Manyak v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJuly 8, 2026
Docket2D2025-1874
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
PETER MANYAK,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 2D2025-1874
July 8, 2026
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Dana M. Moss,
Judge.
J. Andrew Crawford of J. Andrew Crawford, P.A., St. Petersburg, for
Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and James A.
Hellickson, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
On remand from this court's opinion in Manyak v. State, 414 So.
3d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025), the circuit court entered an order attempting
to clarify its reasoning for denying a downward departure as required by
Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 1999). Unfortunately, however, we
must reverse again because the new order is also inadequate.
The order states that the court "concluded that the evidence
presented was insufficient to establish that Mr. Manyak suffered from a
mental disorder that required specialized treatment." Despite this
finding, the court went on to state that it accepted that Manyak was
amendable to treatment and that his alleged disorders were unrelated to
substance abuse or addiction. In the context of this case, these findings
appear contradictory.
The circuit court continued, undercutting its own apparent findings
by noting that "[s]hould the appellate court find that there was sufficient
evidence in the record to support that the Defendant has a mental
disorder that requires specialized treatment, the Court agrees
resentencing would be appropriate." As the record evidence on this point
was conflicting, we read this as an invitation for this court to reweigh the
evidence, which we cannot do. See Banks, 732 So. 2d at 1067. Rather,
the circuit court must make clear factual findings in the first instance;
our role is to review those findings to determine whether they are
supported by competent substantial evidence. Id.
Finally, the circuit court explained that it "likely would not have
imposed the same guideline sentence had the first prong of Banks been
satisfied." This statement compounds our concerns because the
outcome turns on the factual question that the circuit court has failed to
clearly answer. Accordingly, we must reverse and remand for the circuit
court to make clear findings pursuant to the two-part process set forth in
Banks.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
NORTHCUTT, VILLANTI, and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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