Sacha Zaidman and Patricia Zaidman v. Natchaya Zaidman
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledApril 8, 2020
Docket3D19-0966
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed April 8, 2020.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D19-0966
Lower Tribunal No. 17-1394
________________
Sacha Zaidman and Patricia Zaidman,
Appellants,
vs.
Natchaya Zaidman,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jorge E. Cueto,
Judge.
Jonathan M. Drucker; Kula & Associates, P.A., and Elliot B. Kula and W.
Aaron Daniel, for appellants.
Kluger, Kaplan, Silverman, Katzen and Levine, P.L., and Ryan Bollman and
Abbey Kaplan, for appellee.
Before SALTER, LOGUE and GORDO, JJ.
SALTER, J.
This appeal is taken from an order of the Miami-Dade circuit court’s probate
division regarding two competing last wills and testaments: a 2012 document
executed in Florida, and a 2015 document apparently executed in Belgium. The
court concluded that, as a matter of law, the earlier Florida will controlled and had
not been revoked by the later Belgian document. We affirm.
The competing wills were filed with the probate division following the 2017
death of René J.A. Zaidman (“Mr. Zaidman”). The first was presented by Natchaya
Zaidman, designated as Mr. Zaidman’s wife in the will (the appellee here; the
“Wife”). That last will and testament was executed in Miami-Dade County on
March 28, 2012, with the requisite formalities for self-authentication under the
Florida Probate Code, section 732.502(1), Florida Statutes (2019), and is referred to
as the “2012 Will.”
The second will was filed on behalf of the appellants, Mr. Zaidman’s son
Sacha and daughter Patricia (the “Children”). The document was handwritten, dated
May 17, 2015, and deposited with a Rabbi in Antwerp, Belgium (the “2015 Will”).
The 2015 Will purports to revoke all previous wills, states that it is only to be
revealed to the Children after Mr. Zaidman’s death, and provides that any dispute
2
regarding it is to be resolved in the Orthodox Rabbinical Tribunal in Antwerp rather
than in a secular court. 1
The petition for administration was filed by the Wife in Miami. It alleged
under oath that Mr. Zaidman and his Wife were residents of a single-family home in
Aventura, Florida, and that Mr. Zaidman was domiciled in Miami-Dade County.
The Children, themselves residents of Belgium and Israel, filed a counter-petition
(and, later, an amended counter-petition) contending that the 2015 Will controlled
and had revoked the 2012 Will. Following an adversary hearing, the trial court
granted the Wife’s motion to strike the Children’s amended counter-petition with
prejudice. This appeal followed.
Analysis
The issue before the trial court in this case is a question of law controlled by
the applicable provisions of the Florida Probate Code. We review that legal issue
de novo. The Florida Bar v. Greene, 926 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (Fla. 2006).
The Children’s first contention, that the trial court signed the final order
submitted by the attorneys for the Wife without a sufficient time for the attorneys
for the Children to register their objections, is meritless. The trial court conducted
1
These terms are gleaned from what was presented as a certified English translation
of the document handwritten by Mr. Zaidman in Hebrew. Based on the procedural
status of the case, we assume as true the allegations of the Children relating to the
2015 Will in their amended counter-petition.
3
a thorough hearing, invited the submission of the order, and the order simply granted
the motion to strike with prejudice without extensive elaboration. Both sides had a
full and fair opportunity to present their legal arguments regarding the competing
wills.
The substantive legal issues raised by the Children warrant a more detailed
analysis. “The primary goal of the law of wills, and the polestar guiding the rules
of will construction, is to effectuate the manifest intent of the testator.
Notwithstanding this goal, strict compliance with statutory requirements is a
prerequisite for the valid creation or revocation of a will.” In re Estate of Dickson,
590 So. 2d 471, 472 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (citations omitted).
In Florida, a will must be signed at the end by the testator and in the presence
of two witnesses who witness the execution (or an acknowledgement by the testator)
in the presence of each other. § 732.502(1)(a)-(c), Fla. Stat. (2015). 2 These statutory
formalities apply to foreign wills, as section 732.502(2) provides:
Any will, other than a holographic or nuncupative will, executed by a
nonresident of Florida, either before or after this law takes effect, is
valid as a will in this state if valid under the laws of the state or country
where the will was executed. A will in the testator’s handwriting that
has been executed in accordance with subsection (1) shall not be
considered a holographic will.
2
“The purpose of the statute is to assure not only that the signature on the will is that
of the testator, but to provide reasonable assurance of the circumstances under which
the signature was affixed to the document.” Manson v. Hayes, 539 So. 2d 27, 28 n.2
(Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
4
Thus, under section 732.502(2), a holographic will is a “will in the testator’s
handwriting” 3 and it must comply with subsection (1) to be a valid will in this state.
Florida courts refuse to recognize holographic wills that are not executed in strict
compliance with Florida’s testamentary statutes, even if the will is valid under the
laws of the state or country of execution. 4 Similarly, for a valid revocation of a will
by writing, section 732.505, Florida Statutes (2015), provides a will (or codicil or
any part of either) is revoked by writing:
(1) By a subsequent inconsistent will or codicil, or any part of either,
even though the subsequent inconsistent will or codicil does not
expressly revoke all previous wills or codicils, but the revocation
extends only so far as the inconsistency.
(2) By a subsequent will, codicil, or other writing. 5
3
See also Malleiro v. Mori, 182 So. 3d 5, 8 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“A holographic
will is a handwritten will.”).
4
See, e.g., In re Estate of Olson, 181 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1966) (affirming court’s order
denying the probate of a holographic will “because it was not attested by two
witnesses”); Lee v. Estate of Payne, 148 So. 3d 776, 777 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
(holding that testator’s handwritten will, which was valid under Colorado law, was
invalid in Florida because the testator “signed his will without attesting witnesses”);
In re Estate of Salathe, 703 So. 2d 1167, 1168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that
holographic will executed by the decedent in Germany “is without force or effect
under Florida law” and citing section 732.502(2), Florida Statutes).
5
See also In re Estate of Tolin, 622 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 1993) (“[I]t is well settled
that strict compliance with the will statutes is required in order to effectuate a
revocation of a will or codicil.”).
5
Here, the 2015 Will was handwritten by the testator in the presence of (at best)
one witness.6 This alone makes the will invalid as a matter of law. See § 732.502(1),
Fla. Stat. (2015). Contrary to the Children’s assertion, there is no need for an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was more than one witness. The
affidavit of Mr. Matthias Moortgat, a Belgium notary, states that the testator
executed the 2015 Will only “in the presence of Rabbi Yossef T. Hacohen.” An
evidentiary hearing would be futile. 7 As correctly stated by the Wife in her answer
brief: “Even assuming that the 2015 Will is valid in Belgium, it is still invalid in
Florida for failing to comply with the statutory formalities provided in Section
732.502(1).”
For their last issue on appeal, the Children challenge the procedure and
substance of the court’s ruling that the 2015 Will did not revoke the 2012 Will. This
argument is unavailing. The parties argued revocation at the April 23 hearing. The
6
This fact is borne out by an inspection of the 2015 Will and is not disputed by the
Children.
7
At the first hearing on the Wife’s motion to dismiss, the probate court
acknowledged the futility argument:
The Court: As to the fact that no will was ever deposited for
certification, I will grant the motion to dismiss without prejudice for
you to do whatever you need to do.
As to the petition of dismissal -- because futility is really what
you’re arguing to me -- with prejudice I’m denying that. I may grant it
at the May … hearing.
6
Children cited a case on the issue and the Wife fully addressed that issue in her
second motion to dismiss. The Children were on notice that the issue of revocation
was to be decided at the April 23 hearing by the probate court.
The revocation clause within the 2015 Will fails under section 732.505, for
the same reason the 2015 Will in its entirety fails under section 732.502--the
formalities necessary for execution for an instrument of revocation are the same as
those applicable to the Florida last will and testament sought to be revoked. In this
case, those statutory formalities were not followed with respect to the purported
revocation.
For these reasons, we affirm the order dismissing the Children’s amended
counter-petition with prejudice and determining that: “The alleged 2015 will does
not revoke the 2012 will as a matter of law and has no force or effect in this
proceeding.” In affirming the order below, we acknowledge that the trial court did
not pass upon the validity or invalidity of the 2015 Will in Belgium or in jurisdictions
other than Florida. Based upon the limited scope of our appellate review and the
record before us, we express no opinion on any such issues.
Affirmed.
7