Full Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed October 28, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D25-1343 Lower Tribunal No. 25-67863-CC-26 ________________ Maria Gimenez, Appellant, vs. Bargain Properties, Inc., Appellee. An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Lawrence D. King, Judge. Maria Gimenez, in proper person. No appearance on behalf of appellee.1 Before MILLER, LOBREE, and GOODEN, JJ. 1 Appellee was precluded from filing an answer brief after failing to heed our directive to do so within a specified period. MILLER, J. In this eviction dispute, appellant, Maria Gimenez, the tenant, appeals from a final judgment of removal rendered in favor of appellee, Bargain Properties, Inc., the landlord.2 We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). The tenant raises two issues on appeal. First, she contends the trial court erred in granting removal because she filed a viable answer and counterclaim; second, she asserts she established she was entitled to relief from the terms of a partial settlement she negotiated with the landlord. For the reasons below, we disagree and affirm. I In April 2025, the landlord filed an eviction lawsuit against the tenant. The landlord attached a three-day notice of nonpayment, and the complaint alleged the tenant failed to pay past due rent for a four-month period. The tenant filed a document titled “Answer Counterclaim Recoupment,” alleging that her rent was current and the landlord’s neglect rendered the premises uninhabitable. The trial court scheduled a rent determination hearing. In lieu of proceeding forward on the hearing, the parties entered into a negotiated partial settlement. The tenant would be 2 Given our decision, we summarily deny review of the denial of the tenant’s motion to stay. 2 permitted to reside in the premises, rent free, until July 12, 2025. On that date, she would voluntarily vacate the property and the landlord, in turn, would file a voluntary dismissal. The parties also agreed that the tenant would amend her counterclaim within twenty days. The trial court ratified the stipulation. Rather than file an amended counterclaim within the prescribed period, the tenant filed her “Amended Answer.” But contrary to the title, she sought two forms of affirmative relief: (1) to recoup past paid rent under a theory of retaliatory conduct; and (2) to remain in possession of the premises until December 2025. The landlord moved to dismiss, contending that the pleading failed to state a cause of action and violated the expedited procedures set forth in the summary eviction procedure statutes. The trial court granted the motion, without prejudice, and authorized further amendment within fifteen days. The tenant again amended, this time filing an Amended Answer and Counterclaim, alleging substantially similar theories. On July 13, 2025, the day after the tenant agreed to vacate the property, the landlord filed a motion for final judgment of removal. The motion sought immediate possession and included an affidavit of noncompliance. The affidavit stated that the tenant refused to relinquish 3 possession of the property, contrary to the terms of the settlement agreement. The tenant filed an emergency motion to extend the previously agreed upon habitation period. The trial court summarily entered a final judgment for removal. This appeal ensued. II A In enacting the Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (the “Act”), the legislature made an express decision to provide an expedited process for determining the right of possession. § 51.011, Fla. Stat. (2025); ch. 83, Fla. Stat. (2025). The right of possession is paramount, operating essentially in a vacuum “without the necessity of deciding all other issues between the parties.” Camena Invs. & Prop. Mgmt. Corp. v. Cross, 791 So. 2d 595, 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Unless the tenant interposes the defense of payment, the failure to deposit the amount of rent alleged as unpaid in the complaint in the court registry serves as a waiver of all defenses to possession. § 83.232(1), Fla. Stat. The tenant correctly posits that section 83.64, Florida Statutes, prohibits “retaliatory conduct,” and provides that it is a valid defense to possession. Among the retaliatory acts prohibited are decreases in services or increases in rent precipitated by tenant complaints to the landlord. Id. 4 § 83.64(1). But the Act further provides that this defense is inapplicable “if the landlord proves that the eviction is for good cause.” Id. § 83.64(3). “Good cause” includes “good faith actions for nonpayment of rent.” Id. B Here, the tenant timely alleged in her Amended Answer and Counterclaim that she paid her rent but that the landlord retaliated against her for complaining about the condition of the property and improperly raised her rent. But that does not end our analysis. Rather than proceed with the evidentiary hearing on the amount of rent, if any, that should be paid into the court registry during the pendency of the case, the tenant agreed to relinquish possession on the specified date. In so doing, she waived any defenses to possession. Her subsequent failure to abide by the terms of the agreement did not revive her affirmative defenses. See Scarborough Assoc. v. Fin. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n of Dade Cnty., 647 So. 2d 1001, 1003–1004 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (holding that a superseding modification agreement waived preexisting defenses). It instead entitled the landlord to immediate relief, enforcing the bargained-for terms. 5 C To the extent that the tenant claims the trial court erred in rejecting her contention that the agreement was the product of duress or coercion, this issue evades our review. She has failed to provide us with any transcripts of the proceedings or establish any error on the face of the orders under review. See Applegate v. Barbett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) (“Without a record of the trial proceedings, the appellate court can not properly resolve the underlying factual issues so as to conclude that the trial court’s judgment is not supported by the evidence or by an alternative theory. Without knowing the factual context, neither can an appellate court reasonably conclude that the trial judge so misconceived the law as to require reversal.”).3 Accordingly, we affirm the order under review. Affirmed. 3 Despite the tenant’s contention to the contrary, the judgment does not reach the counterclaim; it expressly self-limits to removal. 6