Csilla Mezei v. Iehuda Tzynder
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJuly 15, 2020
Docket3D20-0863
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed July 15, 2020.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D20-0863
Lower Tribunal No. 14-21439
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Csilla Mezei,
Appellant,
vs.
Iehuda Tzynder,
Appellee.
An appeal from a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Maria Elena Verde, Judge.
Buckner, Shifrin, Etter, Dugan & Bradfute, P.A., and Emily M. Bradfute, for
appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ.
MILLER, J.
Appellant, Csilla Mezei, the mother, seeks review of a nonfinal temporary
order granting appellee, Iehuda Tzynder, the father, overnight timesharing.1
Because the motion to modify timesharing was not properly noticed for hearing, the
mother was divested of her procedural due process rights.2 See Schmidt v. Nipper,
287 So. 3d 1289, 1292 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (“Courts have found a due process
violation that rises to the level of an illegal deprivation of the opportunity to be heard
when the trial court heard matters beyond the scope of the matters noticed.”)
(citation omitted); Shah v. Shah, 178 So. 3d 70, 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“The trial
court . . . changed the nature and expanded the scope of the scheduled hearing
without proper notice. In so doing, the court violated the wife’s due process rights.”)
(citation omitted); Rodriguez v. Santana, 76 So. 3d 1035, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)
(“We find that the trial court . . . improperly conducted a final evidentiary hearing
when only a case management conference had been scheduled.”); Margulies v.
1 The mother sought to invoke our original jurisdiction by filing a petition for
certiorari. As the challenged order determines “the rights or obligations of a party
regarding child custody or time-sharing,” we treat the instant petition as a notice of
appeal. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii)(b); see Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c) (“If a
party seeks an improper remedy, the cause shall be treated as if the proper remedy
had been sought; provided that it shall not be the responsibility of the court to seek
the proper remedy.”); Drago v. Drago, 895 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
(redesignating petition for certiorari concerning an order modifying visitation rights
as an appeal from a nonfinal order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii)).
2
Given the challenges facing our trial courts in conducting virtual court hearings
during the current public health crisis, we are not unmindful of the attempt here to
efficiently and equitably resolve the pending motion.
2
Margulies, 528 So. 2d 957, 959 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (“A trial court violates a
litigant’s due process rights when it expands the scope of a hearing to address and
determine matters not noticed for hearing.”) (citations omitted). Thus, we reverse
the order under review and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
3