Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT STEPHEN POTTS, Appellant, v. LEE ANN LEWIS, Appellee. No. 2D22-1678 October 25, 2023 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Doneene Loar, Judge. J. Andrew Crawford of J. Andrew Crawford, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellant. No appearance for Appellee. KELLY, Judge. Stephen Potts appeals from the injunction for protection against stalking entered in favor of Lee Ann Lewis under section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2022) (creating a cause of action for an injunction for protection against stalking). Section 784.048(2) provides that the offense of stalking is committed when a person "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person." Relevant here, section 784.048(1)(a) defines the term "harass" as "to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose." Because the record does not demonstrate a basis for finding that Potts' actions amounted to harassment as defined by the statute, we reverse. Although the statute frames the issue of substantial emotional distress in terms of what a petitioner experiences, courts apply an objective standard to determine if an incident causes substantial emotional distress, not a subjective standard. See Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 238 (Fla. 1995) (holding that the statute requires that the alleged conduct must cause substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person). As this court has explained, "[s]ubstantial emotional distress 'is greater than ordinary distress,' and . . . 'a reasonable person does not suffer substantial emotional distress easily.' " Kaye v. Wilson, 363 So. 3d 1155, 1159 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (quoting Baruti v. Vingle, 343 So. 3d 150, 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)). Annoyance, frustration, or embarrassment will not suffice. See id.; see also Shannon v. Smith, 278 So. 3d 173, 175-76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (explaining that embarrassing, immature, or uncivil behavior will not support a stalking injunction). We review de novo the trial court's conclusion of law that Potts' actions amounted to harassment. See Stallings v. Bernard, 334 So. 3d 365, 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (noting that a finding that evidence is legally sufficient to support the imposition of an injunction is reviewed de novo). Turning to the facts of this case, we conclude that Lewis's evidence was not legally sufficient to establish that Potts' alleged course of conduct would have caused substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person. Potts is a licensed plumber who knew Lewis from church. Prior to the events leading to the injunction, they were friendly and socialized along with other church members. Potts came to believe 2 that Lewis was acting as an unlicensed general contractor, so he contacted her via text messages and in person to tell her that what she was doing was improper and illegal and that she needed to stop, "repent," and "tell the truth." He threatened to report her to law enforcement and the licensing authorities if she did not comply with his demands, and eventually he did report her. He included mutual friends and acquaintances in many of the text messages, and he confronted Lewis at church in front of their mutual friends. The theme of his text messages and conversations to and about Lewis was that she was rude and condescending; that she was a "false witness," a "liar," and a "bully"; that her actions were putting others at risk; that she needed to repent; and that her apologies were insincere. Eventually the church pastor got involved to help mediate the situation with no success. The evidence shows that Potts was relentless in his quest to get Lewis to "repent" and that nothing Lewis or others did could dissuade him from pursing the matter. While we in no way condone Potts' behavior, Lewis's evidence is not sufficient to establish that it would have caused a reasonable person substantial emotional distress. See Rosaly v. Konecny, 346 So. 3d 630, 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (accusations of lying, although they might be offensive or defamatory, do not fall within the definition of harassment); Hasan v. Rivera, 332 So. 3d 1023, 1025 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (respondent's repeated threats to sue petitioner did not rise to the level of causing substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person); Cash v. Gagnon, 306 So. 3d 106, 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (complaints by one condominium complex resident against another, even though they were "voiced in an intemperate, crude, and uncivil manner," did not entitle the resident to an injunction); cf. Wills v. Jones, 213 So. 3d 982, 985 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (parents' threats of 3 litigation against their daughter's doctor, creating a "scene" and saying the case manager was subject to "eternal damnation," and repeated unwanted phone calls to their daughter were not acts that would cause objectively reasonable fear). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate the injunction. Reversed and remanded. ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 4