Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT DOUGLAS R. BELL and THE LAW OFFICE OF BELL & BELL, P.A., Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. ANDREAS KONIDARIS and DIANE KONIDARIS, Appellees/Cross-Appellants. No. 4D2024-2723 [September 16, 2026] Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Nicholas Richard Lopane, Judge; L.T. Case No. 062017CP002657A001CE. Douglas R. Bell of The Law Office of Bell & Bell, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellants/cross-appellees. Gary E. Susser of Law Office of Gary E. Susser, P.A., Delray Beach, for appellees/cross-appellants. MAY, J. It’s all about the fees in this appeal of an attorney’s fees order following probate litigation, in which the attorney represented the personal representative and a beneficiary of an estate. The attorney argues the trial court erred in limiting the fees awarded in several respects. The clients cross-appeal, arguing the trial court should have limited the fees more and/or denied the fees altogether. We agree in part with the attorney and reverse on the main appeal. Because we remand this case for a de novo hearing on attorney’s fees, the issues raised in the cross-appeal are deemed moot. • The Facts Andreas Konidaris (“AK”) served as the decedent’s successor trustee and was later appointed personal representative of the decedent’s estate. His wife Diane Konidaris (“DK”) was the decedent’s granddaughter and a potential beneficiary of the estate. AK and DK retained the attorney to handle the decedent’s estate. This included defending claims of undue influence and tortious interference alleged by the decedent’s son, and an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by various beneficiaries. In March 2017, the attorney filed a FINRA claim 1 on behalf of AK against Morgan Stanley and the decedent’s broker arising from a $200,000 transfer from the decedent’s account to the decedent’s son. The law firm of Vincent & Bishop, P.A. (“V & B”) filed a notice of limited appearance for the clients when it was anticipated that opposing counsel would invoke the witness-advocate rule if the attorney testified at trial. The parties ultimately settled at a second mediation, which the trial court approved. The FINRA claim was dismissed as part of the settlement. Following the settlement, a dispute arose concerning the attorney’s fees. The attorney filed a charging lien and later moved to adjudicate a second amended charging lien, seeking fees and costs. o The Charging Lien Trial At trial, the attorney testified regarding the legal services performed, the results obtained, and the fees sought. His billing records and exhibits, showing reductions in the fees and costs, were admitted into evidence. The clients presented testimony from their daughter (“MK”), a certified public accountant; the decedent’s son’s attorneys, Adrian and Michelle Thomas; Arthur Vincent of V & B; and AK. MK testified that she had reviewed the attorney’s invoices and prepared spreadsheets categorizing and analyzing his billing entries. She attributed 71.5 attorney hours to the FINRA claim. She acknowledged the definition of “block billing” that she had applied and had been provided by the clients’ new counsel. The decedent’s son’s attorneys, Michelle and Adrian Thomas, testified primarily about their own firm’s billing records and their independent knowledge of the FINRA complaint. Neither witness testified to the number of hours which the attorney had spent on the FINRA claim, whether it was 1 A FINRA claim is a claim submitted to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority for resolution through its arbitration process, which provides a forum for disputes involving investors, brokerage firms, and associated persons. 2 authorized, or whether any of the attorney’s billings duplicated V & B’s work. Arthur Vincent of V & B testified regarding his firm’s limited involvement in the case, his firm’s invoices, and the descriptions of attorney and paralegal time reflected in those invoices. Although he authenticated his firm’s billing records, he was not asked to identify any specific billing entries that overlapped with the attorney’s work, quantify any allegedly duplicative time, or compare his firm’s invoices to the attorney’s invoices. Neither did he testify that V & B had performed the same work as the attorney, nor that the attorney’s fees should be reduced by the amounts in V & B’s invoices. AK denied authorizing or directing the attorney to pursue the FINRA claim and testified that the attorney had never sought his approval before filing the claim. AK also testified that after the mediation, no discussion occurred regarding legal fees or any change to the retainer agreement. The attorney continued filing pleadings without direction from him. AK did, however, acknowledge that the attorney had kept him informed by sending pleadings and emails during the litigation. AK routinely relied on the attorney’s legal advice concerning estate administration and repairs to the trust property. The attorney testified that the clients were actively involved in the probate litigation and he discussed litigation strategy with them. According to the attorney, the clients authorized pursuing the FINRA claim, participated in developing the allegations of that claim, reviewed pleadings, and remained informed through regular communications. The attorney believed the FINRA claim had factual support based on the alleged misappropriation of approximately $200,000 from the decedent’s Morgan Stanley account and information developed during the probate litigation. The attorney testified that he had prepared the clients for depositions, actively participated in mediation, negotiated the settlement agreement, and obtained a favorable global settlement. The attorney testified that V & B had been retained to assume responsibility for the FINRA arbitration only after his withdrawal and that V & B’s work did not duplicate his work. According to the attorney, his billing reflected work performed before V & B entered the case. At the close of the evidence, the clients moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. The trial court directed the parties to submit written closing arguments. 3 o The Written Closing Arguments In its written closing argument, the attorney argued that his representation had resulted in a mediation which produced approximately $1.8 million in benefits for the clients and he was entitled to recover the unpaid balance of his charging lien. He argued his $375 hourly rate, his paralegal’s $175 hourly rate, and the hours expended were both reasonable and supported by contemporaneous time records, weekly reconciliations, and monthly invoices. The attorney further argued that the clients failed to identify any specific unreasonable or unnecessary billing entry, MK lacked the foundation to offer reliable opinions regarding his billing, and MK’s FINRA calculations had improperly included unrelated brokerage work. The attorney also argued that AK had authorized the FINRA claim, V & B’s work did not duplicate his own, and the mediated settlement agreement reflected the clients’ agreement to pay him. The clients responded that the requested fees were excessive and unsupported by the evidence. They argued the attorney’s conduct unnecessarily prolonged the litigation, requiring the retention of V & B, whose fees should be deducted from any total because their work duplicated that of the attorney. They further argued the attorney’s billing records were unreliable because the records included reconstructed and block-billed time, sought compensation for clerical paralegal work, and were excessive. The clients also argued the FINRA claim was filed without their authorization and lacked evidentiary support, and thus any fees attributed to the claim should be disallowed. Finally, the clients argued the attorney failed to present independent expert testimony required to establish the reasonableness of his fees and that significant portions of the charging lien were legally unenforceable. o The Order More than eight months after trial, the trial court entered an eighteen- page order adjudicating the attorney’s charging lien. The court found the attorney was “neither skilled nor knowledgeable enough in the area of trust litigation.” The trial court reduced the attorney’s hourly rate from $375 to $300 and his paralegal’s hourly rate from $175 to $125. 4 The trial court found 732.6 attorney hours and 325.6 paralegal hours reasonable. The court reduced the time by 255.4 hours, including 156 hours devoted to the FINRA claim, finding the claim “was neither requested nor approved” by the clients, the attorney “had not consulted with anyone experienced in FINRA claims,” and the FINRA panel found the claim frivolous. The trial court also reduced 54 hours for “unmeritorious discovery issues” and 46 hours for “duplicative work and excessive hand holding.” The trial court found V & B’s work was “absolutely necessary,” its handling of the matter “exceptional,” and “any of the [a]ttorney’s time which was duplicative was not reasonably chargeable to AK.” The trial court deducted the $85,040 paid to V & B from the attorney’s fees award. After awarding $260,480 in fees and $16,584.64 in costs, deducting the V & B offset, and crediting prior payments, the trial court entered a charging- lien award of $124,847.96 for the attorney. o The Motions for Rehearing The attorney’s amended motion for rehearing argued the trial court had overlooked material facts and relied on findings unsupported by the evidence. The attorney attached new email exhibits showing AK had directed the attorney to pursue the FINRA claim. The attorney also argued the evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that the attorney had spent 156 hours on the FINRA matter. The attorney further argued the trial court had improperly deducted the full $85,040 paid to V & B because the evidence did not establish its work duplicated his work. Much of V & B’s work had occurred after the charging lien period or involved matters for which he did not seek compensation. He argued the trial court’s findings were unsupported by the record and had tracked the clients’ written closing argument verbatim. The clients’ motion for reconsideration argued the trial court had overlooked several issues that warranted further reductions to the attorney’s fees award. The clients argued the evidence established that AK had personally paid V & B $82,185—not $77,596.31—and requested that amount be used as the offset. The clients also argued the trial court should disallow the $2,775 for the FINRA filing and panel costs, together with the fees and costs incurred pursuing two unsuccessful appeals, because those matters had not produced any benefit to the clients. Further, the clients argued they were entitled to offset $188,399.97 that they had personally expended repairing the trust property in reliance on 5 the attorney’s advice. Finally, the clients argued the attorney had failed to present an expert witness to establish the reasonableness of his fees. The trial court conducted a hearing on both motions. The attorney again challenged the FINRA findings, the V & B deduction, several factual findings, and attempted to rely on emails that had not been admitted at trial to show AK’s approval of the FINRA claim. The trial court declined to consider the emails and denied both motions. From the fees order and the order denying multiple post-judgment motions, the attorney appeals. The clients cross-appeal the fees order and the order denying their motion for rehearing. • The Analysis The attorney argues the trial court failed to exercise independent judgment by adopting numerous verbatim factual inaccuracies, unsupported findings, and internal inconsistencies directly from the clients’ written closing argument. The clients respond that the trial court exercised independent judgment and the order is supported by competent substantial evidence. The clients further argue the trial court’s fees reductions were supported by competent substantial evidence that the attorney lacked proficiency in trust litigation, overbilled the clients, and performed deficient legal work. o The Trial Court Order We review a trial court’s verbatim adoption of a party’s closing arguments into its final order for an abuse of discretion. See Perlow v. Berg-Perlow, 875 So. 2d 383, 386–87 (Fla. 2004). A trial court may adopt a party’s proposed order verbatim without committing reversible error. Id. However, if the circumstances create the appearance that the trial court failed to exercise an independent analysis of the facts, issues, and law, a reversal is warranted. Id. at 389–90; King v. King, 363 So. 3d 1099, 1100 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (citing Ross v. Botha, 867 So. 2d 567, 572―73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), abrogated on other grounds by C.N. v. I.G.C., 316 So. 3d 287, 289 (Fla. 2021)). In determining whether the trial court exercised independent judgment, courts consider: (1) whether the order is consistent with the court’s oral rulings; 6 (2) how much time has passed after the hearing; (3) whether the order contains irregularities or conflicts; (4) whether the judge participated in the proceeding; and (5) whether the judge edited or instead signed the proposed order verbatim. King, 363 So. 3d at 1101 (citing Ross, 867 So. 2d at 572, abrogated on other grounds by C.N., 316 So. 3d at 289). The lack of independent judgment may appear where the court adopts a party’s submission wholesale, without findings or meaningful modifications. An order which contains errors, omissions, conflicts, or other irregularities suggests that it reflects the drafter’s work product rather than the court’s analysis. See id. at 1100–01; Bishop v. Bishop, 47 So. 3d 326, 328–29 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Here, several months passed before the trial court issued the order. Substantial portions of the order track the parties’ written closing arguments, including identical citation formatting, language, and structure. The order incorporates both parties’ distinct citation styles— underlined citations from the clients’ closing and italicized citations from the attorney’s closing—often appearing side-by-side in the same paragraph. The trial court made no findings on the record before issuing the order and did not announce any preliminary rulings. More importantly, the order contains several findings suggesting adoption of counsel’s advocacy rather than an independent review of the record. Simply put, the order raises substantial doubt about the trial court’s independent judgment. We therefore reverse the order and remand for a de novo hearing. o The Lack of Evidence Supporting the Trial Court’s Findings The attorney next argues the trial court erred in its findings that the attorney had pursued the FINRA claim without the clients’ authorization, and billed 156 hours for that claim, because the findings are unsupported by competent substantial evidence. The clients respond that the trial court’s findings were supported by AK’s testimony that he had neither requested nor authorized the FINRA claim and the claim lacked merit. 7 An attorney’s fees award must be supported by competent substantial evidence. Diwaker v. Montecito Palm Beach Condo. Ass’n., 143 So. 3d 958, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). “Competent evidence includes invoices, records and other information detailing the services provided as well as the testimony from the attorney in support of the fee.” Id. (citation modified). Here, the trial court found the attorney’s FINRA-related services were non-compensable because the claim was unauthorized by the clients. Competent substantial evidence supports that finding. AK specifically testified that he did not authorize pursuing the FINRA claim, and he had no proof that Morgan Stanley had acted improperly or that the decedent’s son had improperly taken funds from the account. Although the attorney’s testimony contradicted that of the client, the trial court was entitled to resolve the conflicting testimony. 2 Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001). But the trial court also found the attorney had billed 156 hours for the FINRA claim and excluded those hours from the fees award. However, that figure appears nowhere in the record. No witness testified to that figure, no billing record reflected it, and no party argued it. In fact, the attorney’s billing records reflect about 35.4 attorney hours devoted to the FINRA matter. Even the clients’ billing spreadsheet attributed only 114.6 hours to the FINRA claim. 3 Even if the FINRA claim was unauthorized, the record does not support the trial court’s finding that the attorney expended 156 hours on the FINRA claim. We therefore reverse and remand on this issue for a reduction of an amount supported by the record. o The Deduction of V & B’s Fees The attorney next argues the trial court erred in deducting V & B’s fees. First, he argues the deduction is not supported by competent substantial evidence because no proof existed of duplicated work. Second, he argues that the order lacks the requisite findings. The clients respond generally that both firms worked on the same case and pursued the same objectives. 2 The attorney’s post-trial attempt to introduce the client’s emails to show that AK had authorized the FINRA claim was properly denied by the trial court as untimely. 3 The spreadsheet shows the attorney billed $42,975.00. At $375 per hour, that amount accounts for only 114.6 hours. 8 Although the retention of multiple attorneys does not automatically render one attorney’s work duplicative, a court may disallow fees for unnecessary work duplication. Fla. Drilling & Sawing v. Fohrman, 635 So. 2d 1054, 1055–56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Once the fee applicant establishes entitlement to fees, the opponent bears the burden of identifying with specificity the hours that should be deducted. Centex-Rooney Constr. Co. v. Martin Cnty., 725 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Here, the trial court deducted $85,040 from the attorney’s fees award, reasoning that V & B’s involvement was “absolutely necessary” and that “any of [the attorney’s] time which is duplicative is not reasonably chargeable to [the clients].” Arthur Vincent testified to his hourly rate, his paralegal’s hourly rate, and the firm’s total fees. But he was not asked whether any V & B’s services duplicated the attorney’s work. The documentary evidence merely reflected the work performed by multiple professionals over the same period. Neither the clients nor the trial court identified any duplicative billing entry. In short, the evidence did not support the $85,040 reduction in the attorney’s fee award. When a trial court fails to make specific findings supporting an award of attorney’s fees, the proper remedy is reversal and remand. See William Dorsky Assocs., Inc. v. Highlands Cnty. Title & Guar. Land Co., 528 So. 2d 411, 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). We must therefore reverse on this issue as well as the record fails to support duplicative work. o The Cross-Appeal The clients raise two issues on cross appeal. First, the clients argue the trial court erred in their request for an offset for money they spent to improve the estate’s real property. Second, the clients argue the attorney’s fees award should be reversed because the attorney did not provide an expert to testify to the reasonableness of the hours expended and a reasonable hourly rate. 4 Because we reverse the judgment for a de novo hearing, these issues are rendered moot. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a de novo hearing 4 We note the Sixth District has recently eliminated this requirement. Ruffenach v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 431 So. 3d 1055, 1058–60 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). Ruffenach held that neither expert testimony nor an evidentiary hearing is required to award attorney’s fees because no statute, procedural rule, or binding Florida Supreme Court decision requires such testimony or hearing. Id. 9 on attorney’s fees. GERBER, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing. 10