Full Opinion

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, LAKELAND, FLORIDA July 29, 2020 SARA A. MARENCO, n/k/a ) SARA A. STUCZYNSKI, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D18-1664 ) ALEXANDER T. MARENCO, JR., ) ) Appellee. ) ) BY ORDER OF THE COURT: IT IS ORDERED that the appellee's "motion for limited rehearing" filed on February 20, 2020, is denied as moot; the appellant's response is noted. On this court's own motion, the opinion dated February 7, 2020, is withdrawn and the attached opinion is substituted therefor. No further motions for rehearing will be entertained in this appeal. I HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL COURT ORDER. MARY ELIZABETH KUENZEL, CLERK IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT SARA A. MARENCO, n/k/a ) SARA A. STUCZYNSKI, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D18-1664 ) ALEXANDER T. MARENCO, JR., ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed July 29, 2020. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Alicia Polk, Judge. Ralph P. Mangione of Burr & Forman, LLP, Tampa, for Appellant. Mark F. Baseman of Felix, Felix & Baseman, Tampa, for Appellee. ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge. This is an appeal from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage between Sara A. Stuczynski (the Former Wife) and Alexander T. Marenco, Jr. (the Former Husband). We agree with the Former Wife that the trial court erred in certain aspects of its child support calculation and in failing to resolve all issues presented for adjudication, and we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, we affirm. First, the Former Wife contends that in calculating her gross income for child support purposes, the trial court erred by excluding negative income from her rental property—a townhouse that she purchased before the marriage. Although the Former Wife has been renting the townhouse to a tenant, she asserted that she was taking a loss on the property because of the mortgage and maintenance fees. The Former Wife asserted that she was underwater on the property, that she would only be able to sell it at a loss, and that she was attempting to mitigate her losses by renting it out. The Former Husband opposed the Former Wife's claiming of any loss based on this nonmarital asset. Pursuant to section 61.30(2)(a)(11), Florida Statutes (2018), "[g]ross income shall include . . . [r]ental income." "Rental income" is defined as "gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses required to produce the income." Id. The Former Wife's rental income, however—positive or negative—did not appear to factor into the trial court's child support determination. Although the court's exclusion of any rental income was consistent with the Former Husband's position, the court made no findings and did not appear to have engaged in the statutorily prescribed analysis or in any analysis at all. Moreover, the court appeared to base its child support determination on "the numbers stipulated to by the parties," but the correct amount of rental income was one of the few income-related issues on which the parties were unable to stipulate. Because we cannot ascertain from the record the basis for the court's exclusion of rental income from its determination of the Former Wife's gross income, we reverse the order of child support and remand for the court to set forth its findings. See Holaway v. Holaway, 197 So. 3d 612, 613 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) ("When a trial court fails to explain the calculations it used to arrive at the parties' imputed incomes in determining an award of child support, this court has remanded to the trial -2- court for clarification." (citing Herring v. Ashby, 869 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004))). Moreover, the Former Husband concedes that the trial court deviated without explanation from the parties' stipulation concerning the Former Wife's net monthly income and monthly expenses, apart from any rental income, when calculating the Former Wife's retroactive child support for 2016. Again, we cannot ascertain the court's reasoning from the record. Consequently, on remand, the court's calculation of retroactive child support for 2016 shall either reflect the parties' stipulation or provide an explanation for the court's deviation from that stipulation. Lastly, we agree with the Former Wife that the trial court erred in failing to determine whether (1) a parenting coordinator should be appointed, (2) the parties should undergo counseling, and (3) life insurance should be required as security for the child support. The parties agreed in their partial parenting plan and time-sharing schedule that these matters were to be determined by the court, and in approving that plan, the court asserted that it was retaining jurisdiction to do so. Moreover, all of these matters were litigated at the trial, but neither the final judgment nor the amended final judgment addressed them, despite the Former Wife's specifically having brought them to the court's attention both in her written closing argument and in her motion for rehearing. Accordingly, the court shall also resolve these matters on remand. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with directions. LaROSE1 and BLACK, JJ., Concur. 1Judge LaRose has been substituted for Judge Northcutt, who was on the original Stuczynski panel. -3-