Scott D. Hunter and Leslie N. Hunter v. John v. Catalano, Susan J. Catalano
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledFebruary 3, 2021
Docket2D19-2981
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
SCOTT D. HUNTER and LESLIE N. )
HUNTER, )
)
Appellants, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D19-2981
)
JOHN V. CATALANO and SUSAN )
CATALANO, )
)
Appellees. )
)
Opinion filed February 3, 2021.
Appeals from the Circuit Court for Collier
County; Hugh D. Hayes, Judge.
Phillip A. Roach, Bonita Springs; and
Anthony M. Lawhon of Anthony M.
Lawhon, P.A., Naples, for Appellants.
John I. Silverfield and Ian T. Holmes
of Holmes Fraser, P.A., Naples, for
Appellees.
MORRIS, Judge.
Scott and Leslie Hunter appeal an order dismissing their action, without
prejudice, against their neighbors, John and Susan Catalano, and their two
homeowners' associations. We agree with the Hunters that the trial court erred in
dismissing their complaint against the Catalanos because the presuit mediation
requirement in section 720.311(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), does not apply to
disputes between parcel owners or members.
The Hunters' action alleged that the Catalanos made changes to their
property that adversely affected the drainage easement between their two homes and
thus the drainage on the Hunters' property. The Hunters alleged three counts: a count
for injunctive relief, a count for breach of the associations' declarations, and a count
against the associations for breach of fiduciary duty. In each count, the Hunters alleged
twenty various violations of the associations' declarations and chapter 720. The
Catalanos and one of the associations filed separate motions to dismiss the action
alleging, among other things, that the Hunters failed to comply with the presuit
mediation requirements of section 720.311(2)(a).1 After a hearing, the trial court
granted the motions to dismiss on the basis of the Hunters' "failure to comply with
[section] 720.311" and entered a final order of dismissal without prejudice. The Hunters
now appeal.2
Section 720.311 provides in relevant part:
(1) The Legislature finds that alternative dispute
resolution has made progress in reducing court dockets and
trials and in offering a more efficient, cost-effective option to
litigation. The filing of any petition for arbitration or the
serving of a demand for presuit mediation as provided for in
this section shall toll the applicable statute of limitations. . . .
(2)(a) Disputes between an association and a parcel
owner regarding use of or changes to the parcel or the
1The other association filed a separate motion to dismiss, alleging different
bases for dismissal. The trial court did not rule on the issues raised in this motion to
dismiss, but the order on appeal states that all three defendants' motions to dismiss are
granted based on the Hunters' failure to comply with section 720.311.
2During the pendency of this appeal, the Hunters settled with both
associations and dismissed the portion of this appeal of the order that relates to the
associations.
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common areas and other covenant enforcement disputes,
disputes regarding amendments to the association
documents, disputes regarding meetings of the board and
committees appointed by the board, membership meetings
not including election meetings, and access to the official
records of the association shall be the subject of a demand
for presuit mediation served by an aggrieved party before
the dispute is filed in court. Presuit mediation proceedings
must be conducted in accordance with the applicable Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure, and these proceedings are
privileged and confidential to the same extent as court-
ordered mediation. Disputes subject to presuit mediation
under this section shall not include the collection of any
assessment, fine, or other financial obligation, including
attorney's fees and costs, claimed to be due or any action to
enforce a prior mediation settlement agreement between the
parties. Also, in any dispute subject to presuit mediation
under this section where emergency relief is required, a
motion for temporary injunctive relief may be filed with the
court without first complying with the presuit mediation
requirements of this section. After any issues regarding
emergency or temporary relief are resolved, the court may
either refer the parties to a mediation program administered
by the courts or require mediation under this section. An
arbitrator or judge may not consider any information or
evidence arising from the presuit mediation proceeding
except in a proceeding to impose sanctions for failure to
attend a presuit mediation session or to enforce a mediated
settlement agreement. Persons who are not parties to the
dispute may not attend the presuit mediation conference
without the consent of all parties, except for counsel for the
parties and a corporate representative designated by the
association. When mediation is attended by a quorum of the
board, such mediation is not a board meeting for purposes of
notice and participation set forth in s. 720.303. . . .
(Emphasis added.) Section 720.311(2)(a) expressly lists five types of disputes that are
subject to presuit mediation. The list includes "[d]isputes between an association and a
parcel owner regarding use of or changes to the parcel or the common areas and other
covenant enforcement disputes"; thus, the Hunters' disputes with the two associations
were subject to the presuit mediation requirement.
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However, the list does not include disputes between a parcel owner and
another parcel owner or disputes between a member of an association and another
member, even though such disputes are actionable under 720.305, Florida Statutes.
See ยง 720.305(1)(b) ("Actions at law or in equity, or both, to redress alleged failure or
refusal to comply with these provisions may be brought by the association or by any
member against . . . [a] member . . . ."). The language of section 720.311(2)(a) is clear
and unambiguous; it does not require that a dispute between parcel owners or members
be mediated prior to the filing of the suit. See Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 807
(Fla. 2008) ("[W]hen the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look behind
the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory
construction to ascertain intent." (alteration in original) (quoting Borden v. E.-European
Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006))). If the legislature had intended such
disputes to be subject to the presuit mediation requirement, the legislature could have
easily included language regarding "disputes between a parcel owner and another
parcel owner" or "disputes between members." Or the legislature could have stated that
all disputes filed under section 720.305 are subject to presuit mediation. But the
legislature did not do so; rather, it specifically listed five types of disputes that must be
mediated presuit, and the list does not include a dispute between parcel owners or
members. If this court were to read into the statute a requirement that disputes
between parcel owners be mediated presuit, this court would be rewriting the language
of the statute, which it is not permitted to do. See Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Fla. Mun.
Power Agency, 789 So. 2d 320, 324 (Fla. 2001) ("Under fundamental principles of
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separation of powers, courts cannot judicially alter the wording of statutes where the
Legislature clearly has not done so.").
The Catalanos point to language in section 720.311(1) and section
720.302(2) that explains the legislature's intent that an expedited process for alternative
dispute resolution will benefit members and associations. See ยง 720.311(1) ("The
Legislature finds that alternative dispute resolution has made progress in reducing court
dockets and trials and in offering a more efficient, cost-effective option to litigation. The
filing of any petition for arbitration or the serving of a demand for presuit mediation as
provided for in this section shall toll the applicable statute of limitations."); ยง 720.302(2)
("[I]n accordance with s. 720.311, the Legislature finds that homeowners' associations
and their individual members will benefit from an expedited alternative process for
resolution of election and recall disputes and presuit mediation of other disputes
involving covenant enforcement and authorizes the department to hear, administer, and
determine these disputes as more fully set forth in this chapter."). However, this general
language does not lead to the conclusion that a dispute between parcel owners or
members is subject to presuit mediation when the enumerated list in section
720.311(2)(a) does not explicitly include such disputes. The legislature generally
indicated its preference for presuit mediation, but it identified specific disputes that are
subject to the presuit mediation requirement.
In sum, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint against the
Catalanos based on the Hunters' failure to comply with the presuit mediation
requirement because the statute does not require presuit mediation of disputes between
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parcel owners or members.3 Accordingly, we reverse the order of dismissal and
remand for further proceedings.4
Reversed and remanded.
NORTHCUTT and STARGEL, JJ., Concur
3The Catalanos make much of the fact that if this court were to agree with
the Hunters' argument, the Catalanos would not be "entitled to cost-saving alternative
dispute resolution afforded to" the associations. However, this concern is moot because
after this appeal was filed, the Hunters settled with the associations.
4The Hunters also argue that section 720.311(2)(a) permitted their request
for temporary relief to be resolved by the trial court before any presuit mediation would
be required. In light of our ruling that the Hunters' dispute with the Catalanos is not
subject to presuit mediation, we need not consider this issue.
We also do not address the Catalanos' argument that the Hunters'
complaint improperly joined or commingled the claims against the three defendants
because this issue was not addressed by the trial court in the order of dismissal and is
more properly addressed on remand, especially in light of the fact that the Hunters
settled with the associations.
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