Kenyun Lekiel Glenn v. Udochi Igbokwe
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket4D2025-3010
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
KENYUN LEKIEL GLENN,
Appellant,
v.
UDOCHI IGBOKWE,
Appellee.
No. 4D2025-3010
[November 18, 2026]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Chris Brown and Jessica M. Marra, Judges; L.T. Case
No. 062025DR015544AXDVCE.
Kenyun Lekiel Glenn, Miami, pro se.
Udochi Igbokwe, Miami, pro se.
LOTT, J.
The trial court entered a permanent injunction for protection against
stalking against Appellant pursuant to sections 784.048 and 784.0485,
Florida Statutes (2025). We reverse and remand to vacate the injunction.
“Trial courts have broad discretion in granting injunctions, and unless
a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated, appellate courts will not
disturb the trial court’s decision. However, the question of whether the
evidence is legally sufficient to justify imposing an injunction is a question
of law reviewed de novo.” Carvajal v. Ferretti, 434 So. 3d 72, 78 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2026) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
As we recently stated:
[T]o obtain an injunction against “stalking” based on
allegations of “harassment,” the petitioner must prove
“willful[], malicious[], and repeated[] ... harass[ment].”
§ 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2024). Each instance of “harassment”
must be comprised of a “course of conduct” (that is, a pattern
of a series of acts over time evidencing continuity of purpose)
that both causes substantial emotional distress and serves no
legitimate purpose. § 784.048(1), Fla. Stat. (2024). Because
the “harassment” must be “repeated[]” for an injunction to
issue, at least two instances of “harassment” are required.
§§ 784.048(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2024); see Carter v. Malken, 207
So. 3d 891, 893-94 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (citation modified)
(“Stalking requires proof of repeated acts .... A minimum of
two incidents of harassment are required to establish
stalking.”). Critically, “[t]wo or more acts that are part of one
continuous course of conduct are legally insufficient to qualify
as separate instances of harassment.” Garcia, 337 So. 3d at
360 (quoting Cash v. Gagnon, 306 So. 3d 106, 109 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2020)). A qualifying course of conduct requires acts
“separated by time or distance.” Id.; see also Eichelberger v.
State, 949 So. 2d 358, 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
Carvajal, 434 So. 3d at 79. In addition, “[w]hether a communication
causes substantial emotional distress should be narrowly construed and
is governed by the reasonable person standard.” Id. at 81 (citation
omitted).
We have reviewed the record and find that the evidence upon which
Appellee relied is legally insufficient to support an injunction. Aside from
vague and conclusory statements, the record shows that Appellant made
numerous calls to Appellee’s cell phone. This is insufficient for two
reasons. First, this constitutes at most one “course of conduct”; two are
required for an injunction to issue. See Carvajal, 434 So. 3d at 79 (quoted
in pertinent part above). Second, mere electronic contact, even if repeated,
would not cause a reasonable person to suffer the requisite “substantial
emotional distress.” Id. at 81 (quoted in pertinent part above).
Because the evidence did not support issuance of an injunction as a
matter of law, we reverse and remand.
The concurring opinion suggests that we ought to instead remand for a
new hearing inasmuch as the trial court erred by relying on the petition
and affidavits (rather than live testimony) after Appellee swore that the
written statements were true. But this was not error; this was merely
reliance on hearsay that was admitted into the record. Appellant did not
attend the hearing and did not contemporaneously object to the admission
of such statements. “[H]earsay received without objection becomes part of
the evidence in the case and is usable as proof just as any other evidence,
limited only by its rational, persuasive power.” Adamson v. R.J. Reynolds
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Tobacco Co., 325 So. 3d 887, 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
The error, instead, is that although Appellee had the unopposed
opportunity to develop the record, said record does not contain sufficient
evidence to support a stalking injunction. Our reversal on this ground
moots the appellant’s other arguments.
Reversed and remanded.
SHAW, J., concurs.
GERBER, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.
GERBER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The trial court’s amended final judgment granted Appellee’s petition for
a permanent stalking injunction against Appellant. On appeal from that
final judgment, Appellant raises three arguments: (1) the appellant was
not given a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the final hearing,
thereby violating due process; (2) the appellee’s evidence was legally
insufficient; and (3) the appellant’s communications with the appellee
arose from a business relationship and, therefore, the communications
served a legitimate purpose.
Appellant’s first and third arguments lack merit. On Appellant’s second
argument, I agree with the majority that we should reverse, but for a
procedural reason, without reaching the merits.
The final hearing’s transcript reveals the following. Appellee appeared,
but Appellant did not appear. The trial court asked Appellee, “Is
everything in the petition that you filed -- is it still accurate[?]” Appellee
responded, “It’s still accurate[.]” Afterwards, the hearing focused on
Appellee’s requested scope for the permanent stalking injunction.
The trial court then orally granted the permanent stalking injunction,
stating: “Based on … your re[-]affirmation of the petition [and] the
allegations made in the petition …, I am granting the injunction and
making it permanent in nature.” Later, the trial court entered a written
final judgment imposing a permanent stalking injunction against the
appellant.
This appeal followed. Our review is de novo. See Pickett v. Copeland,
236 So. 3d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“[T]he question of whether the
evidence is legally sufficient to justify imposing an injunction is a question
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of law that we review de novo.”); Chiscul v. Hernandez, 311 So. 3d 55, 58
(Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“When evaluating whether a trial court’s order
granting an injunction is supported by competent, substantial evidence,
legal sufficiency … as opposed to evidentiary weight, is the appropriate
concern of an appellate tribunal.”) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Applying de novo review, I conclude Appellee’s mere re-affirmance of
her petition’s allegations, without testifying or presenting supporting
evidence, was legally insufficient to support a permanent stalking
injunction against Appellee. See Olson v. Olson, 260 So. 3d 367, 369 (Fla.
4th DCA 2018) (“The former wife presented no evidence but relied solely
on the statements of her attorney, her verified motion for injunction, and
its attachments. A verified motion, by itself, is inadequate to establish the
necessary proof when there is a noticed and contested evidentiary
hearing.”); Mantell v. Rocke, 179 So. 3d 511, 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
(“Because no evidence or testimony was introduced by Appellee … in
support of her petition for an injunction, we are constrained to reverse.”).
Based on the foregoing, I would reverse and remand for a new final
hearing, for which both Appellee and Appellant are entitled to notice and
an opportunity to be heard on the allegations raised in Appellee’s petition.
I express no opinion on the petition’s merits, which would be premature.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.
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