Full Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed October 28, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D26-0944 Lower Tribunal No. 23-28062-CA-01 ________________ Victoria Friend LLC, Appellant, vs. Tamiami Airport Service Center, Inc., et al., Appellees. An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Charles Kenneth Johnson Judge. Saltiel Law Group, and Matthew Carcano, and Hubert Menendez, for appellant. Shutts & Bowen LLP, and Michelle G. Hendler, Julissa Rodriguez; Shutts & Bowen LLP and Erik R. Matheney (Tampa), for appellees. Before FERNANDEZ, LOGUE, and MILLER, JJ. PER CURIAM. Appellant, Victoria Friend LLC, challenges an order denying its renewed motion for leave to amend to assert a claim for punitive damages.1 After considering competing submissions, the trial court denied the motion on the discrete ground that the proffered conduct did not “rise[] to the level of punitives in terms of shocking, outrageous, and [im]moral.” The punitive damages statute conditions leave upon “a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages.” § 768.72(1), Fla. Stat. (2025). Consistently, the Florida Supreme Court has confirmed that the sufficiency of such a showing turns upon whether “a reasonable person could conclude, based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed ‘intentional misconduct’ or ‘gross negligence,’ as defined in section 768.72(2).” Perlmutter v. Fed. Ins. Co., 434 So. 3d 681, 688 (Fla. 2026). Recognizing that the trial court did not have the benefit of Perlmutter at the time the order was rendered, we nonetheless conclude the procedure was defective and the court measured the proffer against a standard the statute does not prescribe. See Bric McMann Indus. Inc. v. Regatta Beach Club Condo. Ass’n, 378 So. 3d 652, 655 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (“Under the revised statute, a plaintiff seeking to recover punitive damages under a theory of intentional 1 We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(G). 2 misconduct need only proffer evidence of ‘intentional misconduct’ as defined in subsection 768.72(2)(a).”); see also Perlmutter, 434 So. 3d at 691 (quashing and remanding for reexamination of the proffer under the announced construction of the statute). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for reconsideration of the motion. Reversed and remanded. 3