Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT AND COMPTROLLER OF COLLIER COUNTY, Appellant, v. U.S. SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and ANDRES TYSON BRANDON, Appellees. No. 2D21-1769 April 13, 2022 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier County; Blake Adams, Judge. Thomas W. Franchino, Naples, for Appellant. Lisa Hanley Colon, Miami; and Bruce S. Reich, Miami Beach, for Appellee U.S. Surety Insurance Company. SILBERMAN, Judge. The Clerk of the Circuit Court and Comptroller of Collier County (the Clerk) appeals the county court's entry of an order granting U.S. Specialty Insurance Company's (the Surety) Motion for Remission of Bail Bond Forfeitures. We reverse because the county court lacked the statutory authority to order remission due to the Surety's breach of the bond. In August 2016, a criminal defendant was arrested on three charges. The Surety posted three appearance bonds on his behalf, two of which are pertinent to this appeal. When the defendant failed to appear for a jury trial on November 28, 2016, the Clerk entered a Notice of Forfeiture on each of the two bonds. The Clerk served the Surety with the notices that same day. Pursuant to section 903.26(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2016), payment of the forfeitures was due to the Clerk on or before January 27, 2017, or sixty days from the notices of the forfeiture. However, the Surety did not pay the forfeitures until January 31, 2017. The Clerk accepted the late payments upon receipt and did not enter judgments of forfeiture pursuant to section 903.27(1). The Surety filed a motion for remission of the forfeitures in the fall of 2018. See § 903.28. The Clerk filed a response to the 2 Surety's motion arguing that the court must deny the motion because the Surety breached the bonds by paying the forfeitures after the sixtieth day, precluding remission under section 903.28(1). The Clerk further argued that as a result of the breaches, the court lacked jurisdiction to order remission. After holding a hearing, the county court agreed that the Surety's failure to pay the forfeitures constituted a breach of the bonds. But the court also found that the Clerk had not strictly adhered to chapter 903 of the Florida Statutes. The court noted that had the Clerk entered a judgment against the Surety, the Surety would have been afforded a remedy to have the judgment set aside. Based on its conclusion that neither party had strictly adhered to chapter 903, the court concluded that the forfeiture payments made by the Surety beyond the statutory time period of sixty days did not extinguish the Surety's remission rights. As a result, the court granted the Surety's motion for remission. On appeal, the Clerk again argues that under the express terms of section 903.28, the county court lacked jurisdiction or authority to grant remission because the Surety breached the bond by failing to timely pay the forfeitures. We conduct a de novo review 3 of statutory interpretation. GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So. 2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007). "Chapter 903, Florida Statutes, is a compilation of enactments governing bail, criminal surety bail bonds, and the procedures bail bond agents should follow in order to obtain relief from the commitments and obligations imposed on them by the surety bonds they issue once the bonds are forfeited." Polakoff & Aabbott Bail Bonds v. State, 111 So. 3d 253, 254 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). "Parties' rights and remedies regarding discharge of forfeited bonds and remission of part or all of the funds forfeited are currently governed by statutes and the courts are limited by their provisions." Bd. of Comm'rs of Brevard v. Barber Bonding Agency, 860 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (first citing Leon County v. Aloi-Williams Bonding Agency, 652 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); then citing Accredited Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Putnam County, 528 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); and then citing Accredited Sur. & Cas. Co. v. State, 418 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)). "Remission of forfeiture is a wholly statutory remedy that 'may not be ordered for any reason other than as specified' in the statute." Hillsborough County v. Roche Sur. & Cas., Co., 805 So. 2d 937, 938-39 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (quoting § 903.28(7) (1999)). And 4 section 903.28(1) unambiguously provides that "the court shall order remission of the forfeiture if it determines that there was no breach of the bond" and when application for remission occurs within two years from the forfeiture. See also Roche Sur. & Cas., Co., 805 So. 2d at 939 (reiterating that "[c]ertain conditions precedent must be met before a court is authorized to order remission of a forfeited bond," including that there had been no breach of the bond). Here, it is undisputed that the Surety was in breach of the bonds because it failed to pay the forfeitures within sixty days of the notices of forfeiture, as required by section 903.26(2)(a). See Roche Sur. & Cas., Co., 805 So. 2d at 939 ("[F]ailure to pay the forfeiture constitutes a breach of the bond." (citing County of Volusia v. Audet, 682 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996))). It is well established that when a "statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look behind the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent." Daniels v. Fla. Dep't of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005). Sections 903.28(1) and (7) are clear and unambiguous and allow for remission of a forfeiture only where the bond has not been breached. 5 Because the trial court correctly determined that the Surety had breached the bonds by failing to timely make the required payments, and because there is nothing in the record suggesting that anything the Clerk did or failed to do led the Surety to delay making the payments, we reverse the order granting the Surety's motion for remission. Reversed. BLACK, J., and CASE, JAMES R., ASSOCIATE SENIOR JUDGE, Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 6