Universal X Rays, Corp. A/A/O Alejandro Botero Cano v. Infinity Auto Insurance Company
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledSeptember 23, 2026
Docket3D2025-1902
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed September 23, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D25-1902
Lower Tribunal No. 23-3360-SP-05
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Universal X Rays, Corp., a/a/o Alejandro Botero Cano,
Appellant,
vs.
Infinity Auto Insurance Company,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Luis Perez-
Medina, Judge.
Robert J. Lee, P.A., and Robert J. Lee, for appellant.
Law Offices of Terry M. Torres & Associates, and Robert Phaneuf, for
appellee.
Before LINDSEY, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.
MILLER, J.
Appellant, Universal X Rays Corp., as the assignee of Alejandro Botero
Cano, the insured, appeals from a trial court order adjudicating cross-
motions for summary judgment in favor of appellee, Infinity Auto Insurance
Company, the insurer. Our de novo review of the record yields no error in
the finding below that the summary judgment evidence established that
Infinity exhausted the policy limits of the insured’s personal injury protection
(“PIP”) benefits by sequentially paying valid claims in good faith. See GEICO
Indem. Co. v. Gables Ins. Recovery, Inc., 159 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 3d DCA
2014) (“Once the PIP benefits are exhausted through the payment of valid
claims, an insurer has no further liability on unresolved, pending claims,
absent bad faith in the handling of the claim by the insurance company.”
(quoting Northwoods Sports Med. & Physical Rehab., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 137 So. 3d 1049, 1057 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014))); Progressive
Am. Ins. Co. v. Stand-Up MRI of Orlando, 990 So. 2d 3, 8 (Fla. 5th DCA
2008) (holding the insurer was not required to pay PIP benefits to provider
because insured’s coverage had been exhausted); see also Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.510(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.”); Whitlow v. Tallahassee Mem’l HealthCare,
Inc., 421 So. 3d 729, 735–36 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (“One of the principal
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purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims or defenses.” (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323–24 (1986))). We therefore affirm.
Affirmed.
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