Jay Larson v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledDecember 10, 2021
Docket2D21-2247
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
JAY LARSON,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 2D21-2247
December 10, 2021
Appeal pursuant to Fla R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court
for Hillsborough County; Michelle Sisco, Judge.
PER CURIAM.
Jay Larson appeals from the order dismissing his motion filed
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse the
order only insofar as it dismissed the motion with prejudice.
Mr. Larson entered negotiated pleas to charges of robbery in
three different cases. He then filed a motion under rule 3.850
challenging his pleas in all three cases. He subsequently filed a
motion to withdraw that rule 3.850 motion seeking to "reserv[e] his
right" to again raise ground two in a postconviction motion "after
consulting with private counsel." The postconviction court granted
Mr. Larson's motion but dismissed his rule 3.850 motion with
prejudice.
This court has held that "[a] typical postconviction motion
should not be dismissed with prejudice when the defendant
volunteers to dismiss it unless there is prejudice to the State or
some justification for resolving the motion on the merits."
McCray v. State, 104 So. 3d 1201, 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); see
also Hansen v. State, 816 So. 2d 808, 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
("Where an appellant files a timely motion for voluntary dismissal of
a rule 3.850 motion, and the state suffers no prejudice, . . . [s]uch a
motion should be granted without prejudice to the appellant's right
to file a subsequent motion."). Though the record reflects that the
postconviction court put forth a substantial amount of work
clarifying the procedural history of the cases for Mr. Larson and the
potential consequences of withdrawing his negotiated pleas, it had
not ruled on Mr. Larson's rule 3.850 motion and did not cite any
prejudice to the State that could justify its decision to dismiss the
2
motion with prejudice. We therefore reverse the order only to the
extent that the dismissal was with prejudice.1
Reversed and remanded.
CASANUEVA, SMITH, and STARGEL JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
1 There is no indication in the postconviction record that Mr.
Larson sought to again raise ground two in a timely filed rule 3.850
motion so that he could have been prejudiced by the postconviction
court's ruling.
3