Michael John Phillips v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJune 10, 2022
Docket2D21-1963
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
MICHAEL JOHN PHILLIPS,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 2D21-1963
June 10, 2022
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hardee County; Michael E.
Raiden, Judge.
Michael Phillips, pro se.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Donna S. Koch,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa for Appellee.
BLACK, Judge.
In 2012, Michael Phillips was convicted of two counts of DUI
manslaughter, one count of DUI with personal injury, and four
counts of DUI with property damage. Following an unsuccessful
appeal from his judgment and sentences, Phillips filed a timely
motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850. Phillips now appeals from the order granting in
part and denying in part his postconviction motion, challenging
only the two claims that were summarily denied.1 We reverse the
order insofar as the postconviction court failed to attach record
documents supporting its summary denial of those claims.
Phillips first contends that the postconviction court erred in
summarily denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to move to exclude testimony and evidence regarding Phillips'
alleged use of K2, a synthetic cannabinoid. In denying this claim,
the postconviction court cited evidence that Phillips had
methamphetamine in his system at the time of the collision and the
testimony from Phillips' own trial expert that methamphetamine
can sometimes make a person "a better driver." The court also
relied upon the trial testimony from both sides' experts about the
effects of K2, stating that both experts were "guarded" in their
1 Phillips' challenge to the resentencing that occurred as the
result of the postconviction court's granting of relief is the subject of
appeal number 2D22-758.
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testimony regarding K2 because K2 can be comprised of several
different chemicals and data on the chemicals is limited. The
postconviction court did not attach record documents supporting
its determination, however. Instead, the court included a footnote
stating that it had not attached trial transcript excerpts "because
the facts it has relied upon to deny [this ground] are from [Phillips']
own motion. It is a safe assumption [Phillips] would have presented
those facts in the light most favorable to himself." While the court's
assumption may be true, it does not relieve the court of its
obligation to attach records that conclusively refute Phillips' claim.
See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(4) ("A copy of that portion of the files
and records in the case that conclusively shows that the defendant
is not entitled to relief . . . shall be attached to the order summarily
denying these claims." (emphasis added)).
In his second argument on appeal, Phillips contends that the
postconviction court erred in summarily denying the claim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State's closing
argument which suggested that Phillips' statement regarding his
use of K2 "the day before" the collision was a mistake based on
Phillips having been sedated and not knowing what day it was.
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Phillips argued in his postconviction motion that counsel should
have objected to the State's argument because it amounted to
comments on matters not in evidence. The postconviction court
agreed with the State's analysis as presented in its response to
Phillips' motion; however, the court did not attach records or
incorporate the State's response. "[T]he rules of criminal and
appellate procedure do not preclude a court from incorporating a
response from the State if the State has provided the necessary
record documents." Barnes v. State, 38 So. 3d 218, 219-20 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2010) (citing Langdon v. State, 947 So. 2d 460, 461 n.2 (Fla.
3d DCA 2006)). However, "the better practice is for the court to
either attach those specific parts of the record that refute each
claim or to discuss its rationale in its order." Id. at 220. Here,
although the State's response appended two pages of trial
transcript, the two pages consisted of only the closing argument
and did not include the testimony or evidence being discussed in
the statements. Moreover, the postconviction court did not append
any records refuting the claim or discuss its rationale for denying
the claim. See Burnett v. State, 933 So. 2d 1282, 1282 (Fla. 2d DCA
2006) ("[T]he postconviction court merely adopted and incorporated
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by reference the State's response and failed to append any record
attachments to its order. Thus the order does not support the
summary denial of Burnett's motion."); Dieudonne v. State, 993 So.
2d 640, 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) ("[T]hose portions of the transcript
upon which the State relied [and the postconviction court
incorporated] were not attached to the State's response or otherwise
included in the record on appeal."). The order is also insufficient for
this court to direct that supplemental records be filed pursuant to
Harvester v. State, 817 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). See
Phillips v. State, 229 So. 3d 426, 428 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (stating
that Harvester applies when the postconviction court's order
references documents but fails to attach those documents).
We reverse the postconviction court's order to the extent that
it denied the two claims discussed; on remand, the court must
either attach those portions of the record that conclusively refute
Phillips' claims or conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.
MORRIS, C.J., and LaROSE, J., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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