Jerra N. Gillespie v. Jason Minning
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 3, 2021
Docket2D20-3430
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
JERRA N. GILLESPIE,
Appellant,
v.
JASON MINNING,
Appellee.
No. 2D20-3430
November 3, 2021
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier County; Elizabeth V. Krier,
Judge.
Michael M. Shemkus of Long, Murphy & Zung, P.A., Naples, for
Appellant.
No appearance for Appellee.
SLEET, Judge.
Jerra Gillespie, the Former Wife, challenges the trial court's
order establishing child support, in which the court ordered the
Former Wife to pay Jason Minning, the Former Husband, $702.90
per month. Because there was no competent substantial evidence
to support the imputation of a $78,000 yearly salary to the Former
Wife, we reverse the portion of the order relating to the Former
Wife's imputed income. We find no merit in the Former Wife's
remaining arguments on appeal and affirm the order in all other
respects.
On June 22, 2018, the eight-year marriage between the
Former Wife and the Former Husband was dissolved. In the final
judgment, the trial court incorporated a marital settlement
agreement in which the parties agreed to a parenting plan for their
one minor child. They also agreed that neither party had an
obligation to the other for child support. At the time, the Former
Wife was teaching gifted children at a private school in Marco Island
and was earning $78,000 a year.
In September 2018, the Former Wife filed a petition to permit
relocation with her minor child to Missouri and to establish a long-
distance parenting plan. In late May 2019, the Former Wife moved
to Fairgrove, Missouri, and obtained a full-time teaching position
earning $57,600 a year. On June 26, 2019, the trial court denied
the Former Wife's petition for relocation.
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Four months later, on October 10, 2019, the Former Wife filed
a petition for modification of the parenting plan to establish
timesharing between her and the Former Husband as she lived in
Missouri and he lived in Florida. She did not seek child support in
that petition. In the Former Husband's counterpetition, he sought
the bulk of parenting time and the establishment of child support.
On November 26, 2019, the Former Wife filed an amended petition
for modification of the parenting plan but did not seek child
support. Through court-ordered mediation, the parties came to an
agreement as to the parenting schedule and the only unresolved
issue that remained was the establishment of child support and
other related expenses.
On June 10, 2020, the trial court conducted a hearing on the
petitions. Initially, at the outset of the hearing, the Former
Husband requested that the trial court impute a $57,600 annual
income to the Former Wife based upon her full-time teaching job in
Missouri. The trial court advised both parties that it had the
authority to impute a $78,000 annual income to the Former Wife
because she voluntarily terminated her employment at the private
school in Marco Island and moved to Missouri. Later, at the close
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of the evidence, the Former Husband requested the imputation of a
$78,000 annual income.
At the hearing, the Former Wife conceded that the termination
of her Florida teaching position and her move to Missouri were
voluntary; however, she objected to the imputation of the Florida
salary and argued that the Former Husband had the burden of
proving the Former Wife's employment potential and probable
earnings based upon her work history, occupational qualifications,
and prevailing earnings level in her community in Fairgrove,
Missouri. The trial court rejected the Former Wife's argument and
imputed a $78,000 annual income to her based upon (1) the June
2019 order denying her petition to relocate which mentioned that
she earned $78,000 at the private school in Marco Island1 and (2)
the Former Husband's testimony that she was making that salary
before she moved to Missouri. This was error.
1 The June 2019 order did not adjudicate the imputation of a
salary to the Former Wife. Rather, the focus of the order was
whether relocation was in the best interest of the child. It
mentioned only once that the Former Wife "resigned her position as
a teacher at a charter school in Marco Island where she earned as
much as $78,000.00 annual salary."
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"A trial court's imputation of income must be supported by
competent, substantial evidence." Tutt v. Hudson, 299 So. 3d 568,
570 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (citing Schlagel v. Schlagel, 973 So. 2d 672,
675 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)). The process of imputing income involves
a two-step statutory analysis: "(1) the determination of whether the
parent's underemployment was voluntary, and (2) if so, the
calculation of imputed income." Cash v. Cash, 122 So. 3d 430, 434
(Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (quoting Bator v. Osborne, 983 So. 2d 1198,
1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)); see also ยง 61.30(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2020).
Section 61.30(2)(b) provides that "[i]n the event of such voluntary
unemployment or underemployment, the employment potential and
probable earnings level of the parent shall be determined based
upon his or her recent work history, occupational qualifications,
and prevailing earnings level in the community if such information is
available." (Emphasis added.) The spouse asserting that income
should be imputed to the underemployed spouse bears the burden
of proof. See Cash, 122 So. 3d at 434 ("The former husband had
the burden of proof as the party asserting that the former wife was
voluntarily unemployed and that income should be imputed to
her.").
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Here, the Former Wife moved from Florida where her annual
salary was $78,000 to Missouri where she made approximately
$57,600 annually. Because she concedes that her present
underemployment is voluntary, our focus shifts to the second step
and determining whether the trial court's calculation of the Former
Wife's imputed income complied with section 61.30(2)(b). We
conclude that it did not.
While a spouse's work history is important and should be
considered when determining an amount to impute, because the
Former Wife relocated from Florida to Missouri the relevant job
market was Fairgrove, Missouri, and the trial court's inquiry should
have focused on that community. See Williams v. Gonzalez, 294 So.
3d 941, 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (reversing the imputation of
income that was based on prior Florida wages rather than North
Carolina wages, where the spouse was living and working at the
time of trial); Rabbath v. Farid, 4 So. 3d 778, 784 (Fla. 1st DCA
2009) (reversing the imputation of income based on a past, foreign
job because "[n]o evidence was presented regarding the current,
prevailing earnings level and the potential source(s) or amount of
income in the pertinent community" (emphasis added)).
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At the time of the hearing, the Former Wife had lived and
taught in school in Missouri for over a year. The only evidence of
earning potential introduced by the Former Husband was his
testimony that the Former Wife earned $78,000 a year at the
private school in Marco Island until May 2019. He did not submit
any other admissible evidence of her earning potential, probable
earnings, and prevailing earnings that established she could earn
$78,000 in the Fairgrove community.
The Former Wife testified that her position at the private
school in Marco Island was immediately filled after her departure
and that she had no intentions of moving back to Florida. When
her annual contract for the full-time teaching position in Missouri
had not been renewed, she searched online for jobs in local
counties and called local school superintendents to find a
comparable position. Ultimately, she was able to find a permanent
substitute teacher position at a much lower salary.
We conclude that there was no competent substantial evidence
to support the trial court's imputation of the $78,000 annual salary
to the Former Wife. It was required to make statutory findings in
compliance with section 61.30(2)(b) and to place the burden on the
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Former Husband to prove that the Former Wife could earn $78,000
in Fairgrove, Missouri. However, the trial court did not require the
Former Husband to produce any evidence other than his bare
assertion that she used to make that salary in Florida more than a
year prior to the hearing. The trial court had no legal basis to rely
solely upon a passing mention of the Former Wife's salary in the
June 2019 order denying the Former Wife's petition for relocation.
Accordingly, we reverse the order establishing child support as
it relates to the amount of income imputed to the Former Wife and
the amount of the Former Wife's child support obligation calculated
pursuant to the imputed income amount. On remand, the trial
court is directed to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the
Former Wife's earning potential in Fairgrove, Missouri, establish a
level of imputed income supported by competent substantial
evidence, and adjust the child support award as necessary. See
Thompson v. Malicki, 169 So. 3d 271, 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). We
affirm in all other respects.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
KELLY and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.
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Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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