Jessica Toledano v. Daniel Alvarez
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledSeptember 2, 2026
Docket3D2026-1522
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed September 2, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D26-1522
Lower Tribunal No. 16-15451-FC-04
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Jessica Toledano,
Appellant,
vs.
Daniel Alvarez,
Appellee.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Diana Vizcaino, Judge.
Fell Law Group, PLLC, and Brian D. Fell (Plantation), for appellant.
Jed R. Friedman, P.A., and Jed R. Friedman, for appellee.
Before SCALES, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and LINDSEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Jessica Toledano (the “Mother”) appeals the trial court’s July
2, 2026 order that denied the Mother's June 5, 2026 motion, pursuant
to Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.490(e)(4), seeking to vacate the
trial court's June 2, 2026 order that ratified recommendations of a general
magistrate. We review the challenged order denying vacatur for an abuse of
discretion. Mathieu v. Dep’t of Revenue, 430 So. 3d 321, 322 (Fla. 3d DCA
2026).
The general magistrate conducted a two-day trial and, in his
recommended order, adopted the recommendation of the Guardian ad Litem
that appellee Daniel Alvarez (the “Father”) have a period of sole timesharing
with the parties’ son for the purpose of reunification. The general magistrate
recommended that the Father and his son spend nine weeks together during
the summer of 2026, with no contact by the Mother.
Upon our careful review of the record and the parties' arguments, we
affirm the challenged order. The findings of the general magistrate’s
underlying recommended order are supported by ample competent,
substantial evidence, and such findings compel affirmance. Sordo v.
Camblin, 130 So. 3d 743, 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); see O.H. v. Agency for
Persons with Disabilities, 332 So. 3d 27, 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (holding that
competent, substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
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mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion” (quoting DeGroot
v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957))); Rodriguez v. Reyes, 112 So.
3d 671, 673-74 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (concluding that a general magistrate’s
factual findings were competent and substantial because they were
supported by “direct testimony” that the magistrate found to be credible).
Because the trial court stayed the challenged order during the
pendency of this appeal – essentially vitiating the general magistrate’s
recommendations which the trial court itself had ratified – we remand for
whatever proceedings, if any, the trial court deems appropriate to effectuate
the general magistrate’s Father-son reunification recommendation.
Affirmed and remanded.
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