Full Opinion

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ Case No. 5D2025-3518 LT Case No. 35-2024-CA-001287 ____________________________ BOWEN KOU, Appellant, v. FLORIDA REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE, INC., and BEN ALBRITTON, Appellees. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County. Dan R. Mosley, Judge. Anthony F. Sabatini, of Sabatini Law Firm, P.A., Mount Dora, for Appellant. Mohammad O. Jazil, of Holtzman Vogel Baran Torchinsky & Josefiak PLLC, Tallahassee, for Appellees. September 25, 2026 PER CURIAM. This is a direct appeal from a post-judgment contempt order. Appellant claims that the trial court was not authorized to use its contempt power to threaten Appellant with incarceration unless he posted a bond or deposited into the court registry the full monetary judgment awarding fees and costs to Appellees pursuant to section 768.295, Florida Statutes, Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute. We agree. Article I, section 11 of the Florida Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud.” Florida courts have consistently applied this provision to prevent use of the contempt power to enforce the payment of monetary judgments not involving child support or alimony. See Schroll v. Schroll, 262 So. 3d 832, 835 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018); Al Ghurair v. Zaczac, 255 So. 3d 485, 487 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018); Dufour v. Damiani, 231 So. 3d 486, 489 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); Pineiro v. Pineiro, 988 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Whelan v. Whelan, 736 So. 2d 732, 733–34 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Yates v. Bryan, 699 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); State ex rel. Gillham v. Phillips, 193 So. 2d 26, 28–29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); Tabas v. Hudson, 175 So. 2d 224, 225–26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). “Although courts can use contempt powers to compel specific actions to facilitate property transfers—they can, for example, use contempt to compel return of personal property—they cannot convert a general payment obligation into something enforceable by contempt by simply characterizing it as an obligation to perform a specific action.” Schroll, 262 So. 3d at 835 (citation omitted). Here, the trial court was not authorized to use its contempt power to enforce payment of a monetary judgment for fees and costs under Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute as this constituted a violation of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. Moreover, the court could not require Appellant to post a bond pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310 or deposit money into the court registry under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.600, as neither rule is compulsory. See First States Invs. 3300, LLC v. Pheil, 52 So. 3d 845, 848 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Morroni v. Fisher, 647 So. 2d 127, 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s contempt order. REVERSED. JAY, C.J., and WALLIS and LAMBERT, JJ., concur. 2 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ 3