Full Opinion

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT THOMAS BRANNICK, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D19-2422 ) PINELLAS COUNTY, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed March 25, 2020. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Linda R. Allan, Judge. Austin J. Grinder of The Ruth Law Team, St. Petersburg, for Appellant. Ashley N. Donnell of Pinellas County Attorney's Office, Clearwater, for Appellee. BADALAMENTI, Judge. Thomas Brannick appeals a final summary judgment in favor of defendant Pinellas County in a negligence action he filed against the County. We reverse because genuine issues of material fact remain unresolved. In his amended complaint against the County, Brannick sought to recover damages for injuries he sustained when he lost control of his bicycle and fell into a drainage ditch in an intersection owned and maintained by Pinellas County. Brannick alleged that the County had actual or constructive notice of an unsafe and dangerous condition in the shoulder area of the intersection, negligently maintained the premises, and failed to warn of the dangerous condition. According to Brannick's expert, the shoulder area of the intersection lacked an adequate clear zone and recovery slope for bicyclists to retain or regain control of their bicycles. The expert testified in his deposition that the pavement was "cracked, deteriorating, and hazardous." He further opined that the slope at the edge of the pavement was unreasonably dangerous; he explained that the slope was far steeper than the slope required by the uniform minimum standards. The County filed a motion for summary judgment contending it was not liable for Brannick's injuries because Brannick cannot establish causation. The County asserted that the undisputed material facts show that Brannick cannot remember how he fell into the ditch and thus how the accident happened. Although Brannick testified in his deposition that he was traveling in the direction of the alleged dangerous condition, his memory of the incident ends before reaching the condition. He specifically testified as follows: Q. Okay. So you're heading west on 142nd approaching the intersection. There's a car stopped northbound on 52nd? A. Yes. Q. Okay. What happened next? A. I wanted to proceed south on 62nd street. I was unsure of what the car wanted to do, so I stayed on the shoulder. I tried to stay on the shoulder of the road and go around the corner. My memory -- I pretty much blacked out after that. -2- My memory has stopped, because I got hit. Of how I got struck, I don't remember what happened after that. His next memory of the incident is waking up, hours later, inside the drainage ditch. At the summary judgment hearing, the County argued it was entitled to summary judgment because Brannick cannot remember what caused his damages. As part of its argument, the County suggested that Brannick could have fallen into the ditch after being struck by the car. The County relied on Brannick's deposition testimony that he noticed a car in the intersection and that "[he] got hit." The trial court agreed with the County's argument, granted the County's motion, and entered summary judgment in favor of the County. "We review a summary judgment de novo." Fiedler v. James, 971 So. 2d 256, 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). A party moving for summary judgment must conclusively demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000). "Special care must be exercised in granting summary judgments in negligence cases. The facts must be so crystallized that nothing remains but questions of law." Stewart v. Fletcher-Bright Co. of Fla., 550 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (citing Carbajo v. City of Hialeah, 514 So. 2d 425, 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)). In determining whether to enter summary judgment in a negligence action, "the question [before the court] is not whether the plaintiff has evidence to prove her case at a given point in the litigation or has personal knowledge of facts establishing the defendant's negligence." Fiedler, 971 So. 2d at 258. In moving for summary judgment, defendants in negligence actions do not meet their burden "merely by showing that the plaintiff is not sure what caused her damages." Id. -3- With those principles in mind, we conclude that the County is not entitled to summary judgment in this negligence action. In this case, questions regarding causation remain unresolved. Such "questions generally must be resolved by the trier of fact based on all the facts and circumstances presented." Sawyer v. Allied Int'l Holdings, Inc., 707 So. 2d 761, 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (citing Helman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 349 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 1977); Leib v. City of Tampa, 326 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)). In resolving all doubts and inferences against the County, as this court must, the facts here indicate that Brannick established a prima facie case of negligence. See id. (citing Majeske v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 117 So. 2d 531, 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)). And in such a situation, summary judgment is inappropriate, and it was therefore reversible error for the trial court to grant the County's motion for summary judgment. On remand, a jury should be given the opportunity to weigh the evidence and resolve the question of whether the County's alleged negligence was indeed the cause of Brannick's injuries. See id. (citing Majeske, 117 So. 2d at 533-34). Accordingly, we reverse the final summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. SILBERMAN and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur. -4-