Full Opinion

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ Case No. 6D2023-0841 Lower Tribunal No. 2020DR-008853 _____________________________ CHRISTIAN ANDRES ROMAN, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. ISABELA DA COSTA ROMAN, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, and DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee. _____________________________ Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County. Torea Spohr, Judge. September 25, 2026 PRATT, J. Appellant and Appellee—formerly husband and wife—appeal and cross- appeal from the trial court’s final judgment of dissolution of marriage and final order on child support. 1 We affirm the final judgment and the final child support order in their entirety with one exception. We reverse and remand for the trial court to correct the final judgment and the final child support order to impute the “in kind payments” Appellee regularly receives from her boyfriend and her boyfriend’s mother as “gross income” under section 61.30(2)(a)13., Florida Statutes (2022). 2 The facts relevant to this appeal are few. The trial court held a hearing on the parties’ petition and counter-petition for dissolution of marriage, including the issue of Appellee’s request for child support from Appellant. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court found that Appellee resides in the marital home with her boyfriend and her boyfriend’s mother (“boyfriend/mother”), that she has resided with the boyfriend/mother for three years and intends to continue doing so, that during the three-year period the boyfriend/mother have paid “all the house hold bills, utilities, mortgage and HOA fees” (“household bills”), that the boyfriend/mother intend to continue to pay the household bills, and that “[t]he in- kind contribution to [Appellee’s] monthly income is substantial inasmuch as the [boyfriend/mother] pay a substantial portion of the monthly bills.” Nevertheless, the 1 This case was transferred from the Second District Court of Appeal to this Court on January 1, 2023. A lengthy bankruptcy stay delayed the resolution of this case. 2 We affirm as to all other issues raised by the parties without further discussion. 2 trial court declined to impute the in kind payments to Appellee as income under section 61.30(2)(a)13. when calculating child support because it concluded that such in kind payments are not contemplated by the statute in light of Nadeau v. Reeves, 328 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). Following the hearing, the trial court entered a final judgment and a final child support order. Because no transcript of the hearing is available, our review of the final judgment and the final child support order is limited to any errors that appear on the face of those orders. See Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. True Builders, 398 So. 3d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024) (“While the appellant has not provided a transcript of the hearing . . . this is not fatal to appellate review when the error appears on the face of the record.” (citation omitted)). 3 As to the trial court’s ultimate decision to award child support, we review for “an abuse of discretion.” J.E.J. v. 3 However, because there is no transcript, we presume that the trial court’s factual findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. See, e.g., Pantoja v. Francis, 431 So. 3d 593, 594 (Fla. 3d DCA 2026) (“In the absence of a transcript, we must presume that the trial court’s decision is supported by competent substantial evidence.”); Southside Church of Christ of Jacksonville, Inc. v. Walker, 286 So. 3d 951, 951 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“Without a transcript of the evidentiary hearing, we must presume that the lower court’s [decision] was supported by competent, substantial evidence.”); Sondel v. Fla. Unemplmt. App. Comm’n, 846 So. 2d 659, 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (“Appellant has failed to include a transcript of the hearing before the [lower tribunal] and therefore is unable to show that the findings of the [lower tribunal] are not supported by competent and substantial evidence.”); Schmidt v. Reyes, 274 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973) (“The judgment reaches this court clothed with a presumption of correctness and in the absence of a record to the contrary, we must assume that the evidence adduced before the court was sufficiently competent and substantial to support the action taken.”). 3 S.A.B., 416 So. 3d 1186, 1189 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025). As to the trial court’s legal determinations, we review “de novo.” Id. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court should have included the monetary value of the household bills as part of Appellee’s gross income for purposes of determining how much Appellant must pay to Appellee in monthly child support under section 61.30. Specifically, Appellant argues that the payment of the household bills regularly made by the boyfriend/mother constitute “in kind payments” under section 61.30(2)(a)13. We agree. 4 Section 61.30 “establishes a guidelines schedule that trial courts must apply in making an award of child support.” J.A.D. v. K.M.A., 264 So. 3d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). Among other things, section 61.30 provides as follows: The child support guideline amount presumptively establishes the amount the trial court shall award as child support. § 61.30(1)(a). The trial court has discretion to deviate from a presumptive child support award by more than five percent “only upon a written finding explaining why ordering payment of such guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate.” Id. In determining the child support guideline amount, the trial court must follow the statutory formula set forth by section 61.30. The statute instructs that the trial court must first determine the net monthly income of each parent by subtracting allowable deductions from each parent’s gross monthly income. § 61.30(2)-(4). The net income for each parent is then added together for 4 Appellant preserved this issue. See Melrose Ventures, LLC v. Uptempo Mktg. Corp., 418 So. 3d 217, 221 n.3 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025) (“[W]here an error by the court appears for the first time on the face of a final order, a party must alert the court of the error via a motion for rehearing or some other appropriate motion in order to preserve it for appeal.” (quoting Williams v. Williams, 152 So. 3d 702, 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014))). 4 a combined net income. § 61.30(5). The trial court must then apply the guidelines schedule to the combined net income to determine the presumptive amount of child support to award. § 61.30(6). J.A.D., 264 So. 3d at 1082-83. See generally § 61.30(1)-(17), Fla. Stat. Relevant here, section 61.30(2)(a) broadly provides: (2) Income shall be determined on a monthly basis for each parent as follows: (a) Gross income shall include, but is not limited to, the following: 1. Salary or wages. 2. Bonuses, commissions, allowances, overtime, tips, and other similar payments. 3. Business income from sources such as self-employment, partnership, close corporations, and independent contracts. “Business income” means gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses required to produce income. 4. Disability benefits. 5. All workers’ compensation benefits and settlements. 6. Reemployment assistance or unemployment compensation. 7. Pension, retirement, or annuity payments. 8. Social security benefits. 9. Spousal support received from a previous marriage or court ordered in the marriage before the court. 10. Interest and dividends. 11. Rental income, which is gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses required to produce the income. 12. Income from royalties, trusts, or estates. 13. Reimbursed expenses or in kind payments to the extent that they reduce living expenses. 14. Gains derived from dealings in property, unless the gain is nonrecurring. § 61.30(2)(a)1.-14., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). See generally Mane FL Corp. v. Beckman, 355 So. 3d 418, 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (“The statute’s use of the word ‘includes’ suggests that the statutory definition . . . is listing non-exhaustive 5 examples.”); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 132 (2012) (discussing the “[p]resumption” that “[t]he verb to include introduces examples, not an exhaustive list”). Under section 61.30(2)(a), a trial court’s determination of “income . . . on a monthly basis for each parent” necessarily contemplates a trial court’s initial determination of the monthly “gross income” of each parent. § 61.30(2)(a), Fla. Stat. And under section 61.30(2)(a)13., “[r]eimbursed expenses or in kind payments to the extent that they reduce living expenses” necessarily fall within the ambit of “gross income.” § 61.30(2)(a)13., Fla. Stat. Here, the parties’ interpretive dispute regarding section 61.30(2)(a)13. requires us to determine the contextual meaning of the phrase “in kind payments.” 5 Chapter 61 contains a definition section, but it does not define the term “in kind,” so we may turn to dictionary definitions to help aid our understanding of the phrase “in kind payments” in light of its statutory context. See Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 599 (Fla. 2022) (“When a contested term is undefined in statute or by 5 Appellee does not dispute that the payments made by the boyfriend/mother are “in kind.” Instead, she echoes the trial court’s conclusion that such in kind payments are not contemplated by the statute because section 61.30(2)(a)13. allegedly solely applies to in-kind-living-expense-reducing payments made by employers. However, for the reasons explained herein, we hold that the payments made by the boyfriend/mother are in kind payments within the contextual meaning of the statute and that section 61.30(2)(a)13. applies to in-kind-living-expense- reducing payments made by employers and non-employers alike. 6 our cases, we presume that the term bears its ordinary meaning at the time of enactment, taking into consideration the context in which the word appears. And we typically look to dictionaries for the best evidence of that ordinary meaning.” (footnote omitted)); Zold v. Zold, 911 So. 2d 1222, 1229 (Fla. 2005) (explaining that “where the Legislature has chosen not to define a term, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary” (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted)). Several common dictionaries near the time of enactment of section 61.30(2)(a)13. provide similar definitions of the term “in kind.” See, e.g., Webster’s 9th New Collegiate Dictionary 661 (9th ed. 1983) (defining “in kind” in relevant part as consisting of something such as “goods or commodities as distinguished from money <payment in [kind] rather than in cash>”); The American Heritage Dictionary 930 (3d ed. 1992) (defining “in-kind” in relevant part as “[g]iven in goods, commodities, or services rather than money: cash and in-kind benefits”); Black’s Law Dictionary 790 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “in kind” in relevant part as “[i]n goods or services rather than money <payment in cash or in kind>”). 6 6 Section 61.30(2)(a)13. was enacted in 1987. See § 61.30(2)(a)13., Fla. Stat. (1987); ch. 87-95, §§ 3, 26, Laws of Fla. We therefore consider enactment-era dictionaries to help ascertain the original meaning of the statutory term “in kind.” See Planned Parenthood of Sw. & Cent. Fla. v. State, 384 So. 3d 67, 78 (Fla. 2024) (consulting “era-appropriate dictionary definitions of key terms” contained in a constitutional provision to help determine the original meaning of the constitutional text); Tomlinson v. State, 369 So. 3d 1142, 1148 (Fla. 2023) (explaining that courts 7 Having carefully considered these definitions, we conclude that the payment of Appellee’s household bills by the boyfriend/mother rests comfortably within the ordinary meaning of the term “in kind,” as such payments provide Appellee with the financial benefit of the goods, commodities, services, or other things paid for by the boyfriend/mother without the actual transfer of money to Appellee. And having carefully considered section 61.30(2)(a)13., we further conclude that such payments constitute “in kind payments” within the contextual meaning of the statute, as the payments are regular and expected—meaning they are calculable “on a monthly basis” as required by section 61.30(2)—and they reduce Appellee’s living expenses “often consult” “[d]ictionaries from the [relevant] era” “when looking for [the] original meaning” of statutory text (citing Conage, 346 So. 3d at 599)); Taylor v. Nicholson-Williams, Inc., 368 So. 3d 1007, 1015 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (referring to “enactment-era dictionaries”). See generally Scalia & Garner at 419 (“Dictionaries tend to lag behind linguistic realities . . . . If you are seeking to ascertain the meaning of a term in an 1819 statute, it is generally quite permissible to consult an 1828 dictionary.”). However, as is not uncommon (but not to be assumed), we note that the term “in kind” is materially the same today as it was at the time of enactment of section 61.30(2)(a)13. See, e.g., Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 644 (12th ed. 2026) (defining “in kind” in relevant part as consisting of something such as “goods or commodities as distinguished from money <payment in [kind]>”); The American Heritage Dictionary 904 (5th ed. 2011) (defining “in-kind” in relevant part as “[g]iven in goods, commodities, or services rather than money: cash and in-kind benefits”); Black’s Law Dictionary 937 (12th ed. 2024) (defining “in kind” in relevant part as “[i]n goods or services rather than money <payment in cash or in kind>”). See generally Fla. Ass’n of Realtors v. Orange Cnty., 350 So. 3d 115, 125 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (explaining that courts “review dictionaries published close to the time of enactment because sometimes a word’s usage evolves or changes” while noting that the words at issue in that case had the “same definition today” as they did at the time of enactment of the at-issue text). 8 as required by section 61.30(2)(a)13. See § 61.30(2)(a)13., Fla. Stat. (“(2) Income shall be determined on a monthly basis for each parent as follows: (a) Gross income shall include, but is not limited to, the following . . . 13. Reimbursed expenses or in kind payments to the extent that they reduce living expenses.”). 7 Our interpretation of section 61.30(2)(a)13. is consistent with how each of our sister districts have interpreted the statute. See, e.g., Levy v. Levy, 388 So. 3d 987, 990 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“For the trial court to factor both the in-kind payments [under section 61.30(2)(a)13.] represented by her brother’s rent relief and the gifts of her boyfriend into Former Wife’s future income, the trial court must determine that these payments are regular and expected. The trial court may impute the value of both the boyfriend’s and the brother’s gifts to Former Wife as income if the gifts are continuing and ongoing, not sporadic, and where the evidence shows that the gifts will continue in the future.” (citations, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted)); Varchetti v. Varchetti, 355 So. 3d 435, 438-39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (“The third matter requiring reconsideration relates to the in-kind contributions, payments, and reimbursements which the former wife was receiving, all of which demonstrated 7 “We are not confronted here with the factual scenario of a parent, responsible for child support, who receives a lump sum payment which is in reality a payment for their monthly expenses. We nonetheless observe that an equity court will always pierce a veiled attempt to obscure the true character of monies paid or benefits received.” Cooper v. Kahn, 696 So. 2d 1186, 1188 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); see also Erskine v. Erskine, 344 So. 3d 566, 578 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (“Proceedings under this chapter are in chancery.” (quoting § 61.011, Fla. Stat.)). 9 that her living expenses were being reduced [under section 61.30(2)(a)13.] . . . The former wife testified that she lived with her fiancé and uncle, both of whom were providing her financial assistance by paying or reimbursing her for various bills, including home utilities, car payments, auto insurance, and groceries. The Florida court erred in failing to take these in-kind contributions, payments, and reimbursements into consideration in calculating the former wife’s gross income.”); Ortega v. Wood, 316 So. 3d 408, 410-11 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (“The relevant inquiry [under section 61.30(2)(a)13.] is whether the benefit is regular and expected and whether the benefit reduces living expenses. . . . The source of the benefit, whether from [the former husband’s] mother or from the business, is immaterial. . . . On remand the trial court is to evaluate in kind contributions to [the former husband], regardless of source, and impute their value as income where they are expected and reduce [the former husband’s] living expenses.” (citations omitted)); Johnson v. Johnson, 268 So. 3d 203, 205 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (“At the trial, the former husband testified that he made the payments [on the parties’ marital home and the parties’ bankruptcy], which the former wife confirmed. However, the child support guidelines worksheet, upon which the trial court relied, did not consider the mortgage and bankruptcy payments that the former husband made during the retroactive period. This was error.”); Bond v. Bond, 224 So. 3d 874, 875 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (“When one party pays the mortgage payment or housing expenses of 10 another party, it is considered an in kind contribution [under section 61.30(2)(a)13.] for purposes of the child support guidelines.”); Schafstall v. Schafstall, 211 So. 3d 1108, 1111 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“Contrary to the former wife’s contention, the trial court was required to include in its calculation of the former wife’s gross monthly income the value of the mortgage payments paid by the former husband as in kind contributions [under section 61.30(2)(a)13.]”); Posner v. Posner, 39 So. 3d 411, 414 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“The parents’ provision of the home in which the husband lived rent free may qualify as an in-kind payment to the husband [under section 61.30(2)(a)13.]”). Our interpretation of section 61.30(2)(a)13. is also consistent with the Fourth District’s insight that “[a]lthough generally [in-kind] payments are employer- related, nothing in [section 61.30(2)(a)13.] precludes [in-kind] payments [by a non- employer] to the extent that they reduce living expenses.” Posner, 39 So. 3d at 414. In other words, because the text of section 61.30(2)(a)13. does not limit its application to in-kind-living-expense-reducing payments made by employers, section 61.30(2)(a)13. applies to in-kind-living-expense-reducing payments made by employers and non-employers alike. Like the Fourth District, we will not read a textual limitation into section 61.30(2)(a)13. that is absent from the text itself. Given the absence of a binding holding by the Florida Supreme Court or the Sixth District regarding the meaning of section 61.30(2)(a)13., the trial court 11 understandably sought to follow what it perceived to be a binding holding of the Fourth District in Nadeau regarding the same. See generally Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666-67 (Fla. 1992) (“This Court has stated that the decisions of the district courts of appeal represent the law of Florida unless and until they are overruled by this Court. Thus, in the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts. . . . The proper hierarchy of decisional holdings would demand that in the event the only case on point on a district level is from a district other than the one in which the trial court is located, the trial court be required to follow that decision. Alternatively, if the district court of the district in which the trial court is located has decided the issue, the trial court is bound to follow it.” (citations, internal brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted)). However, the trial court’s conclusion that the in kind payments received by Appellee do not fall within the meaning of section 61.30(2)(a)13. was based on a misreading of Nadeau. In Nadeau, the Fourth District acknowledged that section 61.30(2)(a)13. “has been interpreted to ‘cover items such as food, housing and vehicles furnished by the employer who is paying wages.’” Nadeau, 328 So. 3d at 1001 (quoting Hinton v. Smith, 725 So. 2d 1154, 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (emphasis added)). But neither the Second District in Hinton nor the Fourth District in Nadeau held that this is all that section 61.30(2)(a)13. covers. This conclusion is buttressed by other decisions from the Second and Fourth Districts acknowledging that section 61.30(2)(a)13. 12 indeed covers more than just in-kind-living-expense-reducing payments made by employers. See, e.g., Varchetti, 355 So. 3d at 439; Bond, 224 So. 3d at 875; Posner, 39 So. 3d at 414. Therefore, in the absence of a conflict between the other district courts of appeal regarding what section 61.30(2)(a)13. covers, the trial court was bound to follow those district court decisions holding that in-kind-living-expense- reducing payments made by non-employers also count for purposes of section 61.30(2)(a)13. 8,9 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion for the trial court to amend the final judgment and the final child support order to impute the “in kind payments” Appellee regularly receives 10 from the boyfriend/mother as “gross income” under section 8 If neither the Florida Supreme Court nor the Sixth District has rendered a decision regarding an issue, and if a decisional conflict exists between the other district courts of appeal regarding the issue, then the trial courts within the Sixth District may choose which of the conflicting decisions of the other district courts of appeal to follow (that is, until the Florida Supreme Court or the Sixth District renders a decision regarding the issue). See generally Pardo, 596 So. 2d at 666 (“Thus, in the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts.”). 9 The actual holdings of Hinton and Nadeau were limited to their facts. The Second and Fourth Districts essentially held in those decisions that section 61.30(2)(a)13. does not encompass payments made by a new spouse of a remarried parent—a circumstance we need not address under the facts of this case. See generally Nadeau, 328 So. 3d at 1002; Hinton, 725 So. 2d at 1158. 10 This opinion does not preclude Appellee from filing upon remand a supplemental petition for child support modification in the event that circumstances 13 61.30(2)(a)13. On remand, the trial court is to make the necessary child support obligation calculations under section 61.30 regarding the “in kind payments” of the household bills made by the boyfriend/mother. We otherwise affirm the final judgment and the final child support order. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED with instructions. TRAVER, C.J., and GANNAM, J., concur. PRATT, J., concurs, with opinion. _____________________________ NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED _____________________________ PRATT, J., concurring. Although not discussed by the parties in their briefs, I note that the definition of “income” applicable to chapter 61, Florida Statutes, is quite broad and may independently capture the payment of the household bills regularly made by the boyfriend/mother as part of Appellee’s monthly “gross income” under section 61.30(2)(a), Florida Statutes. See generally § 61.046(8), Fla. Stat. (2022) (“‘Income’ means any form of payment to an individual, regardless of source, including, but not limited to: wages, salary, commissions and bonuses, compensation as an have changed. See § 61.14, Fla. Stat. See generally Mannella v. Mannella, 363 So. 3d 236, 240 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) (“Section 61.14 gives parties the ability to seek child support modification if there has been a change in circumstances. Section 61.13 gives trial courts the power to modify child support if it is in the child’s best interests or if a substantial change in circumstances has occurred.” (emphases omitted)). 14 independent contractor, worker’s compensation, disability benefits, annuity and retirement benefits, pensions, dividends, interest, royalties, trusts, and any other payments, made by any person, private entity, federal or state government, or any unit of local government. United States Department of Veterans Affairs disability benefits and reemployment assistance or unemployment compensation, as defined in chapter 443, are excluded from this definition of income except for purposes of establishing an amount of support.” (emphasis added)); Zold v. Zold, 911 So. 2d 1222, 1229 (Fla. 2005) (explaining that section 61.046(8) “defines income in terms of payment to an individual,” that a common dictionary defines “payment” to mean “the act of paying” or “something that is paid,” and that “the term ‘payment’ connotes something that is given to or received by an individual and, hence, is available to the individual to satisfy financial obligations imposed by the trial court during dissolution proceedings”) (quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 852 (10th ed. 1999))); J.E.J. v. S.A.B., 416 So. 3d 1186, 1190 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025) (“For purposes of chapter 61, ‘ “[i]ncome” means any form of payment to an individual, regardless of source, including, but not limited to . . . dividends . . . and any other payments . . . .’ ” (quoting § 61.046(8), Fla. Stat.) (emphasis and brackets in original)). I further note that other courts have taken section 61.046(8) into account when determining “income” or “gross income” for purposes of calculating child support payments. See, e.g., Ordini v. Ordini, 701 So. 2d 663, 665- 15 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Cooper v. Kahn, 696 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). However, because we have concluded that the payment of Appellee’s household bills by the boyfriend/mother constitute “in kind payments” within the meaning of section 61.30(2)(a)13. that therefore must be included as part of her gross income under section 61.30(2)(a), we need not determine in this case whether such payments would constitute “income” within the meaning of section 61.046(8) for purposes of determining Appellee’s gross income under section 61.30(2)(a). _____________________________ Richard P. Spence, of The Spence Law Firm, PLLC, Orlando, for Appellant/Cross- Appellee. Debra J. Sutton, of the Sutton Law Firm, Bartow, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Isabela De Costa Roman. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Toni C. Bernstein, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee, Department of Revenue. 16