Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT VISHAL RAMJAS, Appellant, v. LISSETTE DE LA CARIDAD GONZALEZ, Appellee. No. 4D2025-2779 [September 2, 2026] Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Christopher Wigand, Judge; L.T. Case No. 062022DR007300AXXXCE. John Elias of Law Offices of John Elias, Pembroke Pines, for appellant. Nancy W. Gregoire Stamper of Birnbaum, Lippman & Gregoire, PLLC, Fort Lauderdale, and Jonny Kousa of Law Offices of Jonny Kousa, P.L., Coconut Creek, for appellee. GROSS, J. The Father, Vishal Ramjas, appeals a final order denying his supplemental petition for modification of timesharing, parenting plan, and final judgment of paternity. We affirm in part and reverse in part. First, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the Father did not prove a substantial and material change in circumstances. Second, while the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that a modification to equal timesharing was not in the child’s best interests, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing any modification whatsoever and thus denying the Father any contact with the child. Facts In this paternity proceeding, the Father initially wanted no contact with the child. In May 2022, not long after the child’s birth, the parties entered into a parenting plan that gave the Mother sole parental responsibility and sole timesharing. On June 28, 2022, the trial court entered a final judgment of paternity, incorporating the original parenting plan. Three days after the entry of the final judgment, the Father began a medical residency in New Jersey, working 80 to 100 hours a week as a physician. The child lived with the Mother in Florida. The Department of Revenue intervened in 2023, seeking an order to have the Father pay child support. In early 2025, the trial court approved a modification order establishing the Father’s child support obligation. Meanwhile, in 2024, the Father petitioned for modification, alleging that there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances since the entry of the 2022 final judgment—he was now close to completing his medical residency, so he was in a better position to have timesharing with the child. In a May 2025 filing, the Father stated that he had completed his residency program and would be “residing in Florida after June 20, 2025.” At a one-day final hearing in August 2025, the Father testified that he now resides in Fort Lauderdale and works as a “fellow physician” at an Aventura hospital, where his work schedule is 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. Monday through Friday, with one “on-call” weekend a month. The trial court denied all timesharing. The court ruled that the Father was a Florida resident when he entered into the parenting plan, so the Father’s relocation to Fort Lauderdale in 2025 was not a substantial and material change in circumstances. In addition, the court ruled that modifying the parenting plan would not be in the best interests of the child. This appeal ensued. Standard of Review An order on a petition to modify timesharing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Lally v. Lally, 426 So. 3d 514, 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025). A trial court’s decision on a modification petition must be supported by competent, substantial evidence. Miller v. Velleff, 427 So. 3d 540, 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Finding that the Father Had Not Proven a Substantial and Material Change in Circumstances A parenting plan or timesharing schedule “may not be modified without a showing of a substantial and material change in circumstances and a determination that the modification is in the best interests of the child.” § 2 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2024). The requirement that the change be “unanticipated” was removed from section 61.13(3) as of July 1, 2023. Baez v. Edwards, No. 1D2025-2372, 2026 WL 1968270, at *1 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA July 8, 2026); Ch. 23-315, § 2, Laws of Fla. “Modification proceedings are entirely different than initial custody decisions, and courts have considerably less discretion in considering them because they disrupt children’s lives.” Harrell v. Friend, 388 So. 3d 1086, 1089 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (cleaned up). Indeed, “there is a presumption in favor of the reasonableness of the original decree.” Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 933 (Fla. 2005). Thus, “it is well-settled that a trial court’s authority and discretion in a modification proceeding is substantially more restricted than at the time of the original [parenting plan] determination.” Sanchez v. Hernandez, 45 So. 3d 57, 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). “Demonstrating to the court that there has been a sufficient substantial change in circumstances places an extraordinary burden on the party seeking to modify the custody order.” Villalba v. Villalba, 316 So. 3d 366, 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (quoting Reed v. Reed, 182 So. 3d 837, 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)). “However, this burden should not preclude legitimate review in the best interests of the child where there have been significant changes affecting the well being of the child, especially when the change of circumstances has occurred over a substantial period of time.” Reed, 182 So. 3d at 840 (cleaned up). Section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2024), states that a long-distance parent’s move to within 50 miles of the other parent may constitute a substantial change in circumstances, so long as the modification is in the best interests of the child: If the parents of a child are residing greater than 50 miles apart at the time of the entry of the last order establishing time-sharing and a parent moves within 50 miles of the other parent, then that move may be considered a substantial and material change in circumstances for the purpose of a modification to the time-sharing schedule, so long as there is a determination that the modification is in the best interests of the child. § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2024). Here, the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the Father did not prove a substantial and material change in circumstances. 3 Under section 61.13(3), the relevant threshold question is whether the Father was residing in New Jersey “at the time of the entry of the last order establishing time-sharing.” § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2024). The record showed that the Father was residing in New Jersey at the time of the entry of the paternity judgment establishing timesharing, which occurred on June 28, 2022. The Father’s testimony was the only competent, substantial evidence of his residency when the paternity judgment establishing timesharing was entered. Although the Father mentioned doing a summer internship in Florida in 2021, the Father testified that he resided in New Jersey for approximately four years before June 2025, which would have included when he signed the parenting plan in May 2022 and when the paternity judgment was entered on June 28, 2022. The Father explained that he signed the parenting plan and agreed to the final judgment of paternity shortly before he began his medical residency in New Jersey on July 1, 2022. The Father also testified that he was “up in New Jersey when all this occurred.” Notably, the paternity judgment adopting the parenting plan was entered on June 28, 2022, only three days before the Father began his medical residency in New Jersey. The Father’s testimony was consistent with the fact that the paternity judgment’s certificate of service reflected that the judgment was mailed to the Father’s address in New Jersey. 1 The Mother’s testimony did not rebut the Father’s testimony as to his New Jersey residency at the time of the entry of the last order establishing timesharing. The Mother’s testimony did not establish that the Father resided in Florida at the time the parties executed the parenting plan, much less at the time the paternity judgment was entered. In fact, the Mother’s testimony suggested that she did not have personal knowledge of where the Father resided in May and June of 2022. The Mother gave inconsistent answers on this point, claiming that she “didn’t know” where he was because she did not have any communication with him, that she 1 The Father’s testimony about his residency was not “inconsistent,” as the Mother now alleges. Although the Father testified that “I was in New Jersey when I signed the Parenting Plan,” this answer—when interpreted in the context of a pending question about whether he signed the parenting plan three days before “moving” to New Jersey—necessarily meant that the Father was already living or residing in New Jersey when he signed the parenting plan. We do not interpret the Father’s answer as a literal claim that he was physically present in New Jersey when he signed the parenting plan. The parenting plan on its face reflects that the Father’s signature was notarized in Florida after he presented his New Jersey driver’s license. 4 believed he was in New Jersey to do his residency, that she had “no idea” where he was, and that she was “going to say he was in Florida” because his signature on the parenting plan “was stamped here in Florida.” 2 On this record, the trial court was required to accept the Father’s testimony that he resided in New Jersey when the judgment adopting the original timesharing plan was entered. See 940 Lincoln Rd. Enters. v. Hernandez, 67 So. 3d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (“Uncontroverted testimony which is not illegal, inherently improbable or unreasonable, opposed to common knowledge, or contradictory within itself, should not be disregarded by the trier of facts.”). Under section 61.13(3), a long-distance parent’s move to within 50 miles of the other parent may constitute a substantial change in circumstances. § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2024). Here, the Father’s testimony that his current residence in Fort Lauderdale is a 20-minute drive from the Mother’s home in Hialeah—while likely an overly optimistic estimate of driving time—established that he had moved to within 50 miles of the Mother. Although the 50-mile provision in section 61.13(3) is discretionary, the trial court’s discretion is guided by whether the modification is in the best interests of the child. As explained below, although the record does not show that a modification to 50/50 timesharing is in the child’s best interests, the Father proved that a modification allowing him some timesharing would be in the child’s best interests. Despite his past mistakes, the Father has established that he is able and willing to be a parent and to provide a stable home environment. Because the Father has transitioned from being an unavailable, out-of- state resident working an arduous schedule of 80–100 hours per week to being an available, local physician working a less-demanding schedule of about 40 hours per week, a substantial and material change in circumstances has occurred. 2 While the Mother pointed to the fact that the Father’s signature on the parenting plan was notarized in Florida, this was insufficient to establish that the Father was a Florida resident when the final judgment was entered. “Residence” generally means “an actual presence in Florida coupled with an intention at that time to make Florida the residence.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 556 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (citation omitted). That the Father signed the parenting plan in Florida proved only that he was present in Florida at that time. This evidence did not prove that the Father had any intention to remain in Florida and make it his residence, particularly at the time the final judgment was entered on June 28, 2022, which was three days before the Father started his medical residency in New Jersey. 5 Although the Record Supports the Trial Court’s Conclusion that a Modification to 50/50 Timesharing Was Not in the Child’s Best Interests, the Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Refusing Any Modification of Timesharing Whatsoever Once a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances has been made in a modification proceeding, “[t]he court shall determine all matters relating to parenting and time-sharing of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child . . . .” § 61.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2024). “Accordingly, when modifying custody, the primary consideration is the best interests of the child.” Reed, 182 So. 3d at 841. In short, a timesharing decision must be based upon the child’s best interests, not imposed as a sanction for the conduct or recalcitrance of either parent. Giacomaro v. Brossia, 396 So. 3d 222, 228 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024); Decker v. Lyle, 848 So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). “It is the public policy of this state that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities, and joys, of childrearing.” § 61.13(2)(c)1., Fla. Stat. (2024). “[T]here is a rebuttable presumption that equal time-sharing of a minor child is in the best interests of the minor child” “[u]nless otherwise provided in this section or agreed to by the parties.” Id. But this presumption may be rebutted through proof “by a preponderance of the evidence that equal time-sharing is not in the best interests of the minor child.” Id. Absent a timesharing agreement approved by the court, “the court must evaluate all of the factors set forth in subsection (3) and make specific written findings of fact when creating or modifying a time- sharing schedule.” Id. Under section 61.13(3), a “[d]etermination of the best interests of the child must be made by evaluating all of the factors affecting the welfare and interests of the particular minor child and the circumstances of that family, including, but not limited to” the twenty factors enumerated therein. Among those factors are the following: (a) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent- child relationship, to honor the time-sharing schedule, and to be reasonable when changes are required. ... 6 (c) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to determine, consider, and act upon the needs of the child as opposed to the needs or desires of the parent. (d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity. ... § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2024). The consideration of “which parent would facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship with the other parent” is “part of the first factor listed in section 61.13(3).” Martinez v. Lebron, 284 So. 3d 1146, 1149 n.4 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). Likewise, parents have a constitutionally protected “inherent right” to a meaningful relationship with their children. Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290, 1293 (Fla. 1991). As Schutz explains, “a custodial parent has an affirmative obligation to encourage and nurture the relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent.” Id. at 1292. This obligation entails “encouraging the child to interact with the noncustodial parent, taking good faith measures to ensure that the child visit and otherwise have frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent and refraining from doing anything likely to undermine the relationship naturally fostered by such interaction.” Id. “The privilege of visiting the minor children of the parties to a divorce [or paternity] proceeding should never be denied either parent so long as he or she conducts himself or herself, while in the presence of such children, in a manner which will not adversely affect the morals or welfare of such progeny.” Yandell v. Yandell, 39 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 1949). In Verrier v. Oaks, 235 So. 3d 1050 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018), for example, the Second District held that “the restrictions on [the father’s] timesharing the circuit court imposed—essentially terminating any contact whatsoever between [the father] and his children for at least two years and possibly longer—were not supported by any evidence.” Thus, although the Second District affirmed the modification of the parenting plan in most respects, the court remanded for entry of a judgment that would allow the father telephonic contact and “some form of supervised timesharing with the minor children.” Id. Similarly, in Davis v. Lopez-Davis, 162 So. 3d 19, 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), we held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 7 husband any timesharing with the child because “the evidence did not establish that denying the husband timesharing was necessary to protect the child’s welfare.” Although Davis involved an initial timesharing determination rather than a modification, the case is otherwise strikingly similar to this one. In Davis, the wife testified that the husband “had not been in Florida in over five years and that the husband did not know anything about the child’s school, teachers, extracurricular activities, or medical history,” which led the trial court to adopt a magistrate’s recommendation to award the wife 100% timesharing on the ground that the husband and child did not know each other. Id. On appeal, we reversed, concluding that “[t]he husband’s absence from Florida, and the fact that the husband and child do not know each other, does not establish that it would be detrimental or harmful for the husband to spend time with the child.” Id. at 21. We further reasoned that “by denying the husband any timesharing, the child and the husband will never have the opportunity to know each other,” because “the judgment creates a ‘catch-22’ whereby the husband can never rectify the problem that resulted in his loss of timesharing.” Id. Here, while the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that a modification to 50/50 timesharing was not in the child’s best interests, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing any modification whatsoever to the timesharing schedule. The Father bore the burden of proving that a modification would be in the best interests of the child. Bryan v. Wheels, 295 So. 3d 889, 891 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). The Father did not meet his burden of establishing that a modification to 50/50 timesharing was in the child’s best interests, nor did the Father meet his burden of establishing that a modification to shared parental responsibility would be in the child’s best interests. 3 3 The Father argues that “the lower court failed to make the required statutory finding that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child, which is reversible error.” However, the trial court was not required to make such a finding, as this was a modification proceeding rather than an initial determination of whether to order sole or shared parental responsibility. Here, the Father bore the burden of proving that modifying the original parenting plan’s award of sole parental responsibility to the Mother would be in the child’s best interests, which he failed to do. Specifically, the Father failed to establish how it would be in the child’s best interests to modify the parenting plan to give shared parental responsibility to a parent who initially took no responsibility for the child and has still never met the child in person. 8 Even if the presumption of equal timesharing applied once the Father established a substantial and material change in circumstances, the Mother easily rebutted this presumption. The child is four years old. At the time of the final hearing, the Father had never even met the child in person. The Father has never demonstrated his capacity and disposition to handle any of the responsibilities of parenting a child. The parties live in different counties, and the child has been in a stable environment with the Mother in Hialeah. A modification to equal timesharing would disregard the child’s need for stability and continuity under section 61.13(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2024). As the trial court found, no evidence was presented as to how the child “would benefit from uprooting her from the only life she has known and now placing her with a complete stranger 50% of the time in a house full of people she does not know and has never met.” Nevertheless, the trial court abused its discretion by denying any modification and thus denying the Father any contact with the child. Importantly, as emphasized above, the Father demonstrated a substantial and material change in circumstances. Having completed his medical residency and established himself as a physician with a fellowship at an Aventura hospital, he now has the schedule and geographic proximity necessary to be an active parent. Given that the current parenting plan affords the Father no contact with the child whatsoever, a modification that would allow the child to bond with the Father would be in the child’s best interests. Although the trial court may have been influenced by the Father’s regrettable past conduct and earlier indifference to parenting, a timesharing determination “must be based upon the best interests of the child and not as a sanction for the conduct of either of the parties.” Decker, 848 So. 2d at 503. To be sure, the Father’s past conduct was relevant to the best interest factors under section 61.13(3), but the court’s denial of any timesharing whatsoever would appear to function as a sanction. Florida’s public policy as reflected in section 61.13 supports frequent and continuing contact with both parents. And inherent in the first statutory best-interest factor in section 61.13(3) is the notion that the child should have a close and continuing parent-child relationship with each parent. The trial court’s analysis did not fully grapple with these factors. While the Father is certainly to blame for his lack of a parent-child relationship, his testimony established that he is now willing and able to form a relationship with the child. Similar to Davis, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Father any timesharing with the child because the evidence did not establish that denying the Father timesharing was 9 necessary to protect the child’s welfare. The Father’s “absence from Florida, and the fact that the [Father] and child do not know each other, does not establish that it would be detrimental or harmful for the [Father] to spend time with the child.” Davis, 162 So. 3d at 21. The Father is a practicing physician, and there is no evidence that he had any history of domestic violence, abuse, or criminal conduct. By denying him any timesharing whatsoever, the trial court’s order creates a Catch-22 whereby the Father and child will never have the opportunity to know each other, and the Father will never be able to rectify his prior lack of involvement in the child’s life. The Father’s past mistakes, which he acknowledged, do not constitute evidence that his exercise of timesharing would be detrimental to the child. To the contrary, the record shows that it would be in the child’s best interests to have some relationship with her father. Conclusion In sum, we affirm the trial court’s finding that a modification to equal timesharing would not be in the child’s best interests, as that finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence. We also affirm the order to the extent that it denied a modification of the original parenting plan’s award of sole parental responsibility to the Mother. But we reverse the order to the extent that it leaves in place a parenting plan providing for zero communication or contact between the Father and the child, which the record shows is not in the child’s best interests. On remand, the trial court should devise a timesharing schedule that gives the Mother majority timesharing but allows the Father to exercise some timesharing in a manner consistent with the best interests of the child. This could come in the form of telephonic contact and some form of supervised timesharing, gradually changing to unsupervised timesharing and increasing in frequency over time. Because the trial court will be modifying the timesharing schedule, the court will need to evaluate all the factors set forth in section 61.13(3) and make specific written findings of fact. The trial court, in its discretion, may base its findings on the existing record or may hear further evidence, including evidence about the circumstances since the August 2025 order. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. MAY and CIKLIN, JJ., concur. 10 * * * Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing. 11