Cortney Whittington v. Mark Whittington
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledDecember 15, 2021
Docket1D21-2117
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D21-2117
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CORTNEY WHITTINGTON,
Petitioner,
v.
MARK WHITTINGTON,
Respondent.
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.
December 15, 2021
PER CURIAM.
The Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari quashing the trial
court’s order insofar as it orders production of her personnel
records and mental health records without first requiring an in
camera review of the records before they are turned over to the
Respondent’s expert and in the absence of a determination that the
Petitioner waived her privilege to said records.
The records at issue are privileged and protected by statute
and case law. See Ricketts v. Ricketts, 310 So. 3d 993, 996 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2020) (“‘Florida law is clear that a person’s medical records
enjoy a confidential status.’” (quoting S.P. ex rel. R.P. v. Vecchio,
162 So. 3d 75, 79 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014))); see also Brooks v. Brooks,
239 So. 3d 758, 761–62 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“Florida law cautions
against allowing the discovery of entire personnel files, because of
the potential of disclosing irrelevant information that could cause
irreparable harm.”); § 456.057(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (2021); § 90.503(2),
Fla. Stat. (2021).
In determining whether privileged records are subject to
disclosure, the inquiry is whether there is an applicable statutory
exception or there has been a voluntary or involuntary waiver. See
S.P., 162 So. 3d at 80; see also Ricketts, 310 So. 3d at 997 (“Finally,
before a court can order production of privileged records, even
through in camera inspection, it must first determine that the
party asserting the privilege has waived it.”); Miraglia v. Miraglia,
462 So. 2d 507, 507–08 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (finding involuntary
waiver via “calamitous event” following wife’s suicide attempt). No
such inquiry was conducted below.
Because the trial court failed to first determine whether the
Petitioner waived her privilege to said records, it has departed
from the essential requirements of the law. See Zarzaur v.
Zarzaur, 213 So. 3d 1115, 1120 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (finding a
departure from the essential requirements of the law where,
although the parties submitted themselves to an independent
psychologist, the trial court allowed disclosure of surplus records
that were not produced to the independent psychologist).
Additionally, by failing to require an in camera review to
ensure that only relevant records are produced, the trial court also
departed from the essential requirements of law in this respect.
See Scully v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 128 So. 3d
986, 988–89 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); see also Smith v. Smith, 64 So.
3d 169 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (requiring trial court to review wife’s
mental health records in camera prior to releasing them to
husband if wife waived psychotherapist-patient privilege); Barker
v. Barker, 909 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (quashing broad order
for production of entire medical record and remanding for in
camera inspection to prevent disclosure of information not
relevant to litigation).
“[B]ecause the harm caused by the erroneous production of
such records cannot be remedied on appeal[,]” it constitutes
irreparable harm. Scully, 128 So. 3d at 988. Accordingly, the case
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is remanded for the trial court to determine whether the Petitioner
actually or involuntarily waived her privilege to the records at
issue and, if such a determination is made, conduct an in camera
review of the records produced to prevent disclosure of information
that is not relevant to the proceedings.
Accordingly, the petition is GRANTED, the lower court order is
QUASHED, and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
ROBERTS, MAKAR, and BILBREY, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Diane G. DeWolf of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee; Ryan D. O’Connor
of Akerman LLP, Orlando, for Petitioner.
Thomas J. Schulte Jr. of Ausley McMullen, Tallahassee, for
Respondent.
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