Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT SABRA HEALTH CARE HOLDINGS III, LLC; SABRA HEALTH CARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; SABRA HEALTH CARE, LLC; and SABRA HEALTH CARE REIT, INC., Petitioners, v. THE ESTATE OF CAROL DESANTIS, by and through ANTHONY STEVEN DESANTIS, successor personal representative; SKYLINE HEALTH CARE, LLC a/k/a SKYLINE HEALTHCARE, LLC; SKYLINE MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC; SUN ISLAND CAPITAL, LLC; SUN ISLAND HEALTHCARE, LLC; JOSEPH SCHWARTZ; CLEAR WATER CARE AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC; 703 SOUTH 29TH STREET SPE, LLC; LAUREL POINT CARE AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC; WEST JACKSONVILLE CARE AND REHABILITATION, LLC; ATLANTIC CARE AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC; AUBURNDALE OAKS CARE AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC; LAUREL POINT HOLDING, LLC; FC LENDING-SUNSHINE, LLC; PACIFIC WESTERN BANK CORPORATION; INTEGRATED HEALTH SERVICES AT CENTRAL FLORIDA, INC.; LYRIC HEALTH CARE HOLDINGS III, LLC; LYRIC HEALTH CARE, LLC; LYRIC HC OPERATIONS ACQUISITION, LLC; CAPITAL FUNDING GROUP, INC.; MONTANI INVESTORS, LLC; RIDGE CREST HEALTH CARE, LLC; ADDIT, LLC; SLC PROFESSIONALS CHAI, LLC; SLC PROFESSIONALS HOLDINGS, LLC; JOHN DWYER; ALAN J. ZUCCARI; and TIMOTHY F. NICHOLSON, Respondents. No. 2D21-571 January 14, 2022 Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Amy D. Williams, Judge. Seth M. Schimmel of Phelps Dunbar LLP, Tampa, for Petitioners. Lisa M. Tanaka of Wilkes & Associates, P.A., Tampa, for Respondents, Estate of DeSantis. Kenneth N. Johnson of Mesches & Johnson P.L., Palm Beach Gardens, for Respondents, Integrated Health, Lyric Health Care Holdings III, Lyric Health Care, Lyric HC Operations Acquisition, Capital Funding, Ridge Crest Health, Addit, SLC Professionals Chai, SLC Professionals Holdings, Dwyer, and Nicholson. No Appearance for remaining Respondents. LABRIT, Judge. Sabra Health Care Holdings III, LLC; Sabra Health Care Limited Partnership; Sabra Health Care, LLC; and Sabra Health Care REIT, Inc. (collectively, "Sabra") seek certiorari review of an order denying their motion to dismiss the complaint filed by the 2 Estate of Carol DeSantis. Granting this petition turns on whether the DeSantis Estate's claims against Sabra are subject to the requirements of section 400.023(3), Florida Statutes (2019). We deny the petition because Sabra has not shown that the allegations in the complaint fall within this statute. Factual and Procedural Background While the DeSantis Estate filed a lengthy sixty-seven-page complaint against twenty-eight defendants below, the facts underlying this case are relatively simple. Sabra owned a nursing home property, and in 2015, it sold the property to the entities that operate Laurel Pointe nursing home. In March 2016, Carol DeSantis became a resident of the Laurel Pointe nursing home, where she allegedly suffered various damages. Thereafter, the DeSantis Estate sued Sabra for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty (count two) and civil conspiracy (count four), alleging that Sabra knowingly sold the property to a "sham" entity and knew that Laurel Pointe got its nursing home license "using false information and material misrepresentations." Sabra moved to dismiss these claims. Sabra asserted, among other things, that counts two and four fell under section 400.023 3 because these counts "appear[ed] to sound in negligence." Sabra contended, because the DeSantis Estate hadn't met the section 400.023(3) prerequisites to filing a negligence action, the DeSantis Estate's claims against it should be dismissed. The trial court issued an unelaborated order denying Sabra's motion, and Sabra filed the instant petition. Standard of Review "To be entitled to certiorari review, the petitioners 'must establish (1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the trial (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.' " E. Bay NC, LLC v. Reddish, 306 So. 3d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (quoting Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc., 658 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). "We examine prongs two and three first to determine our certiorari jurisdiction." Cap. One, N.A. v. Forbes, 34 So. 3d 209, 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). "If jurisdictional prongs two and three are not fulfilled, then we dismiss the petition rather than deny it." Id. Analysis 4 The parties agree that granting Sabra's petition turns on whether counts two and four are subject to section 400.023(3). The parties also agree that section 400.023(3) only applies to claims of negligence and section 400.022 violations. In its petition, Sabra argues—once again—that counts two and four amount to negligence and section 400.022 violation claims. To support this theory, Sabra doesn't rely on the allegations in counts two and four. Instead, it points to a complaint from a different lawsuit where the DeSantis Estate sued Laurel Pointe for negligence and violating Ms. DeSantis's section 400.022 rights. Sabra argues, because the DeSantis Estate sued Laurel Pointe for negligence and section 400.022 violations in the other complaint, the DeSantis Estate's claims against Sabra in this action are "inextricably connected" to negligence and section 400.022 violations. We disagree. Sabra's reliance on this other lawsuit is misplaced. As was the trial court, we are "confined to consideration of the allegations found within the four corners of the complaint" in reviewing an order on a motion to dismiss. Migliazzo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 290 So. 3d 577, 578–79 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020). Because Sabra has not shown how the allegations in the underlying 5 complaint amount to negligence or section 400.022 claims, we have no reason to second guess the trial court's denial of Sabra's motion to dismiss. Cf. id. Petition denied. CASANUEVA and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 6