Jacob Omar Hill v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJanuary 21, 2020
Docket1D18-1357
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Nos. 1D18-1355
1D18-1357
(Consolidated for disposition)
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JACOB OMAR HILL,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Linda F. McCallum, Judge.
January 21, 2020
ROBERTS, J.
The appellant challenges the trial court’s decision to revoke
his probation. First, the appellant argues that the trial court erred
by revoking his probation for violating condition six. Second, he
argues that the State failed to present evidence that the appellant
was the person on probation and that he was advised about the
conditions of his probation. We only find merit in the first issue.
We affirm as to the second issue without comment.
We review a trial court’s factual finding that the State proved
by a greater weight of the evidence that a violation of probation
occurred under the competent, substantial evidence standard.
Rodgers v. State, 171 So. 3d 236, 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). If there
is a question about whether the proven conduct legally constitutes
a violation of probation, then the trial court’s legal decision is
subject to de novo review. Staples v. State, 202 So. 3d 28, 32 (Fla.
2016) (holding that the question of whether a refusal to admit
sexual misconduct was a violation of probation was a legal
determination subject to de novo review). Finally, the trial court’s
ultimate decision of whether the violation was willful and
substantial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Condition six of the appellant’s probation required him to not
associate with any person engaged in criminal activity. In the
affidavit alleging that the appellant had violated this condition,
the probation officer alleged that the appellant was engaged in
criminal activity at a particular residence. This allegation does
not support a violation of condition six. See Wells v. State, 60 So.
3d 551, 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (finding allegation contained in
the affidavit for violation of probation that the defendant was seen
holding a baby was not sufficient to find the defendant violated the
condition that he was not to have unsupervised contact with
children); Little v. State, 143 So. 3d 465, 468 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)
(reversing probation revocation for purchasing/possessing
pseudoephedrine when the condition prohibited the probationer
from taking medication containing pseudoephedrine). Because the
affidavit did not allege conduct that constituted a violation of
condition six, the trial court erred in finding that the appellant
violated that condition.
The trial court also found that the appellant violated
conditions four and five of his probation. We affirm the appellant’s
revocation of probation on those grounds as each violation is
substantial. See Blake v. State, 21 So. 3d 129, 131 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA
2009) (finding that the defendant’s probation could have been
revoked for either the new law violation or possession of a firearm).
We also find that there was competent, substantial evidence to
support the finding that the appellant violated those conditions.
Even though we find that the trial court did not err in
revoking the appellant’s probation, we must reverse because the
trial court’s brief statements do not allow this Court to determine
whether it would have revoked the appellant’s probation and
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imposed the same sentences in the absence of a violation of
condition six. See Malone v. State, 146 So. 3d 155, 158 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2014) (“When some grounds of probation violation are upheld
and others are invalidated, the proper course of action is to reverse
the order revoking probation and remand for reconsideration,
unless the record clearly demonstrates that the trial court would
have revoked probation based only on the upheld revocation
grounds.”)
Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and
REMAND for further proceedings.
WOLF and JAY, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Kathryn Lane, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
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