District held that the "[d]efendant's prejudice claim is unsubstantiated." Id. at 19. Although the plaintiff had timely disclosed the witness, "[d]efendant waited until five days before trial to depose him." Id. at 19-20. "As such, any last-minute 'surprise' was self-inflicted." Id. at 20 (citing White v. Ring Power Corp., 261 So. 3d 689, 700 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)). The Fourth District explained that "[a]bsent evidence of a party's willful failure to comply or extensive prejudice to the opposition, the exclusion of testimony constitutes an abuse of discretion." Id. at 20 16 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Nob Hill Fam. Chiro., 328 So. 3d 1, 7 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)). Thus, where the defendant had had every opportunity to discover the challenged testimony and had not established bad faith by plaintiff, excluding the testimony was reversible error even though it had been disclosed only five days before trial. Id. Likewise here, any surprise at trial by Landlord about Mr. Koning's opinions was squarely self-inflicted and entirely avoidable. As in Dos Santos and Aponte, it was incumbent upon Landlord to conduct proper pretrial expert discovery in the first instance, and the failure to do so is consequential. Although the court here did not exclude Mr. Koning entirely, its ruling excluded major components of his testimony— including on the hotly disputed issue of causation—that no other identified witness could provide. The exclusion of such testimony central to Tenant's case was unquestionably harmful. Whatever "surprise" Landlord perceived regarding Mr. Koning's opinions at trial was due to Landlord's own failure to use any of the many tools at her disposal to properly seek them before trial. Moreover, Landlord was permitted to cure these discovery failures by actually deposing Mr. Koning during a break in trial, yet she continued to claim surprise even after doing so. On this record, any "prejudice" to Landlord was not attributable to Tenant and, in any event, is not the kind that Binger protects against. See, e.g., Aponte, 417 So. 3d at 19 ("Binger's purpose is to prevent trial by ambush . . . ."). Despite the foregoing, Landlord's argument both below and on appeal has focused almost entirely on the characterization of Mr. Koning's document as a "report" and a purported resulting obligation to set forth all of his opinions therein or face exclusion. But no order in the 17 record required any such thing, nor has Landlord cited to a single legal authority that supports that argument. Rather, Landlord relies primarily on Suarez-Burgos v. Morhaim, 745 So. 2d 368, 370-72 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), where the Fourth District affirmed the exclusion of expert opinions that were not included in an expert's report. But that case specifically addressed a medical examination under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.360(b), which covers the "Examination of Persons" and expressly "requires the disclosure of all opinions and conclusions reached by the expert which the expert plans to testify to at trial." 745 So. 2d at 370-71. It specifically held that "a litigant who receives a report of the examination conducted under the rule should be confident that the report lists all of the major conclusions of the examining expert." Id. at 371 (emphasis added). As a construction expert, Mr. Koning did not examine any persons here, so rule 1.360(b) is not implicated, and Suarez-Burgos's application of it does not govern. At bottom, whether the document was a "report," a "compendium," or something else, it was timely produced and Landlord never properly sought the expert's opinions. Landlord's failure to seek this information was not a valid basis to exclude Tenant's expert's opinions at trial, particularly after Landlord deposed the expert during a break in trial. Because in the context of this case that exclusion was erroneous and harmful, we must reverse and remand for a new trial on proper evidence. CONCLUSION Both of the rulings challenged on appeal constitute reversible error. But because the appropriate relief for the evidentiary error is a new trial on proper evidence before a new jury, the erroneous denial of the juror interview is now moot. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion. 18 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. MORRIS and LABRIT, JJ., Concur. __________________________ Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 19