Edward Joseph Unger v. Jennifer Rose Unger
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledAugust 26, 2026
Docket4D2025-2209
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
EDWARD JOSEPH UNGER,
Appellant,
v.
JENNIFER ROSE UNGER,
Appellee.
No. 4D2025-2209
[August 26, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Jessica Marra and Elaine Alexandra Carbuccia, Judges;
L.T. Case No. 062012DR011780AXXXCE.
Edward Joseph Unger, Boca Raton, pro se.
No appearance for appellee.
CONNER, J.
The pro se former husband appeals from three orders by two different
judges handling the case: (1) the initial judge’s granting the former wife’s
contempt motion alleging the former husband willfully violated time-
sharing orders regarding their children; (2) the initial judge’s denying the
former husband’s motion to vacate the order granting former’s wife’s
contempt motion; and (3) after the initial judge who conducted the
contempt hearing was disqualified, the successor judge’s denying
reconsideration of the initial judge’s orders. The former husband argues
the initial judge’s written contempt order, entered after disqualification,
contained findings that the initial judge had not orally announced during
the contempt hearing, and thus the entire written contempt order should
be vacated.
We agree with the former husband that the initial judge’s written
contempt order, entered after disqualification, contained findings that the
initial judge had not orally announced during the contempt hearing.
However, the proper remedy is not to vacate the entire written contempt
order. Rather, the proper remedy is for the initial judge to enter an
amended written contempt order which deletes the unannounced findings.
Thus, we affirm in part, and reverse in part.
We agree with the former husband’s beginning premise that
“[g]enerally, a disqualified judge is barred from further participation in the
case.” Ross v. Ross, 77 So. 3d 238, 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citations
omitted). The former husband correctly acknowledges that “[w]hen a judge
has heard the testimony and arguments and rendered an oral ruling in a
proceeding, the judge retains the authority to perform the ministerial act
of reducing that ruling to writing.” Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240, 243
(Fla. 1986) (citations omitted); see also Godin v. Owens, 275 So. 3d 700,
701 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (a disqualified judge “maintains the authority to
perform the ministerial duty of preparing a written order to reflect oral
pronouncements made before the motion to disqualify”) (citations omitted).
The former husband also correctly points out that the ministerial act
exception does not apply where the trial judge substantively changes oral
determinations by providing “details not articulated in the trial court’s
prior oral pronouncement.” Godin, 275 So. 3d at 701 (citing Parnell v.
Parnell, 113 So. 3d 989, 990-91 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). “In that instance,
substantive changes in the trial court’s [oral] ruling are not ministerial and
are considered void.” Id. (citing Parnell, 113 So. 3d at 990-91).
Based on the foregoing authorities, the former husband specifically
attacks the written contempt order, because the order contains findings
regarding the former wife’s prior move to Miami, and a ruling on the former
husband’s 2021 motion for contempt against former wife, that were not
made at the 2025 contempt hearing.
Regarding the former husband’s contempt motion attacking the former
wife’s move to Miami in 2021, the 2025 written contempt order found “[t]he
record reflects that said [prior] order found [the former wife] in contempt
as it relates to the school boundary issue ‘only’ and ordered the children
to attend school in Boca as the school boundary could not be changed.”
Additionally, the 2025 written contempt order states that “[the former
wife]’s move in 2021 was not found to be contemptuous.” The 2025 written
contempt order concluded that the 2021 contempt order was of no
consequence, because the issue of the former wife’s move to Miami had
been resolved years ago, and the former wife had returned to Boca Raton.
We agree with the former husband that the 2025 contempt transcript
shows that the initial judge made no oral findings as to the factual
determinations from the 2021 contempt proceeding. More problematic is
a misstatement in the 2025 written contempt order that the former wife
was not found in contempt in 2021, when in fact the 2021 contempt order
stated “[the former wife] is in contempt for failing to comply with the terms
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of the 2013 agreement by relocating to Miami-Dade County.”
The former husband argues that those two findings regarding the 2021
contempt proceeding in the 2025 written contempt order—neither of which
were orally announced during the 2025 contempt hearing—render the
entire 2025 written contempt order void. The former husband further
argues that he is entitled to a new hearing on the former wife’s contempt
motion before a different judge.
We disagree with the former husband’s proposed remedy. Although the
caselaw holds that “substantive changes in the trial court’s [oral] ruling
are not ministerial and are considered void” when a disqualified judge
issues an order after disqualification, Godin, 275 So. 3d at 701, we
disagree that the entire 2025 written contempt order is void. Because we
have the transcript from the 2025 contempt hearing, we can determine
what oral determinations were made before the initial judge’s
disqualification. Thus, we hold that the proper remedy in this case is to
reverse the written contempt order and remand for the initial judge to (1)
vacate the 2025 written contempt order, and (2) enter an amended written
contempt order which removes the two findings discussed above that the
initial judge did not orally announce during the 2025 contempt hearing.
Except as discussed above, we reject the former husband’s other
arguments raised on appeal. As we warned in our order striking the former
husband’s initial brief with leave to amend, we again caution the former
husband about the use of artificial intelligence in preparation of
documents filed with the court.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
CIKLIN, J., and BURTON, CHARLES E., Associate Judge, concur.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.
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