Ligia Ortega v. Fredrik Wood
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledApril 9, 2021
Docket1D20-1534
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D20-1534
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LIGIA ORTEGA,
Appellant,
v.
FREDRIK WOOD,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
Robert K. Groeb, Judge.
April 9, 2021
WINOKUR, J.
Ligia Ortega appeals the trial court’s decisions concerning the
marital home and the income of her former husband, Fredrik
Wood, in the final judgment of dissolution of marriage. We find no
merit in her arguments concerning the partition of the marital
home and affirm without further discussion. However, the trial
court erred in its determination of Wood’s income.
Wood is an optician who owns an optical business with his
mother. Ortega sought to impute as income the reimbursements
and in kind benefits provided by Wood’s business. The business
provided Wood with an apartment where he was living with the
couple’s minor children at no cost. Wood also used the company
card to pay for a variety of personal expenses, such as massages,
dentist appointments, physician appointments, and lab tests for
Wood, prescriptions for Wood and his children, a lawn mower that
was used for and kept at his private residence, cord blood storage
bills for the children, and products from GNC stores.
The trial court refused to consider anything provided by the
business as imputed income. Because Wood testified that the
business offered the same reimbursements to all the employees,
the trial court decided the expenditures were legitimate business
expenses and ended its analysis. The trial court also concluded the
apartment was a corporate asset of the business and likewise
ended its analysis. Because the apartment was not marketable to
third parties, the trial court would not consider its rental value.
The trial court erred in concluding that any corporate asset or
expense cannot also be imputed as income. Section 61.046(8),
Florida Statutes, defines income as “any form of payment to an
individual, regardless of source, including, but not limited to:
wages, salary, commissions and bonuses, compensation as an
independent contractor, worker’s compensation, disability
benefits, annuity and retirement benefits, pensions, dividends,
interest, royalties, trusts, and any other payments, made by any
person, private entity, federal or state government, or any unit of
local government.” The child support guidelines specify that gross
income includes “[r]eimbursed expenses or in kind payments to the
extent that they reduce living expenses.” § 61.30(2)(a)13., Fla.
Stat.
The relevant inquiry is whether the benefit is regular and
expected and whether the benefit reduces living expenses. See
Dep’t of Revenue o/b/o Shorter v. Amico, 265 So. 3d 681, 683 (Fla.
5th DCA 2019) (holding that a court should include as income
“those regular and expected employment benefits” to the extent
the court can determine how they correlate with living expenses
(citing Cozier v. Cozier, 819 So. 2d 834, 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)). It
was error not to include the former husband’s business income or
his reimbursed and in kind payments that reduced his living
expenses. See Mills v. Mills, 62 So. 3d 672, 675 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
However, where reimbursements are for business expenses
incurred by a party instead of living expenses, they are not to be
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imputed as income. See Valentine v. Van Sickle, 42 So. 3d 267, 273
(Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding husband’s per diem reimbursement
for business expenses could not be included in monthly income for
purposes of calculating alimony where funds were used to pay for
husband’s business travel and did not reduce his personal living
expenses).
Medical insurance, term life insurance, the use of a company
car, and contributions to an IRA account paid by an employer have
been found to be income. See Cozier, 819 So. 2d at 836. However,
where gifts of food, clothing, the use of a home, money for bills and
the payment of some of the children’s tuition are periodic and not
regularly provided, it is error to impute their value as income. Id.
Where the occasional use of a home was not imputed as
income under Cozier, the value of free housing has been imputed
were the benefit is expected. In Posner v. Posner, 39 So. 3d 411,
414 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), the Fourth District concluded the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in imputing the rental value of a
home provided by the husband’s parents as in kind income to the
husband. There, the husband’s parents had paid such expenses for
an extended period of time and the husband’s mother testified that
she would pay for his expenses of shelter should he need it. Id. The
trial court could infer that the parents would continue to allow
their son to live rent free until his income level increased to the
point where he could pay for his own housing. Id.
The source of the benefit, whether from Wood’s mother or from
the business, is immaterial. Nor does it matter whether he owned
the business or was merely an employee. The trial court made
several statements that illustrate its confusion. According to the
trial court, in order to be considered imputed income Ortega would
have to demonstrate that no other employees were availing
themself of the benefit. To the contrary, the fact that Wood
testified that all employees can expect to have these personal
expenses reimbursed through the company supports the
conclusion these benefits were regular and expected.
Accordingly, the trial court’s determination of Wood’s income
for alimony and child support purposes is reversed. On remand the
trial court is to evaluate in kind contributions to Wood, regardless
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of source, and impute their value as income where they are
expected and reduce Wood’s living expenses.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, REMANDED with
instructions.
B.L. THOMAS and JAY, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Adam S. Vorhis of Vorhis Legal, PLLC, Asheville, NC, for
Appellant.
John R. Nettles, Gainesville; Kristin Adamson, Tallahassee, for
Appellee.
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