Qiu Feng Ke v. Lisa Marie Gallagher A/K/A Lisa Tudor Gallagher, as Successor Personal Representative of the Estate of Edward Lee Tudor A/K/A Edward Lee Tudor-Baker
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJanuary 22, 2021
Docket2D19-2381
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
QIU FENG KE, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D19-2381
)
LISA MARIE GALLAGHER, )
a/k/a LISA TUDOR GALLAGHER, as )
successor personal representative of )
the Estate of Edward Lee Tudor, )
a/k/a Edward Lee Tudor-Baker, )
deceased, )
)
Appellee. )
)
Opinion filed January 22, 2021.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco
County; Declan P. Mansfield, Judge.
Qiu Feng Ke, pro se.
David M. Caldevilla of de la Parte & Gilbert,
P.A., Tampa; Kevin McLaughlin of Wagner
McLaughlin, P.A., Tampa; and Kenneth G.
Turkel and David A. Hayes of Baja Cuva
Cohen & Turkel, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
In this appeal, Qiu Feng Ke claims the final civil judgment entered against
him in a nonjury trial should be reversed because he was denied the opportunity to
secure counsel, file an amended answer and affirmative defenses, and participate and
be heard in the proceedings. Our review of the record on appeal supports his
arguments. Hence, we must reverse the final judgment, vacate the order granting the
plaintiff's motion for default, and remand for further proceedings.1
On remand, the trial court shall (1) allow Ke a reasonable period of time to
procure counsel should he decide to do so, (2) allow Ke a reasonable period of time to
file an amended answer and affirmative defenses, (3) allow Ke to request a jury trial
pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.430, and (4) arrange transportation or
provide an alternative method for Ke to participate in all proceedings. See Burch v. City
of Lakeland, 891 So. 2d 654, 656 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (listing relevant factors to
consider when deciding whether to transport a prisoner to attend a civil proceeding and
observing that "[a]s an alternative to the prisoner's physical presence, a court may
permit the prisoner's appearance by telephone");2 EAC USA, Inc. v. Kawa, 805 So. 2d
1, 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ("Public policy favors the liberal amendment of pleadings so
that cases may be decided on their merits."); Baker v. Baker, 403 So. 2d 1111, 1113
(Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (holding that the trial court should have postponed a hearing to
afford an incarcerated defendant a reasonable opportunity to obtain representation
"and/or to make arrangements to attend the hearing"); Preston v. City of Fort Pierce,
637 So. 2d 326, 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) ("Although continuances are within the court's
discretion, the exercise of that discretion is also not free form. Typically, discretion is
1We have considered Ke's jurisdictional argument and find it to be without
merit.
2See also Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.530 (providing procedures for parties to
attend court proceedings via telephone or other electronic means).
-2-
exercised to grant continuances where the party is unable through no contrivance of his
own making to attend a civil trial and a delay would not prejudice the opposing party.").
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
VILLANTI, ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, and STARGEL, JJ., Concur.
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