Mark Allen Douglas v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledDecember 2, 2022
Docket2D21-1642
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
MARK ALLEN DOUGLAS,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 2D21-1642
December 2, 2022
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County; Robert J. Branning,
Judge.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Tosha Cohen,
Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and David Campbell,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
ATKINSON, Judge.
Mark Allen Douglas appeals the trial court's order revoking his
probation based on a violation of special condition 19 of his
community control and probation. Douglas argues that the trial
court erred by failing to make specific factual findings in its written
order determining Douglas to be a danger to the community
pursuant to section 948.06(8)(e), Florida Statutes (2021). We agree
and reverse the revocation order because it cannot be determined
from the record whether the trial court would have revoked
Douglas's probation if the trial court had not erroneously
determined him to be a danger to the community.
Section 948.06(8) imposes procedures and requirements for
determining whether a probationer is a violent felony offender of
special concern (VFOSC). "If the court, after conducting [a violation
of probation] hearing . . . , determines that a [VFOSC] has
committed a violation of probation . . . other than a failure to pay
costs, fines, or restitution, the court shall: 1. Make written findings
as to whether or not the [VFOSC] poses a danger to the community"
considering the factors enumerated in section 948.06(8)(e)1.a–e. §
948.06(8)(e) (emphasis added).
The trial court's order finding Douglas to be a danger to the
community lists the factors that the trial court considered in
determining that Douglas posed a danger to the community:
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(i) the nature and circumstances of the violation and any
new offenses charged; (ii) the defendant's present
conduct, including criminal convictions; (iii) the
defendant's amenability to non-incarcerative sanctions
based on his or her history and conduct during the
probation or community control supervision from which
the violation hearing arises and any other previous
supervisions, including disciplinary records of previous
incarcerations; (iv) the weight of the evidence against the
defendant; and (v) other relevant facts.
The five factors the trial court listed in its order are the five
factors enumerated in section 948.06(8)(e)1—reproduced almost
verbatim. The trial court's order did not include any specific factual
findings particular to Douglas's case or explain its reasoning for
concluding that Douglas was a danger to the community. The trial
court did not make any oral findings or explain its reasoning at the
hearing. Therefore, the trial court failed to make sufficient written
findings to support its ruling. Cf. McCray v. State, 282 So. 3d 158,
162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (concluding that the trial court failed to
make sufficient written findings to support its conclusion that the
defendant was a danger to the community and noting that the trial
court's order did not orally find "specific facts under 948.06(8)(e)
upon which it relied to revoke supervision"); Bailey v. State, 136 So.
3d 617, 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (explaining that the preprinted
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form order used by the trial court was likely insufficient and
concluding that even if the form was sufficient, the trial court's
findings were insufficient because the trial court did not indicate
which factors it considered and did not make any oral findings at
the hearing to support its conclusion that the defendant was a
danger to the community); Martin v. State, 87 So. 3d 813, 813 (Fla.
2d DCA 2012) (affirming revocation of the defendant's probation but
remanding for correction of the written order finding the defendant
to be a danger to the community because "the trial court orally
pronounced a reason that is consistent with section
948.06(8)(e)(1)(c)").
There is evidence in the record supporting the trial court's
finding that Douglas would pose a danger to the community if
released. However, because the trial court's order does not satisfy
the requirements of section 948.06(8)(e) and the trial court did not
make any specific oral findings to support its conclusion at the
sentencing hearing, its order finding Douglas to be a danger to the
community was erroneous and must be stricken. We therefore
must reverse the revocation order because it cannot be determined
from the record whether the trial court would have revoked
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Douglas's probation if the trial court had not determined him to be
a danger to the community. See § 948.06(8)(e)2a–b ("If the court
has found that a violent felony offender of special concern poses a
danger to the community, the court shall revoke probation and
shall sentence the offender up to the statutory maximum, or longer
if permitted by law. . . . If the court has found that a [VFOSC] does
not pose a danger to the community, the court may revoke, modify,
or continue the probation or community control or may place the
probationer into community control as provided in this section."
(emphasis added)); Bailey, 136 So. 3d at 620–21 (striking the trial
court's designation under section 948.06(8)(e) because the trial
court failed to make sufficient written findings); see also Barber v.
State, 207 So. 3d 379, 383 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (distinguishing
Bailey and concluding that "[t]here is nothing in the [Bailey] opinion
indicating that the court meant to strike the designation [as a
VFOSC] under sections 948.06(8)(b)–(d)," only that this court struck
the trial court's "designation" of the defendant as a danger to the
community under section 948.06(8)(e)). On remand, the trial court
must strike the designation that Douglas is a danger to the
community and may determine anew whether to revoke Douglas's
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probation. The trial court may reimpose the designation if it makes
the requisite written findings based on record evidence. See Bailey,
136 So. 3d at 621.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
STARGEL and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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