Full Opinion

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT JOHN THOMAS PHELAN, JR., ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D20-1478 ) TRIFACTOR SOLUTIONS, LLC, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed March 5, 2021. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk County, Wayne Durden, Judge. John Marc Tamayo, Robert J. Aranda, and Edward B. Kerr of Campbell Trohn Tamayo & Aranda, P.A., Lakeland, for Appellant. June G. Hoffman of Fowler White Burnett P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee. LABRIT, Judge. In some cases, procedure precedes substance. This is one of those cases. John Phelan, Jr., challenges a temporary injunction on multiple grounds. We reverse. The order is facially deficient because the trial court did not make specific findings to support injunctive relief, and the trial court erroneously set the bond amount without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Background Like most noncompete cases, this case started when a work relationship soured. Mr. Phelan quit his job as president of TriFactor Solutions, LLC, and joined a new company. TriFactor then sued Mr. Phelan for violating a noncompete agreement and sought a temporary injunction. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, at the conclusion of which the trial court made no factual findings and reserved ruling. A few weeks later, the trial court emailed the parties′ counsels, stating that "the necessary prerequisites for a temporary injunction ha[d] been met" and instructing TriFactor′s counsel to "prepare an order" that "address[ed] the elements of temporary injunction" including "the requisite bond." Although the bond amount was not addressed at the hearing, the trial court directed TriFactor to leave a blank space for the bond amount if the parties could not agree to it, stating that the court would fill in the bond amount ″subject . . . to the right of the parties to have a subsequent hearing regarding the amount or sufficiency of the bond ordered.″ The parties ultimately submitted competing orders, which reflected among other things their disagreement as to the bond amount.1 Without holding any further hearings, the trial court signed an order substantially in the form submitted by TriFactor and set the bond at $300,000, as TriFactor had requested. Discussion 1TriFactor proposed a bond amount of $300,000, and Mr. Phelan proposed $450,000. -2- Temporary injunctions are "subject to reversal only for an abuse of discretion." Salazar v. Hometeam Pest Def., Inc., 230 So. 3d 619, 620–21 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (quoting Orkin Extermination Co. v. Tfank, 766 So. 2d 318, 319 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)). A temporary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy" that must be "granted sparingly." Id. at 621 (quoting Charlotte County v. Grant Med. Transp., Inc., 68 So. 3d 920, 922 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)). Although we are required to "construe a restrictive covenant in favor of providing reasonable protection to all legitimate business interests established by the person seeking enforcement," a "temporary injunction requires strict compliance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610.″ Id. (first quoting § 542.335(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2009), and then quoting Coscia v. Old Fla. Plantation, Ltd., 828 So. 2d 488, 490 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)). Rule 1.610(c) requires the movant to plead and prove "(1) a likelihood of irreparable harm; (2) unavailability of an adequate legal remedy; (3) a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits; and (4) considerations of the public interest support the entry of the injunction." Id. (quoting Masters Freight, Inc. v. Servco, Inc., 915 So. 2d 666, 666 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)). Critical to this appeal, ″[t]he trial courts' order must contain '[c]lear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings [to] support each of the four [elements].' " Id. (second and third alterations in the original) (quoting Liberty Fin. Mortg. Corp. v. Clampitt, 667 So. 2d 880, 881 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.160(c) ("Every injunction shall specify the reasons for entry."). Lastly, "[n]o temporary injunction shall be entered unless a bond is given by the movant in an amount the court deems proper." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610(b). And it is well-established that a trial court must "hold[ ] an evidentiary hearing to address the appropriate amount -3- of a bond." Fla. Ga. Grove, LLP v. Collier County, 95 So. 3d 948, 949 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). A temporary injunction that does not include specific findings on each of the required elements needed for issuance of an injunction must be reversed. See Salazar, 230 So. 3d at 621-622 (collecting cases). The order on review falls far short of the "specific findings" requirement. Three of the four required elements aren′t mentioned in the order—never mind supported by "[c]lear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings." Id. at 621 (alterations in the original) (quoting Liberty Fin. Mortg. Corp., 667 So. 2d at 881). The trial court also erred by setting the bond amount without conducting an evidentiary hearing. See Fla. Ga. Grove, LLP, 95 So. 3d at 950. The trial court's plan to hold an after-the-fact hearing on the bond amount was misguided. See Masters Freight, Inc., 915 So. 2d at 667 (stating that bond amount must be set after the trial court "provid[es] both parties with an opportunity to present evidence regarding the appropriate amount of the bond" (citing Santos v. Tampa Med. Supply, 857 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003))); see also Richard v. Behav. Healthcare Options, Inc., 647 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) ("Since damages recoverable for wrongfully obtaining an injunction are limited to the amount of the injunction bond, the court must provide both parties the opportunity to present evidence as to the amount of an appropriate bond." (citing Longshore Lakes Joint Venture v. Mundy, 616 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993))). We reverse the order and remand this case for the trial court to review the record, determine whether the record supports the above-discussed four elements, and -4- if so, enter an order delineating the specific reasons why TriFactor is entitled to injunctive relief. See Masters Freight, Inc., 915 So. 2d at 667. If the trial court enters a temporary injunction, it must set a bond after providing both parties an opportunity to present evidence regarding an appropriate bond amount. Id. Because the order is insufficient "[t]o allow meaningful appellate review," we decline to address the merits of the parties' remaining arguments. Salazar, 230 So. 3d at 621. In remanding for further proceedings, we note that Mr. Phelan raised lack of standing as an affirmative defense. The order on review suggests that TriFactor can enforce the noncompete agreement as successor to Mr. Phelan′s original employer, Advanced Handling Systems, Inc. (AHS). But that successorship does not resolve Mr. Phelan′s claim that TriFactor acquired AHS twelve years after Mr. Phelan left AHS. See § 542.335(1) (stating that "enforcement of contracts that restrict or prohibit competition" is permitted "so long as such contracts are reasonable in time, area, and line of business" (emphasis added)). The trial court must address this affirmative defense on remand. See Salazar, 230 So. 3d at 622. Reversed and remanded. KHOUZAM, C.J., and LUCAS, J., Concur. -5-