Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D19-3653 _____________________________ STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY EXPRESSWAY AUTHORITY, and FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Appellees. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. John C. Cooper, Judge. March 31, 2021 B.L. THOMAS, J. The Florida Department of Transportation appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for the Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority asserting that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims because the Expressway Authority lacked standing under the public official standing doctrine. We agree and reverse. The Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority was created in 1994 by the Miami-Dade County Board of County Commissioners by Ordinance Article XVIII, Section 2-128. As an expressway authority under the Florida Expressway Authority Act, the Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority controlled several expressways (toll roads) in Miami-Dade County. See §§ 348.001–.0012, Fla. Stat. (2018) (repealed 2019). Such control was established by an agreement with the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) in 1996. In 2019, the Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 2019-169, Laws of Florida, amended Chapter 348, Florida Statutes, to dissolve the Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority and to transfer its assets and authority to the Greater Miami Expressway Agency (GMX), an agency newly created by the chapter. See §§ 348.0301–348.0318, Fla. Stat. (2019). After the Greater Miami Expressway Agency Act was enacted, but before it was signed by the Governor, the Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Act and several existing related statutes violated the home rule authority of Miami-Dade County and unconstitutionally impaired its contracts. See Art. VIII, § 6(e), Fla. Const. The Department of Transportation sought summary judgment asserting that the Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority lacked standing to bring the particular causes of action stated in its complaint and that it lacked standing to sue. The trial court incorrectly held that the Expressway Authority had standing and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Expressway Authority as to count 1 of its complaint. By that count, the Expressway Authority sought a declaration that the Greater Miami Expressway Agency Act was an unconstitutional local law which violated Miami-Dade County’s home rule authority. An order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Bowman v. Barker, 172 So. 3d 1013, 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citing S. Nat. Track Serv., Inc. v. Gilley, 152 So. 3d 13, 16 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)). The allegations in a motion for summary judgment must be accepted as true with every possible inference drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. See id. at 1015; see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c). Although the Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority argues it is not a state agency, its motion for summary judgment did not allege that it was not a state agency; its own statements in 2 prior litigation asserted that it was an agency of the state. Further, section 348.0003, Florida Statutes (2018) (repealed 2019), states that all expressway authorities “shall be an agency of the state.” The Florida Supreme Court and this Court have long recognized that Florida adheres to a strict separation of powers doctrine as embedded in our organic law. See Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const.; see State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 353 (Fla. 2000); see Citizens for Strong Sch., Inc. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., 232 So. 3d 1163, 1171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017); see also B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 991 (Fla. 1994); Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1978); Barati v. State, 198 So. 3d 69, 79–80 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). As a state agency, the public official standing doctrine applies to bar the Expressway Authority’s complaint: The public official standing doctrine, first explained in State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line Railway Co. v. State Board of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681 (1922), provides that “a public official may not defend his nonperformance of a statutory duty by challenging the constitutionality of the statute.” Crossings At Fleming Island Cmty. Dev. Dist. v. Echeverri, 991 So. 2d 793, 794–803 (Fla. 2008). The doctrine, grounded in the separation of powers, recognizes that public officials are obligated to obey the legislature’s duly enacted statute until the judiciary passes on its constitutionality. Id. at 683. For that reason, a public official’s “[d]isagreement with a constitutional or statutory duty, or the means by which it is to be carried out, does not create a justiciable controversy or provide an occasion to give an advisory judicial opinion.” Dep’t of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 1981) (holding that the property appraiser lacked standing to challenge an administrative rule), superseded by statute, § 195.092(2), Fla. Stat. (1980), as recognized in Crossings At Fleming Island, 991 So. 2d at 802–03 (explaining that while the Legislature partially overruled the holding in Markham by enacting section 195.092, which allows a property appraiser and any taxing authority to challenge the validity of any 3 “rule, regulation, order, directive or determination of any agency of the state,” the Legislature “did not alter the common law principle announced in Atlantic Coast Line and Markham that property appraisers, as public officials, lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute”). Sch. Dist. of Escambia Cnty. v. Santa Rosa Dunes Owners Ass’n, Inc., 274 So. 3d 492, 494 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). The prohibition against public officials attacking the constitutionality of a statute is not limited to those public officials charged with a duty under the challenged law. The prohibition extends to the public officials whose duties are “affected” by the challenged law. Sch. Dist. of Escambia Cnty., 274 So. 3d at 494 (holding that although statute did not specifically require District to perform a duty, District lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute because the statute’s operation affected the District’s duty under other statutory provisions). Therefore, the Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority lacks standing under the public official standing doctrine because it is a state agency attacking the constitutionality of the 2019 Amendment. And contrary to the Expressway Authority’s arguments, no exception to that doctrine applies here. See Barr v. Watts, 70 So. 2d 347, 350 (Fla. 1953) (noting the personal injury and expenditure of public funds exceptions to the public official standing doctrine). Neither exception applies because the Expressway Authority failed to show that the alleged injuries did “not grow out of the obligation of [its] oath of office, nor out of [its] official position” or that its administration of the act in question required the expenditure of public funds. Sch. Dist. of Escambia Cnty., 274 So. 3d at 496; Barr, 70 So. 2d at 350; see Green v. City of Pensacola, 80 So. 2d 897, 900 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959). The Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority also argues it has standing because it is willing to perform its duties but it is prevented from doing so, erroneously relying on Reid v. Kirk, 257 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1972), Davis v. Gronenmeyer 251 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971) and Department of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981). In Reid, a county assessor sought a declaratory judgment against a Department of Revenue directive, but the assessor did 4 not challenge the validity of the statutes applicable to him. 257 So. 2d at 4. In Gronenmeyer, a county civil service board sought to enjoin the enforcement and implementation of an ordinance, not a state statute. 251 So. 2d at 2–3. Lastly, in Markham, a county appraiser sought a declaratory judgment. But the supreme court held the county appraisers lacked standing for declaratory relief in their governmental capacities because a “[d]isagreement with a constitutional or statutory duty, or the means by which it is to be carried out, does not create a justiciable controversy or provide an occasion to give an advisory judicial opinion.” 396 So. 2d at 1121 (citing Askew v. City of Ocala, 348 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1977)). Reid and Gronenmeyer are both distinguishable because there, the officials did not challenge the constitutionality of a state statute. See Reid, 257 So. 2d at 4; see Gronenmeyer 251 So. 2d at 2–3. And just as in Markham, the Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority lacks standing for declaratory relief in its governmental capacities because the mere disagreement with the constitutional or statutory duty does not create a justiciable controversy. See 396 So. 2d at 1121. Thus, the Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority lacks standing. We reverse the trial court’s partial final judgment granting the Expressway Authority’s motion for summary judgment on count 1 and direct the trial court to dismiss the complaint because all of the Expressway Authority’s claims purport to challenge the constitutionality of related state statutes duly enacted by the Legislature, which is barred by the public official standing doctrine. OSTERHAUS and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ 5 Jason B. Gonzalez and Daniel Nordby of Shutts & Bowen, LLP, Tallahassee; and William E. Foster, Assistant General Counsel, and Clark N. Gates, Assistant General Counsel, of Florida Department of Transportation, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Brooke E. Lewis, Mohammad O. Jazil of Hopping Green & Sams, Tallahassee; Joe Jacquot and Nicholas A. Primrose of the Office of Governor Ron DeSantis, Tallahassee; Valerie L. Chartier- Hogancamp, Orlando; Eugene E. Stearns, of Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Miami; Kelly A. O’Keefe, Glenn Burhans, Bridget K. Smitha, and Melanie R. Leitman, of Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Tallahassee; Oren Rosenthal and Michael B. Valdes, Assistant County Attorneys, Miami; and Kirk D. DeLeon of DeLeon & DeLeon, Miami, for Appellees. 6