Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT CHRISTIAN BOBERG, Appellant, v. OX OF SOUTH FLORIDA, INC., Appellee. No. 4D2026-0794 [November 12, 2026] Appeal of nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Martin County; William L. Roby, Judge; L.T. Case No. 432025CA001026CAAXMX. Adam Richardson of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, and Sean Pleus of Shiner Law Group, Boca Raton, for appellant. Alyssa M. Reiter of Wicker, Smith, O’Hara, McCoy, & Ford, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Plaintiff Christian Boberg appeals from a nonfinal order granting defendant Ox of South Florida, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration of Boberg’s negligence and implied warranty claims. Boberg challenges the order only with respect to Count I, the negligence claim. We reverse in part and remand for further proceedings on Count I. In August 2023, Boberg entered into a contract with Ox for the installation of a floor coating around Boberg’s residential pool. The contract states that Ox does not warrant a slip-resistant surface, disclaims responsibility for injuries resulting from a slip and fall, and limits Ox’s potential liability, including liability based on tort or negligence. The contract’s arbitration provision provides that, at Ox’s sole discretion, “any controversy, claim, or counterclaim . . . arising out of or relating or pertaining to this agreement” shall be decided by binding arbitration. After he allegedly slipped on the flooring, Boberg sued Ox. Count I of Boberg’s complaint alleges that Ox owed a duty “to exercise reasonable care in the preparation and installation of its product for the safety of any invitees and visitors, including Plaintiff.” Boberg also alleges that Ox negligently installed the flooring and failed to warn of latent hazards. Counts II and III asserted implied warranty claims, and Boberg does not challenge the order compelling arbitration of those claims. Ox moved to compel arbitration under the contract. The trial court granted the motion as to all counts, directed the parties to arbitrate before a single arbitrator, and held the action in abeyance pending an arbitration award. “An order granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration is reviewed de novo when it presents a pure question of law.” Dewees v. Johnson, 329 So. 3d 765, 769 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (citation modified). Because the arbitration provision covers claims “arising out of or relating to” the contract, it is a broad arbitration provision. Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 637 (Fla. 1999). That breadth does not make every dispute between the parties arbitrable—a claim must still have a significant relationship, or contractual nexus, to the contract. Id. at 638; Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc., 108 So. 3d 587, 593 (Fla. 2013). A contractual nexus exists when resolution of the claim requires reference to or construction of the contract, or when the claim arises from a duty created by the parties’ unique contractual relationship. Jackson, 108 So. 3d at 593. A claim lacks the required nexus when it concerns a duty imposed by law and generally owed to third parties or the public. Id. In Seifert, the plaintiff sued the homebuilder for negligence after an allegedly defective air conditioning system drew carbon monoxide into the home, causing her husband’s death. 750 So. 2d at 635. Our supreme court held that the negligence claim was not subject to arbitration, because the duties to exercise reasonable care and to warn of a dangerous condition existed independently of the contract. Id. at 640–42. The court further explained the mere fact that a dispute would not have arisen but for the parties’ contractual relationship does not establish the required nexus. Id. at 638. We applied the same reasoning in Dewees. There, despite a broad arbitration provision specifically including personal injury claims, we held that the negligence claims lacked the required contractual nexus, because the claims concerned duties generally owed to roadway users, and did not require construction of the parties’ purchase contract. Dewees, 329 So. 3d at 772. 2 Here, Count I similarly lacks the required contractual nexus. Although Boberg allegedly fell on flooring that Ox contracted to install, Count I alleges a duty of reasonable care in preparing and installing the flooring for the safety of invitees and visitors, as well as a duty to warn of latent hazards. Those duties are alleged to protect invitees and visitors generally, rather than arising from Boberg’s contractual relationship with Ox. See Jackson, 108 So. 3d at 593; Dewees, 329 So. 3d at 772. References in the contract to slipperiness, slip-and-fall injuries, tort liability, and negligence do not change the source of the duties alleged in Count I. Because Count I lacks the required contractual nexus, the negligence claim is not subject to arbitration. Accordingly, we reverse the order compelling arbitration as to Count I and remand for further proceedings on that claim. The order compelling arbitration of Counts II and III remains undisturbed because Boberg does not challenge that portion of the order. Reversed and remanded. CIKLIN, CONNER, and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing. 3