Jack P. Kotlarz v. Wendy W. Kotlarz
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledApril 27, 2020
Docket1D18-4818
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D18-4818
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JACK P. KOTLARZ,
Appellant,
v.
WENDY W. KOTLARZ,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Thomas V. Dannheisser, Judge.
April 27, 2020
ROBERTS, J.
The former husband appeals an award of attorney’s fees and
costs granted to the former wife in association with her
extraordinary efforts to collect the money owed to her by the
former husband. On appeal, the former husband argues that the
trial court erred in granting the former wife attorney’s fees and
costs pursuant to Chapter 61, Florida Statutes. We agree and
reverse.
In the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, which was
issued in 2008, the trial court ordered the former husband to pay
the former wife an equalizing payment as part of the equitable
distribution plan. In 2009, the trial court awarded the former wife
a money judgment. To this day, the former husband has not paid
the equalizing payment.
In 2015, in order to collect on the money judgment, the former
wife began to pursue writs of garnishment and proceedings
supplementary to obtain a writ of execution. Having had little
success in collecting any money to satisfy her money judgment and
needing additional funds in order to continue her collection efforts,
the former wife requested an award of attorney’s fees and costs.
The former wife argued that she is entitled to attorney’s fees and
costs pursuant to Chapter 61. The trial court agreed and awarded
the former wife attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 61.16,
Florida Statutes.
Whether attorney’s fees and costs are authorized under
section 61.16 for the former wife’s collection efforts is a legal
question subject to de novo review. See Mathers v. Brown, 21 So.
3d 834, 837-38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (when the matter on appeal
only concerns an issue of law, the de novo standard of review
applies).
When the former wife received a money judgment, she became
a judgment creditor and was subject to the same remedies
available to any other judgment creditor. See DeSantis v.
DeSantis, 714 So. 2d 637, 638 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (equitable
distribution awards may only be enforced through the usual
remedies available to a creditor against his debtor). Chapter 61
does not provide remedies for judgment creditors. Section 61.16(1)
states, in relevant part:
(1) The court may from time to time, after considering
the financial resources of both parties, order a party to
pay a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees, suit money,
and the cost to the other party of maintaining or
defending any proceeding under this chapter, including
enforcement and modification proceedings and appeals. .
..
(Emphasis added.)
Chapter 61 provides for a writ of garnishment under the
chapter only for the enforcement of alimony or child support. §
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61.12, Fla. Stat. The original equalizing payment owed to the
former wife was not for alimony or child support. Therefore, her
pursuit of a writ of garnishment was not a proceeding under
Chapter 61. Likewise, Chapter 61 does not provide for proceedings
supplementary to obtain a writ of execution. Therefore, her efforts
toward obtaining a writ of execution were not proceedings under
Chapter 61. While we empathize with the trial court’s frustration
in attempting to get the former husband to comply with its orders
over the last ten years, we are compelled to reverse because the
Legislature has not authorized attorney’s fees and costs for the
former wife’s collection efforts.
REVERSED.
ROWE, J., concurs; WOLF, J., concurs with opinion.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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WOLF, J., concurring.
The Legislature may wish to look at the ability of a former
spouse to collect attorney’s fees when attempting to enforce
judgments and agreements that are intended to achieve financial
equity between the parties. This is a classic case of a former spouse
having to dissipate assets in order to attain what was properly
awarded in equitable distribution as part of a dissolution
judgment. Failing to allow attorney’s fees to enforce that judgment
undermines the very purpose of the equalizing payment ordered
by the trial court.
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John M. Kvartek, Pensacola; Charles F. Beall and Haley J.
VanFleteren of Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A., Pensacola;
Darryl Steve Traylor, Jr., of Borowski & Traylor, P.A., Pensacola,
for Appellant.
Laura E. Keene of Beroset & Keene, Pensacola; Linda A. Hoffman
of Carver, Darden, Koretzky, Tessier, Finn Blossman & Areaux,
LLC, Pensacola, for Appellee.
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