Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT THE HONORABLE LARRY L. EGER, in his capacity as Public Defender of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, Petitioner, v. THE JUDGES OF THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, Respondents. No. 2D23-1151 August 23, 2023 BY ORDER OF THE COURT: Upon consideration of Petitioner's motions for clarification and for a written opinion filed on July 21, 2023, IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner's motions are granted to the extent that the order issued on July 13, 2023, is withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted therefor. No further motions for rehearing, clarification, certification, or written opinion will be considered. I HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL COURT ORDER. MARY ELIZABETH KUENZEL CLERK DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT THE HONORABLE LARRY L. EGER, in his capacity as Public Defender of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, Petitioner, v. THE JUDGES OF THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, Respondents. No. 2D23-1151 August 23, 2023 Petition for Writ of Prohibition to the Circuit Court for Sarasota, Manatee, and DeSoto Counties; Diana Moreland, Chief Judge. Larry L. Eger, Public Defender, and Paul Cherry, Assistant Public Defender, Sarasota, for Petitioner. Charles E. Roberts, former Chief Judge, Twelfth Judicial Circuit; Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wendy Buffington, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondents. PER CURIAM. Larry L. Eger, the Public Defender of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, has filed a petition for writ of prohibition challenging an administrative order issued by the Chief Judge of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit.1 We dismiss the petition for lack of standing because Mr. Eger has not shown how the Public Defender's office has suffered a cognizable injury for purposes of this extraordinary writ. As the Florida Supreme Court has explained: Generally, standing "requires a would-be litigant to demonstrate that he or she reasonably expects to be affected by the outcome of the proceedings, either directly or indirectly." Hayes v. Guardianship of Thompson, 952 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2006); see generally Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654, 662 (Fla. 1980) ("[T]his Court has long been committed to the rule that a party does not possess standing to sue unless he or she can demonstrate a direct and articulable stake in the outcome of a controversy."); Weiss v. Johansen, 898 So. 2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) ("Standing depends on whether a party has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy, with a legally cognizable interest which would be affected by the outcome of the litigation."). Johnson v. State, 78 So. 3d 1305, 1314 (Fla. 2012) (alteration in original); see also Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 1993) ("To be a next friend one 'must provide an adequate explanation—such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real 1 Based on written notification from each of the judges of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit authorizing all other judges in the circuit presiding over first appearances to modify the conditions of pretrial release, then Chief Judge Charles E. Roberts granted any judge in the circuit authority to modify or revoke the conditions of pretrial release previously set by another judge upon a finding of probable cause to believe that a defendant committed a new law violation while on pretrial release. Diana Moreland is the current chief judge of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. 2 party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf.' ");2 Merkle v. Guardianship of Jacoby, 912 So. 2d 595, 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("With limited exceptions not material here, Florida's appellate courts are not authorized to issue advisory opinions." (citing Sarasota-Fruitville Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 80 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. 1955); Allen v. Martinez, 573 So. 2d 987, 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991))). Moreover, even if the Public Defender had standing, his arguments would not be cognizable in prohibition. See Norris v. State, 737 So. 2d 1240, 1240 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) ("Certiorari is the appropriate remedy when the petition alleges that the chief judge exceeded his jurisdiction in promulgating an administrative order.")(citing Morse v. Moxley, 691 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Smith, 618 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Upchurch, 394 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Dep't of Juvenile Justice v. Soud, 685 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Valdez v. Chief Judge of Eleventh Jud. Cir., 640 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994))). Accordingly, we dismiss the petition. Petition dismissed. SILBERMAN, LUCAS, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 2 Accord Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017) (reviewing extraordinary writ petitions brought by fifteen individual petitioners challenging county judge's procedure for presiding over Baker Act proceedings). 3