Paul R. Weston Jr. v. Jamie B. Davis Weston
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 6, 2020
Docket1D19-3727
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D19-3727
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PAUL R. WESTON JR.,
Appellant,
v.
JAMIE B. DAVIS WESTON,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.
Terrance R. Ketchel, Judge.
November 6, 2020
PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Paul Weston, is serving a fifteen-year prison
sentence for molesting the daughter of his former wife, appellee
Jamie Weston. The appellant argues the trial court erred by
holding the final hearing in his absence and entering a final
judgment of dissolution of marriage. We are constrained to agree
and reverse the final judgment on appeal.
The appellee filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in
which she asked to be awarded the marital home and property,
inherited from the appellant’s father. The appellant filed an
answer to the petition. The case was eventually set for a final
hearing, and per the appellant’s request, the court allowed him to
appear telephonically as he was incarcerated. There is no record
indication that the Department of Corrections (the Department)
was served with notice of the hearing date. The day before the
scheduled final hearing, the appellant filed a notice of address
change to a new prison facility and advised the court that he could
not participate in the hearing unless the court provided notice to
the Department. The appellant claims that at the time he filed
this notice, he was unaware of the final hearing date due to his
frequent transfers. The trial court proceeded to hold the final
hearing in the appellant’s absence and entered a final judgment of
dissolution that awarded the appellee the marital home and
property. This appeal followed.
“[A] prisoner must bring to the court’s attention his desire to
appear personally or telephonically at a hearing or trial.” Burdoo
v. Plympton, 219 So. 3d 170, 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (quoting
Johnson v. Johnson, 992 So. 2d 399, 401 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)). If
the prisoner requests to be heard, “the right is clear.” Id. The
appellant made clear his desire to appear at the final hearing
telephonically.
The Department requires institutional staff to initiate the
phone call for an inmate to participate in court proceedings. See
Havenner v. Hutchinson, 162 So. 3d 1113, 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA
2015) (citing Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-602.205(8)(b)). In Butler v.
Norton, 158 So. 3d 750, 751 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), a panel of this
Court construed the directive in rule 33-602.205(8)(b) to require
institutional staff to “first receive an order from the court requiring
an inmate to appear for a hearing by telephone on a specific date
and at a specific time.” Butler found the court reversibly erred
because its failure to issue the order to the Department precluded
the inmate from participating in the hearing. Id. at 751. See also
Havenner, 162 So. 3d at 1113; Burdoo, 219 So. 3d at 171. Here the
trial court failed to issue an order to the Department requiring the
appellant to appear, which, coupled with the confusion arising
from the appellant’s transfers, deprived the appellant of the right
to appear at the final hearing. Based on the holding in Butler, we
are constrained to find the trial court erred by holding the hearing
in the appellant’s absence. The final judgment should be reversed,
and the case remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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ROBERTS, ROWE, and KELSEY, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Paul R. Weston Jr., pro se, Appellant.
Ryan G. Hardy of Ryan G. Hardy, P.A., Crestview, for Appellee.
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