Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT OSVALDO L. GONZALEZ, Appellant, v. LAURA HAYDEE GONZALEZ, Appellee. No. 4D2025-2461 [August 19, 2026] Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Lillian B. Ewen, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562012DR002866AXXXHC. Jorge Andrés and Thomas L. Colter of Law Patriot, Stuart, for appellant. Chet E. Weinbaum of the Law Office of Chet E. Weinbaum, P.A., Fort Pierce, for appellee. FORST, J. Appellant Osvaldo L. Gonzalez (“Former Husband”) appeals from the trial court’s partial summary judgment for Appellee Laura Haydee Gonzalez (“Former Wife”). This ruling “resolved” Former Husband’s pending petition for termination or modification of alimony, so Former Husband appealed the ruling through an appeal of a final judgment that subsequently granted Former Wife’s motion for contempt against Former Husband based on his failure to meet his alimony payment responsibilities. Former Husband does not challenge the portion of the final judgment finding him in civil contempt, which we affirm without discussion. He instead argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the language in the parties’ marital settlement agreement waived the possibility of modification except if Former Wife remarried. We agree and, accordingly, reverse in part. Background The parties’ 2013 final judgment of dissolution incorporated a marital settlement agreement that included an exhibit with the following provision: I, [Former Husband], have come to an agreement with [Former Wife] to pay her alimony in the amount of two hundred eighty five dollars ($285.00) per pay period, do [sic] to the fact that her only income is from disability. The funds will be directly deposited on each pay period of the fifty two weeks per year. This contract is to begin on the day of sale of [the marital property]. This contract should remain in affect [sic] until [Former Wife] is remarried. In early 2024, Former Husband ceased making alimony payments. In response, Former Wife moved for civil contempt and enforcement seeking payment of the accumulating arrearage for the preceding four months. A few months later, Former Husband filed a petition seeking termination or a substantial reduction of his alimony obligation. He alleged a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances based on his retirement after his employer had relocated out of state, his receipt of Social Security benefits, and his alleged inability to continue paying alimony while paying his own expenses. He also asserted that Former Wife’s financial need had decreased. Former Wife opposed the petition by denying that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred, and responding that the marital settlement agreement provides the payments “should remain in effect until [Former Wife] is remarried,” and she had not remarried. She also amended her contempt motion to reiterate this position. During a case management conference, Former Wife orally moved for partial summary judgment, which resulted in the parties submitting competing written memoranda on the issue of whether the alimony provision was modifiable. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in Former Wife’s favor on the issue that “unless and until the Former Wife remarries, there is no basis to modify or terminate the alimony award in this case.” The trial court acknowledged that the agreement did not contain an express waiver of the right to modify, but when read as a whole, “the interpretation of the agreement can lead to no other conclusion but waiver.” This ruling “resolved” Former Husband’s pending petition for termination or modification of alimony, and the trial court proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on Former Wife’s motion for contempt. After considering the evidence, the trial court found that Former Husband had 2 the ability to pay but willfully failed to do so, granted the motion for contempt and enforcement, and entered final judgment, ordering Former Husband to pay the stipulated $20,995 arrearage amount. The appeal of the partial summary judgment with respect to Former Husband’s modification petition follows. Analysis “We review the trial court’s partial summary judgment ruling de novo.” Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Yager, 413 So. 3d 786, 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025). “The interpretation of the wording and meaning of the marital settlement agreement, as incorporated into the final judgment, is subject to de novo review.” Kipp v. Kipp, 844 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (quoting McIlmoil v. McIlmoil, 784 So. 2d 557, 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)). “In Florida, the statutory right to modification, unless specifically waived, is incorporated as a matter of law in any agreement or judgment providing for alimony.” Harmon v. Harmon, 629 So. 2d 1011, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). “[A]n effective waiver of the right to modification may be deemed to arise only when it is stated either in express terms or through an interpretation of the agreement as a whole which can fairly lead to no other conclusion.” Cook v. Cook, 94 So. 3d 683, 685 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Bassett v. Bassett, 464 So. 2d 1203, 1205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)). The marital settlement agreement provision at issue does not state that alimony is nonmodifiable, and contains no express waiver of either party’s right to seek modification. The provision stating that alimony shall “remain in affect [sic]” until Former Wife remarries merely identifies one circumstance under which alimony terminates. The provision does not state that remarriage is the exclusive basis for modification or termination, nor does the provision otherwise preclude a future modification based upon changed circumstances. Thus, this marital settlement agreement lacks the type of clear, exclusive language found in cases where waiver has been established. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 110 So. 3d 108, 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (marital settlement agreement specified that alimony was “non- modifiable . . . regardless of any change in circumstances of either party” and “[t]his alimony shall terminate on the Husband’s death, the Wife’s death, or the Wife’s remarriage, whichever shall first occur”); Elbaum v. Elbaum, 141 So. 3d 658, 662–63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (marital settlement agreement specified alimony would be “non-modifiable” absent “unforeseen circumstances” pertaining to the deterioration of former husband’s health or business). 3 The marital settlement agreement here also does not support the existence of an implied waiver. The inclusion of a remarriage provision does not clearly and unambiguously foreclose all other grounds for modification. See Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 133 So. 3d 1008, 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (declining to find a remarriage provision constituted a waiver where the prenuptial agreement was “silent on modification of alimony,” “the provisions regarding alimony did not specifically waive the right to modification,” and the integration clause could not “reasonably be construed as prohibiting judicial modification of the alimony obligation”). The agreement in the present case is also silent regarding modification, and Florida precedent holds that such silence is insufficient to establish waiver of the statutory right to seek relief under section 61.14 of the Florida Statutes. See, e.g., id. at 1016–17. Conclusion We construe the above-noted marital settlement agreement provision as merely addressing the impact of Former Wife’s remarriage on her receipt of alimony—remarriage would necessarily terminate the alimony requirement regardless of other considerations, including Former Wife’s continued need for alimony and Former Husband’s continued ability to pay the specified alimony. Here, no remarriage has occurred and, because the marital settlement agreement did not contain an express or sufficiently implied waiver of the parties’ right to seek modifications allowed by statute, Former Husband’s modification or termination petition should have been adjudicated. Thus, the trial court’s interpretation of the agreement was erroneous as a matter of law. As such, the order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Former Wife is reversed and the matter remanded for consideration of the merits of Former Husband’s modification or termination petition. Because Former Husband does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s findings that he possessed the ability to pay the alimony obligation and arrearage and willfully failed to do so, we affirm without discussion the portion of the final judgment granting Former Wife’s motion for contempt and enforcement. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. GERBER, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing. 4