Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT DESMOND F. BALLARD, Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA; UNKNOWN TENANT #1 N/K/A KALOTTA WILLIAMS; and ALL UNKNOWN PARTIES CLAIMING INTERESTS BY, THROUGH, UNDER OR AGAINST A NAMED DEFENDANT TO THIS ACTION, OR HAVING OR CLAIMING TO HAVE ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY HEREIN DESCRIBED, Appellees. No. 2D22-2245 June 30, 2023 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Cynthia J. Newton, Judge. Niles B. Whitten of The Law Office of Niles B. Whitten, PLLC, Gainesville, for Appellant. Jacqueline Costoya Guberman of Kelley Kronenberg, Fort Lauderdale; and Jason M. Vanslette and Irina M. Danilyan of Kelley Kronenberg, Fort Lauderdale (substituted as counsel of record) for Appellee Bank of America, N.A. No appearance for remaining Appellees. MORRIS, Chief Judge. Desmond F. Ballard appeals a final summary judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of Bank of America, N.A. He contends that the trial court erred by failing to detail its reasons for granting summary judgment in accordance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(a) and by granting summary judgment because Bank of America failed to strictly comply with the requirements for filing a motion for summary judgment. He also argues that there is conflict between rule 1.510(a) and rule 1.510(c)(5) regarding the necessity of filing a response to a motion for summary judgment where the movant has not yet met its burden of proving entitlement to summary judgment. Because the trial court failed to detail its reasons for granting summary judgment either orally or in the written order, we must reverse and remand for the trial court to enter an order in compliance with rule 1.510(a). We find no merit to Ballard's remaining arguments. Rule 1.510(a) requires trial courts to "state on the record the reasons for granting or denying" a motion for summary judgment. This is a mandatory obligation, and it is not enough for a "[trial] court to make a conclusory statement that there is or is not a genuine dispute as to a material fact." In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 77 (Fla. 2021). In this appeal, Ballard points to the trial court's failure to detail its reasons for granting summary judgment in the written order. But he fails to acknowledge that this requirement could have been satisfied if the trial court orally made findings at the summary judgment hearing. See, e.g., Rkhub Logistics LLC v. E. Auto Motor Corp., 344 So. 3d 485, 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (explaining that pursuant to rule 1.510(a), a court must state its specific reasons for granting or denying summary 2 judgment "either at a hearing or in a written order"); Jones v. Ervolino, 339 So. 3d 473, 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (reversing and remanding where neither the trial court's oral pronouncement nor its written order satisfied rule 1.510(a)'s requirement to include specific reasoning); Simmons v. Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 338 So. 3d 1057, 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (concluding that where the transcripts from the summary judgment hearings reflected that the trial court specifically stated its reasons for granting the motion, the trial court did not violate rule 1.510(a)). Bank of America concedes that the trial court's order failed to detail its reasons for granting the summary judgment. And both parties concede that there is no transcript from the summary judgment hearing. While the lack of a transcript of a summary judgment hearing does not necessarily preclude appellate review for certain types of disputes, the appellant still retains the burden to provide an adequate record. See Johnson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. of Ams., 248 So. 3d 1205, 1210- 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). And where there is a dispute over a lack of findings, appellate courts are not required to "assume that the trial court committed reversible error during the course of a hearing that" cannot be reviewed because the trial court "very well may have orally pronounced its findings . . . at the . . . hearing." Nunes v. Nunes, 112 So. 3d 696, 700-01 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).1 At issue here is the trial court's failure to provide specific reasoning for granting the summary judgment either orally at the hearing or in its written order. Had the trial court granted summary judgment at the hearing, we could have denied relief on this issue due to Ballard's failure 1 In Nunes, the appellate court refused to reverse even though the order failed to contain the required findings. 112 So. 3d at 702. 3 to provide a transcript or statement of the proceedings pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200(b)(5). This is because we would have been unable to conduct a meaningful appellate review. However, in this case, the trial court did not grant summary judgment at the hearing; instead, it instructed Ballard to file a memorandum of law addressing Bank of America's alleged noncompliance with rule 1.510. It is clear then that the trial court did not orally pronounce its reasons for granting summary judgment at the hearing. Cf. Fast v. Nelson, 22 So. 3d 109, 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (noting the general rule that where a trial court's written order lacks required findings but where the appellant has failed to provide a transcript, it would ordinarily be impossible for the appellant to establish harmful error, but then explaining that where the trial court in that case reserved ruling on a motion, it was undisputed that the trial court did not orally pronounce the required findings at the hearing and thus the lack of a transcript did not preclude meaningful appellate review). Accordingly, because the trial court failed to detail its specific reasons for granting summary judgment as required by rule 1.510(a) either orally at the hearing or in its written order, we must reverse and remand for the limited purpose of having the trial court enter an order in compliance with rule 1.510(a). See Fast, 22 So. 3d at 110 (reversing and remanding for the trial court to make required findings); Mech v. Brazilian Waxing by Sisters, Inc., 349 So. 3d 453, 456 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (reversing and remanding with directions to the trial court to explain its reasoning as required by rule 1.510(a)); Rkhub Logistics LLC, 344 So. 3d at 486 (reversing summary judgment order and remanding for the trial court to explain its reasoning for granting summary judgment); Jones, 339 So. 3d at 475 (reversing and remanding for entry of an order that complies with rule 1.510(a)). 4 Reversed and remanded. KHOUZAM and BLACK, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 5