Full Opinion

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT S.S., ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D19-2572 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed May 7, 2021. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Michael J. Scionti, Judge. Howard L. Dimming, II, Public Defender, and Susan M. Shanahan, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Katie Salemi Ashby, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. SMITH, Judge. Following a bench trial, S.S., a juvenile, was found to have committed one count of criminal mischief. He was adjudicated delinquent, placed in confinement at a residential treatment program, and ordered to complete community service and pay restitution. He appeals his adjudication and disposition, arguing that his motion for judgment of dismissal, presented at the close of the State's case during his adjudicatory hearing, should have been granted because the State failed to meet its burden of establishing a prima facie case that S.S. committed criminal mischief. We agree and therefore reverse S.S.'s adjudication of delinquency and resulting disposition. On November 26, 2018, S.S. was captured on surveillance video attempting to break into the bicycle ministry operated by Bethesda Ministries (Bethesda), a church-affiliated outreach program. The bicycle ministry is located in a house near Bethesda's church, which is monitored by a video surveillance system twenty-four hours a day. Teataihaea Rogers, the church's outreach program coordinator, upon noticing damage to the outside of the back door, its frame, and doorknob of the bicycle ministry building door, reviewed the church's video surveillance. She observed on the video an individual attempting to break in through the bicycle ministry's door and thereafter contacted law enforcement. Ms. Rogers provided a copy of the video to the responding officer, and from this video the police were able to identify and locate S.S. at a nearby location. S.S. was then detained and questioned by Detective Degagne, who informed him that he had been captured on video attempting to break into the bicycle ministry. S.S.'s fingerprints were later found on the damaged door. Prior to reading S.S. his Miranda1 rights, the detective suggested that S.S. write a letter of apology to the ministry, with which S.S. complied. S.S. was not read his Miranda rights until midway through Detective Degagne's questioning. At S.S.'s adjudicatory hearing, the State attempted to utilize in its case-in-chief S.S.'s pre- 1See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). -2- Miranda statements to law enforcement during questioning, his letter of apology, and the surveillance video. The defense moved to suppress all three items of evidence, which the trial court granted. 2 Unable to rely on that evidence, the State instead went forward with its case relying solely on the presence of S.S.'s fingerprints taken from the damaged door. S.S.'s fingerprints were analyzed by the State's fingerprint expert, who was employed with the Tampa Police Department. The expert testified that the fingerprints analyzed from the damaged door matched the fingerprints of S.S. After the close of the State's case, S.S. moved for judgment of dismissal as to both the burglary and criminal mischief charges based on the State's failure to establish the prima facie elements of each charge. While the trial court dismissed the burglary charge, it found the State met its burden with regard to the criminal mischief charge, and this appeal followed. We review the trial court's denial of the motion for judgment of dismissal de novo. T.A.K. v. State, 258 So. 3d 559, 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). "A judgment of dismissal is proper if the State fails to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case." Id. (citing Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.110(k)). "Sufficient evidence to support an adjudication exists when 'a rational trier of fact could find that the elements of the crime have been established beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id. (quoting K.W. v. State, 983 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)); see also A.L. v. State, 275 So. 3d 819, 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). To establish a prima facie case for criminal mischief, the State was 2The State failed to authenticate the surveillance video through the testimony of Bethesda's representative Ms. Rogers. -3- required to show that S.S. willfully and maliciously damaged the property of another— here, the bicycle ministry belonging to Bethesda. See § 806.13(1)(a); Stinnett v. State, 935 So. 2d 632, 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). The State attempted to make the requisite showing by presenting the testimony of Bethesda's representative Ms. Rogers, who discovered the damage. Ms. Rogers testified that S.S. did not have permission to enter the bicycle ministry and that the break-in attempt caused damage to the door. The State also presented as a witness a fingerprint expert who testified that the prints found on the damaged door belonged to S.S. Fingerprint evidence alone may be considered direct evidence when the fingerprint is found on an item or property that is not accessible to the general public. See Harris v. State, 160 So. 3d 913, 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) ("[E]vidence of appellant's fingerprints on a jewelry box drawer that the victim received sealed from the factory years earlier, and to which the victim had not given appellant access, was sufficient to meet the State's burden."). However, where the item or property is available to the public and the defendant presents a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, fingerprint evidence alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction. See Leonard v. State, 731 So. 2d 712, 716 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); C.P.C. v. State, 179 So. 3d 376, 378 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) ("Consistent with that rule, a fingerprint left in a location accessible by the public, without more, is insufficient to establish the identity of the culprit." (quoting Hill v. State, 973 So. 2d 655, 655 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008))). In this case, unless the State was able to establish S.S.'s identity another way, it was required to prove that his fingerprint could only have been placed on the damaged door at the time S.S. allegedly committed the criminal mischief. See Hill, 973 So. 2d at 655; see also Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1982); Williams v. -4- State, 740 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Formor v. State, 676 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Here, there was other evidence of S.S.'s identity as the perpetrator of the damage to Bethesda's property; unfortunately for the State, however, the trial court granted the defense's motion to suppress that evidence. Thus, neither the surveillance video, nor S.S.'s pre- and post-Miranda statements to Detective Michelson, nor his letter of apology were admitted into evidence, and so it follows that this evidence could not factor into the trial court's finding of guilt on the criminal mischief charge. Additionally, although the State presented an expert fingerprint witness, neither the State nor the defense inquired whether it was possible to pinpoint a time during which S.S. left the prints on the damaged door. Indeed, the fingerprint expert's testimony was brief and mostly involved recitation of his knowledge and experience, with limited testimony elicited about the methodology of his analysis. No other evidence was introduced regarding the collection date, time, and source of the fingerprints. It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that fingerprints found on an area accessible to the general public are insufficient, alone, to sustain a finding of guilt. See Leonard, 731 So. 2d at 716; Amell v. State, 438 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Williams, 740 So. 2d at 28; K.S. v. State, 814 So. 2d 1190, 1192 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Accordingly, the State failed to present a prima facie case for criminal mischief, and the trial court erred in denying S.S.'s motion to dismiss. We therefore reverse the order adjudicating S.S. guilty of criminal mischief and the resulting disposition and remand to the trial court for entry of an order granting S.S.'s motion for judgment of dismissal of the criminal mischief charge. -5- Reversed and remanded. VILLANTI and SLEET, JJ., Concur. -6-