Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT JOSHIA MILLER, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. No. 2D2026-1679 September 18, 2026 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, Manatee County; Frederick Mercurio, Judge. Larry J. Eger, Public Defender, and Gabriela Guardiola, Assistant Public Defender, Bradenton, for Petitioner. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Shayla Mattinson Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent. SILBERMAN, Judge. Joshia Miller petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus.1 We previously granted the petition and now write to explain our decision. 1 This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to article V, section 4(b)(3), of the Florida Constitution. "A petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper method to seek review of an order setting pretrial release conditions." Norton-Nugin v. State, 179 So. 3d 557, 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). On June 2, 2026, Miller was arrested on a warrant for six counts of promotion of content depicting sexual conduct of a child (counts one through six), and two counts of promotion of animal sexual abuse material (counts seven and eight). The allegations in the affidavit supporting probable cause are that Miller transmitted eight videos to unknown users through Kik, a mobile messaging app. Counts one through six are second-degree felonies. Counts seven and eight are third-degree felonies. On June 3, 2026, a First Appearance Order established bonds at $10,000 per count, totaling $80,000. The order also imposed pretrial supervised release, a travel restriction requiring Miller to remain in the Twelfth Circuit, and prohibitions against contacting minors or accessing a device connected to the internet. At Miller's first appearance hearing, the court was in receipt of Miller's pretrial criteria form establishing that he had no prior criminal history, resided in Manatee County for twenty- nine years, had his mother in the community, was employed full-time, and was recommended for the pretrial release services program. On June 4, 2026, Miller filed a motion to modify bail. The motion set forth legally sufficient factual allegations demonstrating that he could not afford the current monetary bail. On June 16, 2026, the court addressed Miller's motion to modify bail to reduce the monetary bail amount. At the hearing, Miller introduced evidence of his inability to afford the monetary bail. Testimony from Miller established that he: 1. Has resided in Manatee County his whole life (29 years). 2. Graduated high school in Manatee County. 3. Resides with his mother and his older brother. 2 4. Was employed by a vape shop in Manatee County that would not require him to encounter children. 5. Had an income of $16 per hour and worked approximately 58 hours per week. 6. Paid $400 a week (approximately $1600 a month) towards his family's mortgage payments. 7. Paid additional bills in the household (electric, phone, water); 8. Had no money saved. 9. Could afford a $2,800 total bond through a bondsman with money that his employer owes him. 10. Could not afford a monetary bond without his employer's financial assistance. 11. Has transportation to court proceedings. 12. Does not own a passport. On June 16, 2026, the court denied the motion to modify bail and noted that the findings were stated on the record. On the record, the court ruled: I'm going to deny the request. In large part it's because not only did you have this material, but according to several portions of the probable cause affidavit there's evidence that you uploaded and transmitted it to other people. So for all those reasons and the fact that I know that you're going to score to prison, I'm going to deny your request to reduce or modify the bonds, finding them to be more than reasonable, given the nature of the charges involved. The trial court erred by basing its decision entirely on the nature of the alleged offenses and not considering any other factors. "Setting conditions of release, including whether and how much monetary bail must be posted, is a matter for the discretion of the trial court, whose determination may be reversed only if that discretion is abused." Sewell 3 v. Blackman, 301 So. 3d 354, 355 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (citing Norton- Nugin, 179 So. 3d at 559). In setting bail and conditions of release, the court must consider the factors listed in section 903.046(2), Florida Statutes (2025), which are mirrored in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.131(c)(3). Those factors include but are not limited to: (a) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged. (b) The weight of the evidence against the defendant. (c) The defendant's family ties, length of residence in the community, immigration status, employment history, financial resources, and mental condition. (d) The defendant's past and present conduct, including any record of convictions, previous flight to avoid prosecution, or failure to appear at court proceedings. . . . (e) The nature and probability of danger which the defendant's release poses to the community. (f) The source of [noncriminal] funds used to post bail or procure an appearance bond. . . . (g) Whether the defendant is already on release pending resolution of another criminal proceeding or on probation, parole, or other release pending completion of a sentence. ... (k) Any other facts that the court considers relevant. § 903.046(2). Other factors include "the probability of the accused appearing at trial, his accessibility to means of flight, . . . the prior record of the accused in responding to process, whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested, . . . his respect for the law, the accused's character and reputation, and the state of his health." Donohue v. Jenne, 765 So. 2d 969, 971 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (quoting Good v. Wille, 382 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)). In this case, Miller presented testimony as to the bond factors, but the trial court did not consider any factors other than the nature of the crimes alleged and the fact that Miller would likely score prison time. 4 The trial court did not weigh all of the appropriate bond factors and did not make specific findings about Miller's financial circumstances or whether he was a perceived flight risk or a threat to the community. See Dyson v. Campbell, 921 So. 2d 692, 693 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) ("It does not follow, however, that where a defendant testifies that he cannot meet a given bond amount, that bond is per se excessive or unreasonable. In addition to a defendant's financial resources, a trial court must consider a host of other factors in determining whether to release the defendant on bail or other conditions, and if so, what bail or other conditions are appropriate."). Here, the trial court simply found that the bond amounts were "more than reasonable, given the nature of the charges involved." Additionally, because the charges of promotion of content depicting sexual conduct of a child and promotion of animal sexual abuse material are not designated as "dangerous" under section 907.041(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2025), there is a statutory presumption in favor of release on nonmonetary conditions. See Sewell, 301 So. 3d at 356. For these reasons, we granted Miller's petition and directed the trial court to hold a hearing to determine reasonable conditions of release pursuant to section 903.046 and rule 3.131(c)(3).2 Petition granted with instructions. KELLY and GUARD, JJ, concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 2 Our order also provided that "[t]he parties may be given an opportunity to present additional evidence if the trial court deems it necessary." See Good, 382 So. 2d at 411. 5