Nathan White and Serena White v. Martin C. Boire and Janet L. Boire
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledApril 7, 2021
Docket2D20-2021
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
NATHAN WHITE and SERENA )
WHITE, )
)
Petitioners, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D20-2021
)
MARTIN C. BOIRE and JANET )
L. BOIRE, )
)
Respondents. )
)
Opinion filed April 7, 2021.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Circuit Court for Hillsborough County;
Richard A. Nielsen, Judge.
Thamir A.R. Kaddouri, Jr., and
Penelope Rowlett, of Law Office of
Thamir A. R. Kaddouri, Jr., P.A.,
Tampa, for Petitioners.
G. Donovan Conwell, Jr., of Conwell
Business Law, LLLP, Tampa, for
Respondents.
ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.
Nathan and Serena White timely seek certiorari review of the trial court's
order granting Martin and Janet Boire's motion for leave to amend their complaint to
seek punitive damages pursuant to section 768.72, Florida Statutes (2019). Because
the court appears to have relied on an incorrect legal standard in granting the motion,
we grant the Whites' petition for a writ of certiorari and quash the order.
The Boires filed a complaint against their neighbors, the Whites, seeking
equitable relief and compensatory damages based on allegations that the Whites had
engaged in intentional misconduct in connection with an agreement between them and
the Boires to jointly purchase land adjacent to the couples' properties. During the
litigation, the Boires moved for leave to amend their complaint to seek punitive damages
in connection with their claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive fraud.
The motion proffered facts that the Boires argued constituted circumstantial evidence
that the Whites had never intended to purchase the property jointly; rather, their intent
all along had been to mislead the Boires into inaction so that they could negotiate for
and purchase the property themselves.
The proffer was presented in a narrative form and consisted entirely of the
representations of counsel. Although it attributed some facts to the prior testimony of
particular people and referred to numerous documents, counsel did not submit any
depositions or documentary evidence with the motion, and apart from one document
that was an exhibit to the complaint, none appear to have been previously filed in the
court record.
At the hearing on the motion, the Whites objected to the Boires' reliance on
the proffer, arguing that many of the representations were not supported by the
evidence or, particularly with respect to damages, were actually contradicted by the
evidence. The Boires responded that the Whites were improperly "arguing the counter-
evidence and asking the court to weigh the evidence."
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The trial court did not address the Whites' objection. At the conclusion of
the parties' arguments, the court stated, "The court is aware that the standard here is
that there has to be a reasonable showing either—it's an either/or here, evidence in the
record or by proffer, a reasonable showing to provide a reasonable basis for recovery of
the punitive damages." The court then concluded "that there has been [a] sufficient
proffer of at least the Plaintiffs' view," and it stated further:
I think the case law is clear as well that on a motion to
amend, there is not to be the counter evidence presented.
And on this record, of course it wasn't presented on
pleadings or notices of filing, but, rather, by argument at the
hearing.
But whether in one form or another, the court doesn't
make some evidentiary findings on a motion to amend, the
court simply accepts the allegations as it would in a motion
to dismiss. And on that basis is there sufficient allegations
appropriate for the relief being sought to support a claim for
punitive damages.
The court notes that there are a number of cases
cited in the moving papers establishing that a claim for fraud
is—fraud in the inducement is sufficient with enough
allegations of the motive, if you will, again alleged. Whether,
in fact, the proof is there is a matter for trial.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a written order granting the Boires'
motion for leave to amend their complaint and stating, "Plaintiffs' proffer of evidence [is]
sufficient to establish a reasonable evidentiary basis for recovery of punitive damages."
The Whites' timely petition followed.
Section 768.72(1) provides that a claim for punitive damages will not be
permitted unless there is a "reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered
by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages."
Subsection (2), which sets forth the plaintiff's burden at trial, establishes that the
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"reasonable basis for recovery" is a showing that the defendant "was personally guilty of
intentional misconduct or gross negligence." § 768.72(2) ("A defendant may be held
liable for punitive damages only if the trier of fact, based on clear and convincing
evidence, finds that the defendant was personally guilty of intentional misconduct or
gross negligence.").
Section 768.72 "create[s] a substantive legal right not to be subject to a
punitive damages claim and ensuing financial worth discovery until the trial court makes
a determination that there is a reasonable evidentiary basis for recovery of punitive
damages." Globe Newspaper Co. v. King, 658 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 1995). Certiorari
review is available to determine whether a trial court has complied with the procedural
requirements of section 768.72. Id. at 519–20. "The prospect of intrusive financial
discovery following a trial court's authorization for an amendment to add a claim for
punitive damages is the irremediable injury . . . required for . . . [the] exercise of . . .
certiorari jurisdiction." Cat Cay Yacht Club, Inc. v. Diaz, 264 So. 3d 1071, 1076 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2019) (citing TRG Desert Inn Venture, Ltd. v. Berezovsky, 194 So. 3d 516, 520 n.5
(Fla. 3d DCA 2016)).
Although the trial court's written order suggests that the court applied the
correct, evidentiary standard in granting the motion to amend, its statements at the
hearing concerning the sufficiency of the "allegations" persuade us otherwise,
particularly given that the Boires' proffer consisted solely of their counsel's
representations notwithstanding the Whites' repeated (and unaddressed) objection.
Accordingly, the order granting the Whites' motion for leave to amend their complaint to
seek punitive damages must be quashed. See Bistline v. Rogers, 215 So. 3d 607, 609–
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10 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quashing an order granting the plaintiff's motion to amend
because although the order stated that the trial court had "reviewed and considered the
evidentiary proffer," it was clear from the order as a whole that the court had improperly
accepted the plaintiff's allegations as true and granted the motion on that basis); cf.
Tilton v. Wrobel, 198 So. 3d 909, 910–11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quashing an order
granting the plaintiff's motion to amend because the trial court's statements at the
hearing indicated that rather than making a decision concerning the sufficiency of the
evidentiary proffer, the court appeared to have concluded that the complaint's
allegations of defamation entitled the plaintiff to seek punitive damages as a matter of
law).
Petition granted; order quashed.
VILLANTI and STARGEL, JJ., Concur.
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