Chanwn A. Francois v. Executive Towing & Recovery, Inc.
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledSeptember 16, 2026
Docket4D2025-2502
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
CHANWN A. FRANCOIS,
Appellant,
v.
EXECUTIVE TOWING & RECOVERY, INC.,
Appellee.
No. 4D2025-2502
[September 16, 2026]
Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; John Matthew Brooks Hurley, Judge; L.T. Case No.
062025SC015695AXXXNO.
Eduardo A. Maura and Luis F. Quesada of Ayala Law, P.A., Miami, for
appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
CIKLIN, J.
Chanwn A. Francois (“Francois”) appeals a final judgment entered in
favor of Executive Towing & Recovery, Inc. (“Executive”) following a bench
trial. Because a towing operator’s lien is purely statutory, strict
compliance with section 713.78, Florida Statutes (2024), is required.
Here, the record establishes that Executive failed to provide the required
notice within five business days after Francois’ vehicle was stored. We
therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Francois’ vehicle was stolen and promptly reported stolen. The vehicle
was subsequently found in a residential parking lot where the
homeowners’ association, unaware of the vehicle’s ownership, requested
that Executive tow it.
Executive towed and commenced storage of the vehicle on October 16,
2024, the day after it was reported stolen. On October 26, 2024, Executive
sent a “Towing Notice of Claim of Lien and Proposed Sale” addressed to
Francois, but it was not delivered to Francois and was instead returned to
Executive.
Francois eventually learned from law enforcement of the whereabouts
of his vehicle, and he filed a statement of claim against Executive, alleging
illegal towing and wrongful possession of property in violation of section
713.78. Francois’ subsequent motions to prevent Executive from selling
his vehicle were denied, and the trial court entered final judgment in favor
of Executive, stating in part that Executive “strictly complied with the
requirements of Florida Statute § 713.78.”
Section 713.78 provides that when a vehicle is lawfully towed, a towing-
storage operator may charge the owner of the vehicle certain fees, and the
towing-storage operator has a lien on the vehicle for those fees. §
713.78(2)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2024). Under section 713.78(4)(c), the towing-
storage operator must provide notice to the registered owner, among
others, within five business days after the date of storage of the vehicle.
“Failure to make good faith efforts to comply with the notice requirements
of . . . section [713.78] precludes the imposition of any storage charges
against the vehicle or vessel.” § 713.78(9), Fla. Stat. (2024).
“The Florida Supreme Court has held that liens which are ‘purely
creatures of statute’ can only be acquired, created, or attached to property
if the statutes from which they derive are strictly followed.” Dwork v. Exec.
Ests. of Boynton Beach Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 219 So. 3d 858, 861 (Fla.
4th DCA 2017) (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Buck, 594 So. 2d 280,
281 (Fla. 1992)). Because the common law does not provide for imposing
a lien for towing and storage fees, Murrell v. Trio Towing Serv., Inc., 294 So.
2d 331, 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), strict compliance with section 713.78 is
required for a lien to be enforceable, see, e.g., RSC Corp. v. Hertz Vehicles,
LLC, 90 So. 3d 358, 362-63 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); Meadow Groves Mgmt.,
Inc. v. McKnight, 689 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
Thus, a towing operator may not enforce a lien where the towing
operator fails to follow section 713.78’s notice procedures. See Dowell v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 269 So. 3d 662, 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).
The notice requirements of paragraph (4)(c) are not
discretionary; nor are they a technicality. Based on the plain
language of the statute, timely notice is mandatory and serves
several essential purposes, including making the vehicle
owner aware that (1) towing and storage charges have been
incurred, (2) a lien exists to secure payment of those charges,
and (3) the towing-storage operator can enforce the lien . . . by
selling the vehicle if the charges remain unpaid after 35 days.
§ 713.78(4)(c), Fla. Stat. Additionally, because the notice here
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set the date, time, and location of the sale, this was the only
notice of sale required to be sent directly to the vehicle owner.
See § 713.78(6), Fla. Stat. For these reasons, time is of the
essence.
Id. (footnote omitted) (affirming trial court’s determination that public sale
of vehicle was null and void where towing operator failed to meet statutory
notice requirement).
Here, the approved statement of the evidence and proceedings
establishes that Executive towed and stored Francois’ vehicle on October
16, 2024. Executive did not send or otherwise attempt to deliver the
required notice until October 26, 2024, beyond the five-business-day
period prescribed by section 713.78(4)(c). Executive therefore failed to
strictly comply with section 713.78’s notice requirements.
Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment and remand for further
proceedings consistent with our conclusion that Executive failed to timely
comply with section 713.78’s notice requirements.
Reversed and remanded.
CONNER and FORST, JJ., concur.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.
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