Chad Mc Daniel v. Laura Alise Mc Daniel
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJune 15, 2022
Docket2D20-2845
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
CHAD McDANIEL,
Appellant,
v.
LAURA ALISE McDANIEL,
Appellee.
No. 2D20-2845
June 15, 2022
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Wesley D.
Tibbals, Judge.
Eric J. Stuedemann of Salty Law, P.A., Bradenton, for Appellant.
Eileen H. Griffin of Griffin & Associates, P.A., Brandon, for Appellee.
ATKINSON, Judge.
Chad McDaniel (Father) appeals the final judgment of
dissolution of marriage, contesting, among other issues, his income
utilized in the calculation of child support. We reverse and remand
for further proceedings because the trial court incorrectly calculated
the Father's income from 2018, 2019, and 2020 for the purposes of
determining current and retroactive child support. There was no
competent, substantial evidence that the per diem amounts that the
trial court included reduced the Father's living expenses. There
were also errors with the calculations of the Father's income for
2019 and 2020, which we explain below.
The parties were married in 2011. They have four minor
children between the ages of four and ten. The Mother was a
veterinarian. The Father worked for a utility construction and
maintenance company. His position required him to travel to
various office locations, including Port Charlotte, Ft. Myers, and
Bowling Green. He testified that the per diem payments he received
from his employer were "to decrease the cost for me to travel."
As the Mother conceded at oral argument, the trial court erred
in calculating the Father's 2019 income by failing to utilize the
correct monthly total of $6,286.21. Neither party was able to
provide an explanation for how or why the trial court arrived at
what the parties agree is an inaccurate figure, but we trust that it
can be remedied upon remand.
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The trial court also erroneously included amounts listed on
the Father's 2018, 2019, and 2020 earning statements as "per
diem" pay in calculating the Father's income for child-support
purposes. Gross income includes "[r]eimbursed expenses or in kind
payments to the extent that they reduce living expenses." ยง
61.30(2)(a)13, Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphasis added).
The Father testified that the per diem reimbursements covered
gasoline and hotel stays when he was required to travel between his
employer's offices. The Father's testimony did not indicate that
these amounts in any way reduced his normal living expenses. And
there was no other evidence to support the inclusion of the per diem
amount in the Father's income. Because no competent, substantial
evidence was presented establishing that the per diem payments
resulted in a reduction of his everyday living expenses, it was
improper for the court to have included those amounts in the
Father's 2018, 2019, and 2020 income. See Lauro v. Lauro, 757 So.
2d 523, 525โ26 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (reversing the final judgment of
dissolution because per diem compensation "for expenses incurred
when [the husband] is away from home, including food, telephone[,]
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and laundry," did not reduce the husband's living expenses under
section 61.30(2)(a)13).
The Father also contends that the trial court made an error in
calculating his 2020 income. The earning statements upon which
the trial court relied included "year-to-date" totals. The Father
argues that the trial court should instead have utilized his "current"
net pay total and calculated a per diem figure based upon that
amount. Because the "current" net pay total on the statement
dated January 5, 2020, excluded January 1, 2020, through
January 4, 2020, the trial court did not necessarily err by relying
upon the year-to-date figure when calculating the Father's 2020 net
income. However, as the Father correctly contends, the trial court
erred by dividing the year-to-date figure by twenty-six days because
the year-to-date total already represented the Father's net pay for
the entire thirty-one days of the month of January.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
SLEET and SMITH, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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