Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT KENYUN LEKIEL GLENN, Appellant, v. UDOCHI IGBOKWE, Appellee. No. 4D2025-3010 [November 18, 2026] Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Chris Brown and Jessica M. Marra, Judges; L.T. Case No. 062025DR015544AXDVCE. Kenyun Lekiel Glenn, Miami, pro se. Udochi Igbokwe, Miami, pro se. LOTT, J. The trial court entered a permanent injunction for protection against stalking against Appellant pursuant to sections 784.048 and 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2025). We reverse and remand to vacate the injunction. “Trial courts have broad discretion in granting injunctions, and unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated, appellate courts will not disturb the trial court’s decision. However, the question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to justify imposing an injunction is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Carvajal v. Ferretti, 434 So. 3d 72, 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As we recently stated: [T]o obtain an injunction against “stalking” based on allegations of “harassment,” the petitioner must prove “willful[], malicious[], and repeated[] ... harass[ment].” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2024). Each instance of “harassment” must be comprised of a “course of conduct” (that is, a pattern of a series of acts over time evidencing continuity of purpose) that both causes substantial emotional distress and serves no legitimate purpose. § 784.048(1), Fla. Stat. (2024). Because the “harassment” must be “repeated[]” for an injunction to issue, at least two instances of “harassment” are required. §§ 784.048(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2024); see Carter v. Malken, 207 So. 3d 891, 893-94 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (citation modified) (“Stalking requires proof of repeated acts .... A minimum of two incidents of harassment are required to establish stalking.”). Critically, “[t]wo or more acts that are part of one continuous course of conduct are legally insufficient to qualify as separate instances of harassment.” Garcia, 337 So. 3d at 360 (quoting Cash v. Gagnon, 306 So. 3d 106, 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)). A qualifying course of conduct requires acts “separated by time or distance.” Id.; see also Eichelberger v. State, 949 So. 2d 358, 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Carvajal, 434 So. 3d at 79. In addition, “[w]hether a communication causes substantial emotional distress should be narrowly construed and is governed by the reasonable person standard.” Id. at 81 (citation omitted). We have reviewed the record and find that the evidence upon which Appellee relied is legally insufficient to support an injunction. Aside from vague and conclusory statements, the record shows that Appellant made numerous calls to Appellee’s cell phone. This is insufficient for two reasons. First, this constitutes at most one “course of conduct”; two are required for an injunction to issue. See Carvajal, 434 So. 3d at 79 (quoted in pertinent part above). Second, mere electronic contact, even if repeated, would not cause a reasonable person to suffer the requisite “substantial emotional distress.” Id. at 81 (quoted in pertinent part above). Because the evidence did not support issuance of an injunction as a matter of law, we reverse and remand. The concurring opinion suggests that we ought to instead remand for a new hearing inasmuch as the trial court erred by relying on the petition and affidavits (rather than live testimony) after Appellee swore that the written statements were true. But this was not error; this was merely reliance on hearsay that was admitted into the record. Appellant did not attend the hearing and did not contemporaneously object to the admission of such statements. “[H]earsay received without objection becomes part of the evidence in the case and is usable as proof just as any other evidence, limited only by its rational, persuasive power.” Adamson v. R.J. Reynolds 2 Tobacco Co., 325 So. 3d 887, 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The error, instead, is that although Appellee had the unopposed opportunity to develop the record, said record does not contain sufficient evidence to support a stalking injunction. Our reversal on this ground moots the appellant’s other arguments. Reversed and remanded. SHAW, J., concurs. GERBER, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion. GERBER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. The trial court’s amended final judgment granted Appellee’s petition for a permanent stalking injunction against Appellant. On appeal from that final judgment, Appellant raises three arguments: (1) the appellant was not given a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the final hearing, thereby violating due process; (2) the appellee’s evidence was legally insufficient; and (3) the appellant’s communications with the appellee arose from a business relationship and, therefore, the communications served a legitimate purpose. Appellant’s first and third arguments lack merit. On Appellant’s second argument, I agree with the majority that we should reverse, but for a procedural reason, without reaching the merits. The final hearing’s transcript reveals the following. Appellee appeared, but Appellant did not appear. The trial court asked Appellee, “Is everything in the petition that you filed -- is it still accurate[?]” Appellee responded, “It’s still accurate[.]” Afterwards, the hearing focused on Appellee’s requested scope for the permanent stalking injunction. The trial court then orally granted the permanent stalking injunction, stating: “Based on … your re[-]affirmation of the petition [and] the allegations made in the petition …, I am granting the injunction and making it permanent in nature.” Later, the trial court entered a written final judgment imposing a permanent stalking injunction against the appellant. This appeal followed. Our review is de novo. See Pickett v. Copeland, 236 So. 3d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“[T]he question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to justify imposing an injunction is a question 3 of law that we review de novo.”); Chiscul v. Hernandez, 311 So. 3d 55, 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“When evaluating whether a trial court’s order granting an injunction is supported by competent, substantial evidence, legal sufficiency … as opposed to evidentiary weight, is the appropriate concern of an appellate tribunal.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Applying de novo review, I conclude Appellee’s mere re-affirmance of her petition’s allegations, without testifying or presenting supporting evidence, was legally insufficient to support a permanent stalking injunction against Appellee. See Olson v. Olson, 260 So. 3d 367, 369 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (“The former wife presented no evidence but relied solely on the statements of her attorney, her verified motion for injunction, and its attachments. A verified motion, by itself, is inadequate to establish the necessary proof when there is a noticed and contested evidentiary hearing.”); Mantell v. Rocke, 179 So. 3d 511, 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“Because no evidence or testimony was introduced by Appellee … in support of her petition for an injunction, we are constrained to reverse.”). Based on the foregoing, I would reverse and remand for a new final hearing, for which both Appellee and Appellant are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard on the allegations raised in Appellee’s petition. I express no opinion on the petition’s merits, which would be premature. * * * Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing. 4