Cedric Armstrong v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledMay 10, 2023
Docket2D2023-0110
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
CEDRIC ARMSTRONG,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 2D23-110
May 10, 2023
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for
Manatee County; Frederick P. Mercurio, Judge.
Cedric Armstrong, pro se.
PER CURIAM.
Cedric Armstrong appeals from the order summarily denying his
motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We
reverse and remand for the postconviction court to address the claim of
scoresheet error raised in point five of Mr. Armstrong's motion; we affirm
the order in all other respects.
The summary record reflects that on March 16, 2020, Mr.
Armstrong entered a plea to possession of cocaine in case number 2019-
CF-4008. On April 30, 2020, the trial court sentenced him to one year
and one day of community control. On November 20, 2020, the trial
court revoked his community control, as well as his probation imposed
for convictions in two 2017 cases. The court sentenced him to 42.675
months in prison, the lowest permissible sentence pursuant to Mr.
Armstrong's Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet.
Mr. Armstrong filed his rule 3.800(a) motion on January 20, 2022.
In the handwritten points four and five, he raised two claims of
scoresheet error.1 The postconviction court correctly ruled that the first
allegation of scoresheet error lacks merit, but it did not address the
second claim of scoresheet error. Mr. Armstrong alleged in the third
sentence of point five that the scoresheet prepared for his sentencing
upon violation of his community control improperly listed his conviction
for possession of diazepam in case number 2017-CF-1564 as an
additional offense before the court for sentencing. He alleged that the
trial court had previously sentenced him to time served for that
conviction, so it should have been scored in the "prior record" section of
the scoresheet. Mr. Armstrong further alleged that but for the scoresheet
errors, he would have received a shorter sentence. He attached to his
motion a postconviction order and scoresheets that tend to support this
claim.
Mr. Armstrong filed his rule 3.800(a) motion within the time
afforded by rule 3.850(b), and the motion contains an oath that meets
the requirements of rule 3.850(c) and (n). In Brooks v. State, 969 So. 2d
238, 243 n.8 (Fla. 2007), the supreme court directed that when a claim
1 Mr. Armstrong raised three additional claims. Two are not
cognizable in motions filed under rule 3.800(a) or rule 3.850, and the
third, which appears to challenge the trial court's jurisdiction, is
conclusively refuted by the record attachments.
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of scoresheet error is raised in a rule 3.800(a) motion that would be
timely under rule 3.850(b), "for purposes of determining harmless error,
the court should treat a motion alleging scoresheet error as one filed
under rule 3.850 and apply the would-have-been-imposed standard."
Accordingly, on remand, the postconviction court shall determine
whether the assessment of 2.4 points for the conviction for possession of
diazepam was error and, if so, whether "the record conclusively shows
that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence using a
correct scoresheet." Id. at 241.
Reversed and remanded.
SILBERMAN, SLEET, and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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