Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON f/k/a THE BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF THE CWABS INC. ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-BC3, Appellant, v. MICHAEL FERNANDEZ and DIANNA FERNANDEZ, Appellees. No. 2D2025-1819 November 4, 2026 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Jennifer X. Gabbard, Judge. Eric M. Levine and Adam G. Schwartz of Atlas | Solomon LLP, Stuart, for Appellant. Alan Borden of Debt Relief Legal Group, LLC, Tampa, for Appellees. GUARD, Judge. The Bank of New York Mellon (Bank) appeals an adverse final judgment denying its foreclosure of a mortgage based on a failure to prove a default. Because the undisputed evidence at trial was that Michael and Dianna Fernandez had not made a payment since June 2017 and no defense allowed them to stop paying their mortgage, we reverse. I. In 2007, the Fernandezes executed a $160,000 note secured by a mortgage on their home. In 2012, the Fernandezes filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy. During that bankruptcy, the Fernandezes entered a modification agreement with the then servicer of their loan, modifying the terms of their mortgage. Then, on August 21, 2015, Bank of America, N.A. (Bank of America), who was the Bank's servicer at that time, reversed four previous payments made in 2015. While a Bank of America payment history shows those reversals, the payment history contains no explanation of why those payments were reversed. At trial, the Bank's witness was unable to testify regarding the reason for the reversals other than to speculate about what would normally cause such reversals. At trial, Dianna Fernandez testified that she made the reversed payments and that funds for those payments were never returned to her. The effect of the reversals was that it placed the Fernandezes' loan in default by four payments. Despite that fact, from August 2015 through April 2017, the Fernandezes continued to make their monthly payments, and Bank of America accepted those payments. In May 2017, Bank of America returned the Fernandezes' May 2017 payment because it was for less than the total amount owed as it did not include the four reversed payments. Approximately two times in or around May 2017, Dianna Fernandez went into a Bank of America branch and attempted to make a single mortgage payment. Bank of America refused to take those payments. That same year, Bank of America sued to foreclose on the loan but voluntarily dismissed its case before trial. In January 2021, the Bank sought again to foreclose on the Fernandezes' home. In its complaint, the Bank alleged that "[t]here has 2 been a default under the note and mortgage, as modified, held by Plaintiff in that the payment due January 1, 2017, and all subsequent payments have not been made." The January 1, 2017, date in the complaint was only accurate if the four reversed payments should have been reversed. At trial, evidence and testimony showed that the last payment the Fernandezes made was in May 2017. Though, Bank of America returned that payment. Dianna Fernandez admitted that their last accepted payment was made in April 2017. She also admitted that they did not have sufficient funds to bring the mortgage current when the action was filed. In their answer and affirmative defenses, the Fernandezes asserted one defense relevant to this appeal. In their second affirmative defense, the Fernandezes alleged: II. UNCLEAN HANDS 15. Defendants assert that the bad action of the Plaintiff has caused the loan to be in default. 16. Plaintiff states the Defendants have not made a payment since January 1, 2017. This is false, Defendants made all payments until Plaintiff stopped taking payments. 17. Plaintiff's own actions of not accepting payments caused any default and this bars Plaintiff from foreclosing on the property. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment against the Bank, concluding that it failed to prove a default. The trial court made the following relevant findings: 3. The Court finds that as of the Plaintiff's alleged default date of January 1, 2017, the accounting showed that the Defendants made on time payments as required under the contract, but there were transactions reported which showed a reversal of four payments occurring on August 21, 2015. The Plaintiff's representative failed to provide any explanation as to the reason for the reversals or any explanation that would indicate the reversals were caused due to a 3 contractual default by the Defendants. The Plaintiff's witness couldn't give competent testimony as to why those reversals occurred. 4. The Court finds that the Defendant, Mrs. Fernandez, was credible in her testimony as to the payments she made on a monthly basis in accordance with the Note and Mortgage contract from January 2015 until April of 2017. Defendants['] May 2017 payment was returned by the Plaintiff, and subsequent attempts to pay directly at the servicer, Bank of America, were not accepted after May 2017. The trial court did not cite any authority, and it is unclear whether it relied on the Fernandezes' second affirmative defense in reaching its conclusion or something else. The Bank timely appealed. II. As explained below, we conclude that there was legally sufficient evidence that the Fernandezes defaulted on the note and mortgage after May 2017. We also hold that, under these circumstances, the Bank's failure to accept the May 2017 payment did not excuse the Fernandezes from their ongoing obligations under the note and mortgage. A dispute over the proper accounting of payments with a bank or servicer does not, without more, excuse a borrower's obligation to make timely payments. On remand, the trial court should remove the principal amount of the four reversed payments, interest before June 2017, and any fees claimed against the Fernandezes before July 2017. Also, because the main issue litigated below concerned the four reversed payments, the trial court may reduce any attorney's fees awarded by the amounts spent litigating the four reversed payments. A. This case reaches us after a bench trial. We have held that we review the legal conclusions of a trial court after a bench trial de novo. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Dias, 331 So. 3d 755, 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) 4 (quoting Jasser v. Saadeh, 91 So. 3d 883, 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). We also have stated that we review the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a civil, nonjury trial de novo. Mace v. M&T Bank, 292 So. 3d 1215, 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (citing Norman v. Padgett, 125 So. 3d 977, 978 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)). We have explained that legally sufficient evidence is equal to competent substantial evidence. Id. We have further commented that the competent substantial evidence standard is met when there is properly admitted evidence that has "a 'definite probative value.' " Id. (quoting Savage v. State, 120 So. 3d 619, 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)). B. To be entitled to foreclose a mortgage, a lender must prove (1) an agreement, (2) a default, (3) a proper acceleration, and (4) the amount owed or due. Ernest v. Carter, 368 So. 2d 428, 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The trial court found that the bank failed to prove the second element, a default. Each failed monthly payment is a separate default. Bartram v. U.S. Bank Nat'l. Ass'n, 211 So. 3d 1009, 1021-22 (Fla. 2016) (holding each new default is a separate cause of action for statute of limitations purposes); Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1006-07 (Fla. 2004) (concluding that a second foreclosure action founded on subsequent, different default was not barred by dismissal of a prior action); U.S. Bank Home Mortg. v. Boivin, 403 So. 3d 421, 427-28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025) (discussing the interplay between the separate, subsequent default concept and a laches defense); Grdic v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. as Tr. for Registered Holders of Ace Secs. Corp., 267 So. 3d 473, 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (examining when statute of limitations runs in a foreclosure action when subsequent defaults occur). Putting aside for the moment the four reversed payments, the Bank presented legally sufficient 5 evidence that the Fernandezes failed to make payment and were in default from June 2017 onwards. In Lunn Woods v. Lowery, this court dealt with a foreclosure appeal not dissimilar to this appeal. See 577 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). In that case, a plaintiff sought to foreclose a security interest under an agreement for deed. Id. In its complaint, the plaintiff sought to foreclose based on both a failure to make payments and to timely pay real estate taxes. Id. At trial, the defendant proved that the plaintiff had misapplied payments and no payments were missed. See id. But the evidence showed that the defendant failed to timely pay the taxes. Id. The trial court denied the foreclosure. Id. We reversed. Id. In reversing, we stated that "despite the court having found an improper application of payments, it was error to deny foreclosure on that basis since there was uncontradicted evidence of [the defendant's] breach of the covenant to pay real estate taxes and assessments." Id. at 707 (citing Heimer v. Albion Realty & Mortg. Inc., 300 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)). Here, the Bank alleged a continuing default from January 2017 forward. The dispute at trial centered over the four reversed payments from 2015, ignoring the missed payments from June 2017 onwards. While the trial court found—and the record supports—that the Fernandezes paid and did not have returned the four 2015 payments, that result does not change the failure to pay every month from June 2017 forward. Each of those missed payments was a separate default that entitled the Bank to a foreclosure, and the trial court's conclusion to the contrary is erroneous. C. That brings us to whether there was a basis, equitable or otherwise, for the trial court to deny the Bank's right to foreclose. The 6 final judgment itself does not state any legal basis on which the trial court relied. That is not surprising given neither party argued any such basis with precision at trial. What we are left with in the final judgment is a finding that "Defendants['] May 2017 payment was returned by the Plaintiff, and subsequent attempts to pay directly at the servicer, Bank of America, were not accepted after May 2017." Those facts alone do not excuse the subsequent defaults by the Fernandezes. It was only after the trial court entered final judgment that various defenses and equitable principles were raised by the Bank in its motion for rehearing to the trial court. The trial court denied the Bank's motion for rehearing without any analysis. We have recognized that foreclosure can be refused by a trial court where (1) the mortgagee waives or is estopped from accelerating because of misconduct or unfulfilled conditions, (2) the mortgagor tenders payment after default but before acceleration, or (3) the mortgagor's failure to make timely payments was stopped by a misunderstanding or excusable neglect coupled with some misconduct by the mortgagee which contributed to the default. Lunn Woods, 577 So. 2d at 707 (citing Campbell v. Werner, 232 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)); see also David v. Sun Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 461 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 1984) (refusing to prevent a foreclosure without one of those three "established principles of equity" being proven). While not clearly under either the Fernandezes' second affirmative defense or the trial court's findings, the second and third equitable principles above are close enough to both to cause us to analyze whether either was proven. 1. First, as to the second equitable principle from Lunn Woods, that defense is a tender of payment defense. See Delandro v. America's Mortg. 7 Servicing, Inc., 674 So. 2d 184, 186-87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Almost one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court of Florida stated: 'Tender' has a definite legal signification. It imports not merely the readiness and ability to pay the money or to deliver the deed or other property, at the time and place mentioned in the contract, but also the actual production of the thing to be paid or delivered and an offer of it to the person to whom the tender is to be made. Kreiss Potassium Phosphate Co. v. Knight, 124 So. 751, 754 (Fla. 1929) (citing Holmes v. Holmes, 12 Barb. 137, 144 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1851)). The court continued and specified that a party asserting such a defense had to deposit the money in the registry of the court for the defense to be successful.1 Id. at 755; see also Rissman ex rel. Rissman Inv. Co. v. Kilbourne, 643 So. 2d 1136, 1140-41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (requiring actual attempt to deliver money for a tender of payment to occur). While we doubt whether Knight's requirement of a deposit in the registry of the court is the only way to be successful on such a defense, the facts in this case are clear. The Fernandezes neither offered to pay their unpaid mortgage payments into the court's registry nor did they have in their possession the amount due under the mortgage when this suit was initiated. Accordingly, the defense of tender of payment fails and does not excuse the Fernandezes' missed mortgage payments. 1 The Bank claims that the Fernandezes waived tender of payment as a defense. The Fernandezes point to their second affirmative defense and counter that the Bank waived their failure to deposit monies by failing to plead an avoidance in their reply or otherwise timely raising it during trial. The second affirmative defense was styled "UNCLEAN HANDS," not "TENDER OF PAYMENT." But the second defense did mention a tender by the Fernandezes. We decline to find either party waived or failed to preserve this issue and, instead, resolve the issue on the merits of the defense. 8 2. Second, as to the third equitable principle from Lunn Woods, that equitable principle resembles or is the defense of unclean hands. See Proino Breakfast Club, II, Inc. v. OGI Cap., Inc., 331 So. 3d 846, 848 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021). In Proino, we stated that the equitable defense of unclean hands is designed to prevent a party from engaging in misconduct "akin to fraud" and "its 'purpose is to discourage unlawful activity.' " Id. (quoting Cong. Park Off. Condos II, LLC v. First-Citizens Bank & Tr. Co., 105 So. 3d 602, 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)). To be a defense, we also stated that the party's misconduct "must generally be connected with the matter in litigation and must affect the adverse party." Id. (quoting McCollem v. Chidnese, 832 So. 2d 194, 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). Turning first to case law from this district, in Proino, we concluded that allegations regarding a breach of a promise to sell a restaurant and apply those sales proceeds to a loan were legally sufficient to support an affirmative defense of unclean hands and defeated a motion for summary judgment.2 Id. Similarly, in Perry v. Turner, we concluded that unclean hands prevented an equitable cause of action. 365 So. 3d 1222, 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023). In Perry, Perry fraudulently concealed his assets with his girlfriend for years to hinder his creditors and ex-wife from recovering from him. Id. at 1223-24. When the girlfriend and Perry broke up, Perry sought to recover his secreted assets from the girlfriend. 2 In Proino, we cited with approval to the Fourth District's case in Marin v. Seven of Five Ltd., 921 So. 2d 699, 700-01 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Id. Marin involved a mortgage foreclosure based on a failure to make payments where the borrower alleged that the lender agreed to refinance the obligation and later reneged. 921 So. 2d at 700. The Fourth District reversed summary judgment because it found those allegations sufficient to state a defense of unclean hands and unrebutted on summary judgment. Id. at 700-01. 9 Id. We affirmed a final judgment against Perry after a nonjury trial that concluded unclean hands denied Perry's equitable cause of action. Id. at 1224-25. In affirming, we stated that unclean hands prevents someone from "profit[ing] from his own fraud or wrongdoing." Id. at 1224 (quoting Leila Corp. of St. Pete v. Ossi, 138 So. 3d 470, 473 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)). Turning next to mortgage foreclosure related cases, the First District reversed a final judgment for a borrower entered after a nonjury trial based on an unclean hands defense. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n as Tr. for C-Bass Mortg. Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-CB8 v. Qadir, 342 So. 3d 855, 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). In reversing that final judgment, the First District, in part, stated that there was no evidence that the bank had acted in a "sneaky, unscrupulous, or tricky" manner. Id. As the court commented, the defense only bars an equitable claim when "the plaintiff has engaged in some manner of unscrupulous conduct, overreaching, or trickery that would be 'condemned by honest and reasonable men.' " Id. (quoting 21st Mortg. Corp. v. TSE Plantation, LLC, 301 So. 3d 1120, 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)). Similarly, in Congress Park Office Condos II, LLC, the Fourth District affirmed a summary judgment of foreclosure in favor of a lender. 105 So. 3d at 610. As part of affirming that summary judgment, the Fourth District considered whether an unclean hands affirmative defense prevented foreclosure. Id. at 609-10. In that case, the borrower had "intentional[ly] fail[ed] to comply with material terms of the mortgage and note." Id. at 610 (alterations in original). In rejecting the defense, the Fourth District stated, "A failure to comply with the material terms of a loan document may be a breach of contract, and it may not be nice, but it does not amount to unclean hands." Id. 10 Here, the Fernandezes failed to present evidence of conduct amounting to fraud or otherwise show that the Bank (or its agents) acted in a "sneaky, unscrupulous, or tricky" manner. See Qadir, 342 So. 3d at 859. Instead, the Fernandezes argue: [i]f the [Bank] wanted to proceed with a working loan, they could have easily adjusted their accounting, modified the loan, adjusted the payments, negotiated to get some of the $20,000 the Fernandez's [sic] had saved up and turned the loan right back into a performing loan. The [Bank] did nothing, but sit back for two more years and then bring the foreclosure at issue here. Those allegations do not even rise to the level of violating the loan documents, which is insufficient to state an unclean hands defense. See Cong. Park Off. Condos II, LLC, 105 So. 3d at 610. The Bank did not have a duty to reach out to the Fernandezes or offer to modify their loan. There is nothing in the record showing the Bank affirmatively doing anything but proceeding forward toward foreclosure based on their position on the four reversed payments. We in no way condone how Bank of America or the Bank prosecuted this action or treated the Fernandezes. We do not believe that many of the decisions made here were particularly wise or prudent. But we conclude that not being "nice" or doing what we consider to be unwise or imprudent is insufficient to prove that the Bank acted with unclean hands. III. While we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case to the trial court to act consistent with this opinion, we are not unsympathetic to the situation that the Fernandezes find themselves in. The Fernandezes still have options to retain their home. Under Florida law, the Fernandezes have the ability or possibility of redeeming the indebtedness. See § 45.0315, Fla. Stat. (2026). Alternatively, there may 11 be options under federal law that would allow the Fernandezes to cure their indebtedness over time. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1301. Both or any other possibilities exceed this opinion and are ultimately up to the Fernandezes to pursue. Reversed and remanded. SILBERMAN, J., Dissents with opinion. ATKINSON, J., Concurs in result only. SILBERMAN, Judge, Dissenting. I would affirm the final judgment in the Fernandezes' favor because competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings and conclusions. As has long been established, "[i]t is not the function of the appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court through re-evaluation of the testimony and evidence from the record on appeal before it. The test . . . is whether the judgment of the trial court is supported by competent evidence." Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1976); see also Kuhnsman v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 311 So. 3d 980, 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ("[W]e review the trial court's findings of facts to determine if they are supported by competent substantial evidence." (quoting Coconut Grove Acquisition, LLC v. S & C. Venture, 240 So. 3d 92, 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018))). Therefore, I respectfully dissent. The trial court made the following findings, all of which are supported by the record evidence: 2. The Court finds that the Plaintiff failed to meet their burden to show that the Defendants breached the Note and Mortgage contract. 12 3. The Court finds that as of the Plaintiff's alleged default date of January 1, 2017, the accounting showed that the Defendants made on time payments as required under the contract, but there were transactions reported which showed a reversal of four payments occurring on August 21, 2015. The Plaintiff's representative failed to provide any explanation as to the reason for the reversals or any explanation that would indicate the reversals were caused due to a contractual default by the Defendants. The Plaintiff's witness couldn't give competent testimony as to why those reversals occurred. 4. The Court finds that the Defendant, Mrs. Fernandez, was credible in her testimony as to the payments she made on a monthly basis in accordance with the Note and Mortgage contract from January 2015 until April of 2017. Defendants [sic] May 2017 payment was returned by the Plaintiff, and subsequent attempts to pay directly at the servicer, Bank of America, were not accepted after May 2017. At trial, the evidence established that the Bank had reversed four payments that it had accepted and that were made by the Fernandezes from January through April 2015. In August 2016, the Fernandezes received a letter from the then servicer, Bank of America, indicating that they were in arrears by four payments, which apparently related back to the four payments that had been reversed.3 Neither the Bank's witness nor its records explained the reason for the reversal of payments or whether the Bank had retained the funds represented by those payments. But the evidence established that the Bank continued to accept and retain payments from the Fernandezes until they made the May 2017 payment. After its acceptance of that payment, the Bank wrote a check and returned the funds from that payment and then rejected the Fernandezes' subsequent efforts to make monthly payments. 3 Four different companies had serviced the loan during the time period giving rise to this dispute. 13 In its complaint, the Bank asserted that the loan was in default because "the payment due January 1, 2017, and all subsequent payments have not been made." Yet the evidence established that payments had been made through the May 2017 payment that the Bank initially accepted but then returned, and the Bank then refused further payments. As the majority notes, the Bank's witness could not explain why the early 2015 payments were reversed beyond offering unsubstantiated speculation. The trial court rejected the witness's speculative testimony as well as his inability to establish that the reversals were due to any default by the Fernandezes. Instead, the court found that Ms. Fernandez's testimony was credible, including her testimony that all required payments had been made until the Bank returned the May 2017 payment and then rejected the Ferdandezes' subsequent efforts to make payments. Although the Bank argues that the trial court erred in accepting the testimony of Ms. Fernandez, the law is clear that credibility determinations are the province of the trial court. Shaw, 334 So. 2d at 16. The Bank properly recognizes that the burden of proof at trial in a civil case is the preponderance of the evidence standard. See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC, 139 So. 3d 869, 872 (Fla. 2014). Yet the Bank challenges the trial court's findings and, in essence, argues that the evidence it offered should have been accepted over the Fernandezes' contrary evidence. On that basis, it contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the Bank failed to carry its burden to establish that the Fernandezes breached their loan obligations. Foreclosure proceedings are equitable in nature, and "[a] court of equity may refuse to foreclose a mortgage when an acceleration of the 14 due date of the debt would be an inequitable or unjust result and the circumstances would render the acceleration unconscionable." Campbell v. Werner, 232 So. 2d 252, 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (quoting Althouse v. Kenney, 182 So. 2d 270, 272 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)); see also Ivy Chase Apartment Prop., LLC v. Ivy Chase Apartments, Ltd., 352 So. 3d 33, 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (reiterating that foreclosure may be denied on equitable considerations such as unclean hands or unconscionability). Here, the Bank failed to establish the reason for its reversal of the early 2015 payments. Although it claimed the account was in default when it filed suit, at trial it failed to establish that, in fact, a default existed through some fault of the Fernandezes. Based on the record evidence, the purported default appears to have been created based on the Bank's own conduct or actions taken by its loan servicers. And to the extent the Bank claims a continuing default based on its rejection of the May 2017 payment and the Fernandezes' subsequent efforts to make payment, the record supports the view that it was the Bank's actions that put the loan into a default posture and kept the loan in that posture. The majority misses the point when it holds that "the Bank's failure to accept the May 2017 payment did not excuse the Fernandezes from their ongoing obligations under the note and mortgage." As explained above, it was the Bank's conduct that created the ongoing purported default. Finally, as the majority opinion correctly points out, the Bank did not raise any issue with the trial court before or at trial regarding any obligation on the Fernandezes to tender funds into the court's registry. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.600 states as follows: In an action in which any part of the relief sought is a judgment for a sum of money or the disposition of a sum of money or the disposition of any other thing capable of 15 delivery, a party may deposit all or any part of such sum or thing with the court upon notice to every other party and by leave of court. (Emphasis added.)4 See First States Invs. 3300, LLC v. Pheil, 52 So. 3d 845, 848 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (concluding that rule 1.600 is voluntary in nature and noting that a hearing may be required to "resolve the issue of what monies were properly subject to being deposited into the court registry"); Morroni v. Fisher, 647 So. 2d 127, 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) ("Nothing in rule 1.600 authorizes a trial court to require a mortgagor to deposit mortgage payments into the court's registry." (first citing Hughes v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 621 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); and then citing Law v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of Fla., 452 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), superseded by statute on other grounds, § 697.07, Fla. Stat. (1989), as recognized in Williams v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Fla., 591 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992))). Under all the circumstances present in this case, the Bank's failure to timely raise this issue at or before trial precludes relief as to the issue. In sum, I find no fault with the trial court's determination that the Bank failed to carry its burden that the Fernandezes defaulted on their loan obligations. Accordingly, I would affirm the final judgment. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 4 The Florida Supreme Court adopted rule 1.600 in 1967, well after Kreiss Potassium Phosphate Co. v. Knight, 124 So. 751 (Fla. 1929), was decided. 16