State of Florida v. Gulf Coast Transportation , Inc.

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT GULF COAST TRANSPORTATION, INC., d/b/a UNITED CAB, UNITED TAXI AND TAMPA BAY CAB, SOUTH TAMPA CAR SERVICE, LLC, BLACK DIAMOND CAB SERVICE, LLC, A+ CAB TAMPA, INC., AFTAH ABDERRAHMANE d/b/a MOE TAXI, GUSTAVO BOJORQUEZ d/b/a G & Y TRANSPORTATION, GOLDEN BAY CAR SERVICE, INC., d/b/a AMERICAN TAXI OF TAMPA BAY, PALM TAXI SERVICE, LLC, ABBAY TAXI, LLC, AWASH TAXI, LLC, ABC TAXI, LLC, BAY & BEACH CAB, LLC, d/b/a EXECUTIVE CAB, BAY & BEACH TRANSPORTATION, LLC, CALL-B-4-DUI TRANSPORTATION, INC., ADDIS CAR SERVICE, INC., BLUE TAXI SERVICES, LLC, AAA CAB OF TAMPA, LLC, SHAH'S TAXI SERVICE, LLC, ACCESSIBLE TAXI, LLC, NEW TAMPA TAXI CAB, LLC, MIRETU MENGESHA d/b/a SUNSHINE TAXI, CHECKER CAB TRANSPORTATION, INC., RED TOP CAB COMPANY, YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF TAMPA, INC., TRANSAFE, INC., CONDOR GROUP, INC. d/b/a BLACK CAR, TRANSAFE TRANSPORTATION, INC. d/b/a LIMOX, HYDE PARK TAXI SERVICE, INC., GREEN TAXI CAB, INC., YBOR TAXI, LLC, DAVID'S AUTO SUPPLY, INC., VIP TAXI, INC. d/b/a A-1 TAXI COMPANY, MULUGETA WORKU d/b/a WHITE BLUE TAXICAB, ERMIYAS T. DESTA d/b/a WESTCHASE CAR SERVICES, WESTCHASE TAXI, LLC, and SAMUEL G. TESFAGIORGIS d/b/a UNITED CAB, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, Appellants, v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY and  STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellees. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant, v. GULF COAST TRANSPORTATION, INC., d/b/a, UNITED CAB, UNITED TAXI and TAMPA BAY CAB, SOUTH TAMPA CAR SERVICE, LLC, BLACK DIAMOND CAB SERVICE, LLC, A+ CAB TAMPA, INC., AFTAH ABDERRAHMANE d/b/a MOE TAXI, and GUSTAVO BOJORQUEZ, d/b/a G & Y TRANSPORTATION, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated; and HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, Appellees. Nos. 2D20-3326, 2D20-3432 CONSOLIDATED October 7, 2022 Appeals from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Paul L. Huey, Judge. Bryan S. Gowdy and Dimitrios A. Peteves of Creed & Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville; Jason K. Whittemore of Wagner McLaughlin, P.A., Tampa; and Anthony D. Martino of Clark & Martino, P.A., Tampa, for Gulf Coast Transportation, Inc., et al. Robert E. Brazel, Chief Assistant County Attorney, Office of the County Attorney, Tampa, for Hillsborough County. 2 Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Amit Agarwal, Solicitor General, James H. Percival, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Kevin A. Golembiewski, Deputy Solicitor General, David M. Costello, Assistant Solicitor General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, and Daniel W. Bell, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, for the State of Florida. ATKINSON, Judge. These consolidated appeals1 arise from an inverse condemnation proceeding brought by Gulf Coast Transportation, Inc., doing business as United Cab, and several other taxicab companies operating in Hillsborough County (collectively, Taxicab Companies) against the State of Florida (the State) and Hillsborough County (the County).2 In Case 2D20-3326, the Taxicab Companies appeal the trial court's final judgment in favor of the County. In Case 2D20-3432, the State appeals the trial court's order denying its motion to dismiss the Taxicab Companies' complaint for 1 The cases were previously consolidated for oral argument, and we now consolidate them for purposes of this opinion. 2 Throughout this opinion, references to the County as a party will be to "the County." However, references to Hillsborough County as a geographic location or when it is part of the name of a separate entity (for example, the Hillsborough County Public Transportation Commission) will be to "Hillsborough County." 3 failure to state a claim. We hold that the Taxicab Companies did not have a property interest for purposes of the Takings Clause. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in favor of the County in Case 2D20-3326; we reverse the portion of the order denying the State's motion to dismiss and remand Case 2D20-3432 for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In 1976, the State enacted special legislation which created the Hillsborough County Consolidated Taxicab Commission and governed the makeup of its board of commissioners, its authority, and its operations. Ch. 76-383, Laws of Fla. The special act gave the Hillsborough County Consolidated Taxicab Commission broad powers, including the powers to issue and revoke public vehicle driver licenses and to require inspections, insurance, installation of two-way radios, background checks for public vehicle driver applications, and payment of public vehicle licensing and annual fees. Id. In 1983, the legislature changed the commission's name to the Hillsborough County Public Transportation Commission (PTC). Ch. 83-423, Laws of Fla. The legislature again passed a special act concerning the PTC in 2001, but the PTC's powers and 4 responsibilities remained largely unchanged after the 1983 and 2001 special acts.3 See ch. 2001-299, § 5, Laws of Fla.; cf. ch. 76- 383, Laws of Fla.; ch. 83-423, Laws of Fla. In 2012, the legislature again passed a special act concerning the PTC. Ch. 2012-247, Laws of Fla. In relevant part, the 2012 special act provided (2) Any certificate of public convenience and necessity for taxicabs or any taxicab permit previously or hereafter issued by the [PTC], created by chapter 83-423, Laws of Florida, is the private property of the holder of such certificate or permit. (3) The holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity for taxicabs or a taxicab permit issued by the [PTC] may transfer the certificate or permit by pledge, sale, assignment, sublease, devise, or other means of transfer to another person. . . . Except for a transfer by devise or intestate succession, the transfer must be approved, in advance, by the [PTC], and the proposed transferee must first qualify to be a taxicab certificateholder or permitholder under commission rules. The proposed transferee of a transfer by devise or intestate succession must conditionally qualify as a taxicab certificateholder or permitholder under [PTC] 3 The 1983 special act that changed the commission's name did not change its powers, authority, or the makeup of its board of commissioners. In 2001, the legislature again passed a special act concerning the PTC that removed gender-specific references, protected the rights of PTC employees, created a PTC staff, and permitted the PTC to deny public vehicle driver licenses to or revoke such licenses of individuals convicted of sexual offenses or designated as sexual predators. Ch. 2001-299. 5  rules within 120 days after the transfer, unless otherwise extended by the commission. The conditional nature of the qualification shall be removed upon the probate court's final adjudication that the proposed transferee is actually entitled to the ownership of the transferred certificate or permit. Ch. 2012-247. The 2012 amendment also specifically recognized the "existing and authorized population cap and limits for taxicab permits" promulgated by the PTC in its rules and incorporated the "existing population cap and limits" into the amendment. See ch. 2012-247(4); see also Hillsborough County Public Transportation Commission, Rule 1-2.001(7) (Mar. 19, 2013) ("The [PTC] may at no time authorize more than one (1) Taxicab Type of service Permit per one thousand-nine hundred (1,900) inhabitants of Hillsborough County . . . ."). Through chapters 76-383, 83-423, 2001-299, and 2012-247, the legislature created an administrative body—the PTC— empowered to create and maintain a capped taxicab market in Hillsborough County. The PTC governed and regulated participation in this limited market by promulgating rules according to the special legislation and issuing certificates of public convenience and taxicab permits (collectively, medallions) to limit 6 the individuals or entities that could participate in what was effectively a closed market. A person could only participate in this closed market scheme while in possession of a valid medallion issued by the PTC according to its rules and the special legislation. The 2012 special legislation granted medallion holders property rights in their medallions so that they could transfer their medallions to otherwise qualifying individuals who wanted to compete in the closed market. The grant of property rights resulted in a secondary market in which medallion holders could transfer their medallions for value to other persons approved by the PTC or devise their medallions to persons who were required to become conditionally qualified to hold the medallions pursuant to PTC rules within 120 days. The PTC, as created and modified by the special acts passed in 1976, 1983, 2001, and 2012, governed the taxicab industry in Hillsborough County until 2017 when the legislature dissolved the PTC and repealed the 2012 special act. Ch. 2017-198, Laws of Fla. Chapter 2017-198 did not transfer any of the PTC's assets or liabilities to the County or direct the County to adopt any specific regulatory scheme. The 2017 legislation repealing chapter 7 2012-247 did not address whether the County must compensate medallion holders for any loss of property rights in their medallions that had been conferred by chapter 2012-247 or otherwise recognize those property rights. The PTC having been dissolved and the special legislation governing it having been repealed, the County was authorized to regulate vehicles for hire pursuant to section 125.01(1)(n), Florida Statutes (2017) (providing that the governing bodies of counties have the power to license and regulate passenger vehicles for hire in unincorporated areas and that the governing bodies of charter counties may issue a limited number of permits to operate taxis). The County passed a vehicle for hire ordinance which required persons desiring to engage in taxicab business in Hillsborough County to obtain certificates from the Tax Collector and permits for each vehicle for hire. Hillsborough County, Fla., Ordinance 17-22, (Sept. 7, 2017). The County's new ordinance did not recognize or grandfather in medallions issued by the PTC. See id. The Taxicab Companies operated taxicabs in Hillsborough County while the special acts were in effect and had been issued medallions by the PTC. According to the 2012 special legislation, 8 the Taxicab Companies were given transferable "property" rights in their medallions. After the State enacted chapter 2017-198 and the County promulgated Ordinance 17-22, the Taxicab Companies could not use their PTC medallions to continue their business in Hillsborough County. Since medallions issued by the PTC no longer served to permit a person to operate a taxicab in Hillsborough County, the Taxicab Companies concluded that their medallions had been rendered worthless. The Taxicab Companies brought the underlying inverse condemnation action, claiming that the State and the County had taken their medallions without compensation. In their second amended complaint, the Taxicab Companies alleged one count of unlawful taking without compensation against each governmental entity. In Count 1, the Taxicab Companies alleged that they had purchased the medallions at substantial cost; the new ordinance required them to purchase new certificates and permits; the County did not compensate them for or offer to purchase the old medallions; the old medallions could no longer be used to operate taxicabs in Hillsborough County or be transferred for value; and, therefore, the County has taken their property without compensation. In Count 2, the Taxicab Companies alleged 9 that the State had taken their private property by negating their taxicab medallions which rendered them valueless and deprived the Taxicab Companies of all reasonable and beneficial use of the medallions. Like in Count 1, the Taxicab Companies alleged that the State did not compensate them for or offer to purchase the old medallions. The second amended complaint did not allege that any of the Taxicab Companies were no longer operating in Hillsborough County or that any of them had been deprived of that opportunity either under the new County ordinance or as a result of the State's 2017 act dissolving the PTC and repealing the 2012 special legislation. The County filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be liable for any alleged taking because it neither granted nor removed any property rights that the Taxicab Companies may have had in their medallions. The State filed a motion to dismiss the Taxicab Companies' second amended complaint, arguing that the Taxicab Companies had no cognizable property rights in the old medallions and, even if they did, the County was responsible for any taking. In response to both the County's and the State's motions, the Taxicab Companies argued 10 that the taking occurred through the combined efforts of the State and the County. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order, finding the following facts were undisputed: the PTC was a governmental entity created by the State, the PTC was independent and separate from the County, the County had no control or authority over the PTC or the issuance of medallions, and the State Legislature had limited control over the PTC since the legislature could modify or abolish the PTC. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the County "had no power to do anything as to those [medallions] and, in fact, did nothing;" therefore, "there were no certificates for [the] County to take because" the medallions "had, in essence, vanished" as a consequence of the legislature's prior act of abolishing the PTC and repealing the 2012 legislation. For these reasons, the trial court granted the County's motion for summary judgment and entered a final judgment in favor of the County. In the same order, the trial court denied the State's motion to dismiss because the State had been "acting within its power" when it "cause[d] the demise of the PTC and, thus, its medallions" by legislatively 11 abolishing the PTC and repealing its 2012 special act that created property rights in the medallions. We have jurisdiction to review the order denying the State's motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(k) because the trial court's ruling on that motion is "directly related to an aspect"—whether a taking occurred within the meaning of the Florida Constitution—of the appealable final summary judgment in favor of the County. "A trial court's decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de novo." TLC Props., Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 292 So. 3d 10, 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (citing Mills v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 27 So. 3d 95, 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)). "Because a ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is an issue of law, it is reviewable on appeal by the de novo standard of review." Crocker v. Marks, 856 So. 2d 1123, 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (quoting Bell v. Indian River Mem. Hosp., 778 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). The Florida Constitution provides that "[n]o private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner . . . ." Art. X, § 6(a), Fla. Const.; see also TLC Props., Inc., 292 So. 3d at 13–14. Florida 12 courts have interpreted the Takings Clauses of the Florida and federal constitutions as operating "coextensively."4 Orlando Bar Grp., LLC v. DeSantis, 339 So. 3d 487, 490 n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (citing St. Johns River Water Mgmt Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1222 (Fla. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 570 U.S. 595 (2013)). When the government has not formally instituted eminent domain proceedings, a property owner claiming that the government has taken his or her private property without compensation may file a cause of action for inverse condemnation, as the Taxicab Companies did in this case. See TLC Props., Inc., 292 So. 3d at 14 (quoting Schick v. Fla. Dep't of Agric., 504 So. 2d 1318, 1319 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)). In inverse condemnation proceedings, the "plaintiff must first demonstrate that he possesses a 'property interest' that is constitutionally protected. Only if the plaintiff actually possesses 4 Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court has recognized that the Florida Constitution provides for more extensive compensation than the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause because "full compensation" provided by the Florida Constitution includes reasonable attorney's fees whereas the "just compensation" provided by the Fifth Amendment does not include attorney's fees. Joseph B. Doerr Tr. v. Cent. Fla. Expressway Auth., 177 So. 3d 1209, 1215 n.5 (Fla. 2015). 13 such an interest will a reviewing court then determine whether the deprivation or reduction of that interest constitutes a 'taking.' " Checker Cab Ops., Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, 899 F.3d 908, 917 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Givens v. Ala. Dep't of Corr., 381 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2004)); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000–04 (1984) (explaining that courts must first determine whether the plaintiff has a property interest protected by the Takings Clause in the thing which the government is alleged to have taken). Privileges and licenses are not constitutionally protected property interests for purposes of the Takings Clause. See Marine One, Inc. v. Manatee County, 898 F.2d 1490, 1492–93 (11th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that revocation of "mere licenses . . . cannot rise to the level of a Fifth Amendment taking" (emphasis in original)); see also Support Working Animals, Inc. v. DeSantis, 457 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1214 n.11 (N.D. Fla. 2020) ("To the extent Plaintiffs assert they possess a constitutionally protected property interest in the continued operation of their dog-racing businesses, Plaintiffs' participation in the dog-racing business is a privilege and is not a legal right. Therefore, Plaintiffs do not possess a constitutionally 14 protected property interest in their licenses to engage in pari-mutuel dog racing." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). It is well-established that permits and licenses to operate taxicabs are privileges created by the government. Hamid v. Metro Limo, Inc., 619 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) ("A taxicab is a common carrier. The right to operate common carriers is not an inherent right, but a mere privilege. The privilege can be acquired only by permit, license, or franchise emanating from the governmental unit." (citations omitted)); Hartman Transp., Inc. v. Bevis, 293 So. 2d 37, 40 (Fla. 1974); Riley v. Lawson, 143 So. 619, 622 (Fla. 1932); see also State ex rel. Hutton v. City of Baton Rouge, 47 So. 2d 665, 668 (La. 1950) ("A certificate of public convenience and necessity is in the nature of a personal privilege or license, which may be amended or revoked by the power authorized to issue it, and the holder does not acquire a property right."). This privilege is a creature of statute; as such, any value in the medallions that conferred the privilege of participating in the taxicab business in Hillsborough County was derived from the statutes which created the medallions and the regulatory scheme governing the PTC. 15  The fact that the legislature declared PTC medallions to be transferrable personal property does not transform that which is a license or a privilege into a property interest cognizable under the Takings Clause. In other words, the "private property" label given to the medallions did not transform the license—something not protected by the Takings Clause—into a compensable property interest. Cf. 145 Fisk, LLC v. Nicklas, 986 F.3d 759, 770 (7th Cir. 2021) (recognizing that to determine whether a person has a property interest for purposes of the Due Process Clause, courts must "look behind labels" (quoting Rebirth Christian Acad. Daycare, Inc. v. Brizzi, 835 F.3d 742, 747–48 (7th Cir. 2016))). In Dennis Melancon, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, the City of New Orleans had passed ordinances that created a regulatory framework governing the local taxicab industry. 703 F.3d 262, 265–66 (5th Cir. 2012). Like the special legislation in this case, the ordinances required taxicab operators to obtain one of the limited number of certificates of public necessity and convenience (called CPNCs) to provide taxi services in the City. See id. at 266. "As a result of this limited supply, and because the City permitted CPNC holders to transfer their certificates for consideration, a secondary 16 market developed for the exchange of CPNCs." Id. Like the special legislation in this case, "all CPNC transfers required approval by the City" and the governing ordinances "provided that such approval would be granted upon the transferee's completion of various City- imposed requirements." Id. The City's original regulatory framework was silent regarding whether CPNCs were a "privileges," "rights," "property," or something else. CPNC holders filed lawsuits after the City enacted ordinances amending the regulatory framework. In one new ordinance, the City expressly provided that "CPNCs are privileges and not rights." Id. (emphasis added). Other new ordinances made the City's approval of transfers discretionary rather than mandatory and prohibited transfers of CPNCs during suspension and revocation proceedings. Id. In the lawsuits, the CPNC holders argued that the amendments to the regulatory framework constituted a regulatory taking without just compensation. Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a preliminary injunction entered by the district court, concluding that the CPNC holders had not established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits because they did not 17 possess a property interest in the CPNCs that was protected by the Takings Clause: To be sure, as Plaintiffs argue, the City traditionally has permitted CPNC holders to transfer their certificates for consideration. By so doing, the City tacitly has contributed to the development of a secondary market wherein CPNCs historically have attained significant value. This does not, however, change our understanding of the fact that CPNC holders merely possess a "license to participate in the highly regulated taxicab market [that] is subject to regulatory change." Id. at 273 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coal., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 572 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir. 2009)). [W]hatever interest Plaintiffs hold in their CPNCs is the product of a regulatory scheme that also vests the City with broad discretion to alter or extinguish that interest. Indeed, although Plaintiffs allege that the April 2012 amendment . . . makes discretionary the previously mandatory transfer approval process, we note that even under the prior version of the ordinance, the City retained the right to impose various preapproval requirements. In other words, even under the previous version of the ordinance, a transferee's ability to obtain a CPNC was bounded by the City's regulatory framework—a framework that was subject to further change. . . . . . . Although it is true that a secondary market has developed based on the transferability of CPNCs, as we have explained, any resulting interest Plaintiffs hold in their CPNCs has emerged from a regulatory framework that itself allows the City to limit or revoke that interest. Such an interest does not fall within the ambit of a 18  constitutionally protected property right, for it amounts to no more than a unilateral expectation that the City's regulation would not disrupt the secondary market value of CPNCs. Id. at 274 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Unlike the 2012 special legislation expressly designating PTC medallions in this case as "private property," the original ordinances in Dennis Melancon did not include such a designation and were silent regarding their property status until the ordinance amendment expressly providing that CPNCs were "privileges not rights" precipitated the lawsuit from which the Dennis Melancon appeal was taken. Nonetheless, despite that dissimilarity, the reasoning of Dennis Melancon provides apt guidance for assessing the claims of the Taxicab Companies in this case, whose only interest in their medallions is the product of the regulatory scheme created by the legislature in the special legislation governing the PTC. See id. at 273. This regulatory scheme was subject to change—indeed, the scheme had been altered and amended by special legislation and PTC rules several times since the legislature created it in 1976. Ch. 83-423; ch. 2001-299; ch. 2012-247; see Dennis Melancon, 703 F.3d at 273–74 (citing Minneapolis Taxi 19 Owners, 572 F.3d at 509); Ill. Transp. Trade Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 839 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2016) ("A 'legislature, having created a statutory entitlement, is not precluded from altering or even eliminating the entitlement by later legislation.' " (quoting Dibble v. Quinn, 793 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2015))). The fact that the legislature declared that medallions were the private property of medallion holders and granted them the ability to transfer their medallions—subject always to the regulation of the PTC—does not transform a medallion from a license into a property interest protected by the Takings Clause; rather, the legislature always retained the power to change or abolish the regulatory framework that created the Taxicab Companies' medallions. See Dennis Melancon, 703 F.3d at 273–74; see also Ill. Transp. Trade Ass'n, 839 F. 3d at 599 (recognizing that the legislature's decision to deregulate or amend existing regulations "is a legally permissible choice" that did not run afoul the Takings Clause). By simply pronouncing that a government license or benefit is "private property," a legislature does not thereby create compensable property that gives rise to a Takings claim ex nihilo. Cf. Ill. Transp. Trade Ass'n, 839 F.3d at 599. While future legislatures are required 20 to give faith to promises made by previous legislatures or state agencies in contracts, cf. Scott v. Williams, 107 So. 3d 379, 385 (Fla. 2013), the legislature did not make a promise or a contract with the medallion holders by enacting the 2012 special legislation. Instead, the legislature was regulating the taxicab industry. Future legislatures are free to amend or abolish regulatory frameworks established by their predecessors; doing so does not necessarily give rise to a Takings Clause claim. See Ill. Transp. Trade Ass'n, 839 F.3d at 599. The dissent and Taxicab Companies rely implicitly on the premise that once a legislature has affixed the "private property" label to a set of statutorily created rights and privileges, all subsequent legislatures—and courts—must agree that the medallions were and are property subject to the Takings Clause and that medallion holders must be compensated if and when future legislative amendments eliminate or reduce the value of their rights or privileges. If governing entities did have prospective power over their successors to create such "property" that if abolished or altered by a future legislature would give rise to a Takings Clause claim, the government would be required to "regulate by purchase." 21 See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) ("[G]overnment regulation . . . involves the adjustment of rights for the public good . . . [which o]ften . . . curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. To require compensation in all such circumstances would effectively compel the government to regulate by purchase." (emphasis in original)). But they do not; the meaning of the constitution—including the Takings Clause—is the meaning of its language in context, and that is not subject to the whim of legislative bodies any more than it is subject to the whim of judicial officers. See Advisory Op. to Governor re Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020) ("The words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means." (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012))). The Taxicab Companies have argued that the legislature's pronouncement that the medallions are "private property" was more than a mere designation to define the parameters of transferability; rather, they contend, it created something owned by the designees, and when the legislature abolished the PTC and repealed chapter 22 2012-247, the legislature had taken some thing from them for which they were owed compensation under the Takings Clause. To the contrary, the medallions are effectively nothing more than a labelled status that provided a market advantage by virtue of the exclusivity caused by their scarcity. That exclusivity is not a thing that can be owned by an individual for which a government must compensate them under the Takings Clause; it is merely a consequence of the regulatory framework in a highly regulated industry in which participants have no expectation of the maintenance of the status quo. See Dennis Melancon, 703 F. 3d at 273–74 (concluding that CPNC holders merely possessed a "license to participate in the highly regulated taxicab market" and that "whatever interest Plaintiffs h[e]ld in their CPNCs [wa]s the product of a regulatory scheme that also vest[ed] the City with broad discretion to alter or extinguish that interest" (emphasis in original)). We agree with our dissenting colleague that statutory language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning and that courts should not treat words or phrases as mere surplusage. See Alachua County v. Watson, 333 So. 3d 162, 169 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Niz- 23 Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480 (2021)). However, the assertion that the majority is not giving effect to the phrase "private property" and according it its ordinary meaning is based on an unsupported premise—that the ordinary meaning of the words "private property" necessarily includes compensability under the Takings Clause. In order to conclude that the plain meaning of "private property" requires compensation under the Takings Clause, we must infer something from that phrase that is not apparent from the language in the context of the 2012 special legislation—that the phrase necessarily conveys that the property is subject to compensation under the Takings Clause. Rejecting that premise neither fails to give effect to the phrase "private property" nor denies it its ordinary meaning—a meaning that does not in and of itself answer the question of whether it is compensable under the constitution. See, e.g., Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65–66 ("[T]he denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety."); Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 95 F.3d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1996) ("Corn 24 correctly notes that the property rights protected by the Fifth Amendment are created and defined by state law. He errs, however, in suggesting that the Fifth Amendment requires the payment of just compensation for every deprivation of a right recognized by state law. 'Property' as used in the Just Compensation Clause is defined much more narrowly than in the due process clauses. Thus, while certain property interests may not be taken without due process, they may be taken without paying just compensation." (citations omitted) (first citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992); then citing Pittman v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 64 F.3d 1098, 1104 (7th Cir. 1995); and then citing Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Jay Cnty., 57 F.3d 505, 511 n.6 (7th Cir. 1995))). Because not all property interests are compensable under the Takings Clause, the dissent and the Taxicab Companies' conclusion relies upon a non sequitur that labelling something "private property" ipso facto makes it compensable under the Takings Clause. The pivotal question is what the constitution means when it uses the term "property"—and whether the interest created and labeled "property" by the 2012 special legislation falls within that 25 meaning. To resolve this case, we must determine whether this property interest—whatever the Taxicab Companies owned when they were granted medallions—is the type of property interest protected by the Takings Clause, an endeavor that requires us to construe the word "property" as it is used in that clause, because the word "property" in the 2012 special legislation does not answer that question. See, e.g. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65–66; Corn, 95 F.3d at 1075. The dissent is necessarily construing the term "property" in the constitution by concluding that the Takings Clause requires compensation for the elimination of any right or privilege to which the legislature affixes the label "private property." That is an expansive understanding of the word "property" for purposes of the Takings Clause that is neither supported by case law nor compelled by the language of the constitution. To support this notion, the dissent points out that the constitution itself does not define the term "property" and that "[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution" but instead "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 26 1001 (alteration in original) (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)). However, this does not compel the premise essential to the Taxicab Companies' and our dissenting colleague's argument—that property compensable under the Takings Clause necessarily includes interests that do not exist independently from the government regulation that created them so long as the regulation labels them "private property." The case law upon which our dissenting colleague relies does not support such a premise but rather the opposite. While language in published Takings Clause precedent describes property rights or interests for purposes of the Takings Clause as being created, defined, or determined by state law, see, e.g., Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2075–76 (2021); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1001, the property itself is not created by or derived from state law. Rather, the property itself preexisted the regulations and laws defining a person's property interest in that thing. In Cedar Point, for example, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a California law that required agricultural employers to open their real property to union organizers for up to three hours per day, 120 days per year, 27 constituted a taking. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2069, 2080. The Court explained that "[a]s a general matter, . . . property rights protected by the Takings Clause are creatures of state law." Id. at 2075–76. While the agricultural employers' right to exclude others from their real property was defined by state law, the property itself—the real property—was not created by state law. The agricultural employers obtained the property independently of the state law regulating and defining individuals' interests and rights with respect to real property. See id. In Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 159 (1998), the Supreme Court held that interest income generated on Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts was the client's property for purposes of the Takings Clause. The Court explained that "[b]ecause the Constitution protects rather than creates property interests, the existence of a property interest is determined by reference to 'existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.' " Id. at 164 (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). However, as in Cedar Point, the regulation did not create the property—interest income generated from the account itself was not 28 created by state law; it existed independently of the state regulation requiring the interest be paid to foundations that funded legal services for low-income individuals. See id. In Ruckelshaus, the Supreme Court held that pesticide companies had a property interest in health, safety, and environmental data provided to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) because the data constituted a trade secret which is a type of intangible property protected by the Takings Clause. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003–04. The Court reaffirmed the "basic axiom that ' "[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." ' " Id. at 1001 (alteration in original) (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 161). While the data the companies provided to the EPA may have been compiled as the result of a government regulation, the property at issue—pesticide companies' trade secrets—was not created by the government regulation. Rather, that data and its value was obtained or generated by the companies, independent of any law protecting them as trade secrets or the regulation that required the 29 pesticide companies to compile and provide the information to the EPA. In regulatory takings cases, the property owners typically have had a preexisting property interest that predated the regulation at issue, and the regulation erodes or elimi