Urbana at the Residences Condominium No. 3 Association, Inc. v. White Course Lennar, LLC
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 12, 2026
Docket3D2026-1461
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed November 12, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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Nos. 3D26-1461 & 3D26-1462
Lower Tribunal Nos. 24-12280-CA-01
& 26-532-CA-01
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Urbana at the Residences Condominium No. 3
Association, Inc.,
Petitioner,
vs.
White Course Lennar, LLC, Lennar Homes, LLC, Raisa
Krause, Carmen Orozco, Vanessa Perez, Capri Construction
Corp., Crown Roofing, Horizon Windows Corp., Miami
Architectural Studio, LLC, Jennifer Mallon Salman, Nodal
Structures, Inc., Carlos A. Nodal, Pascual Perez &
Associates, Inc., Edgardo Perez, Sunshine Windows
Manufacturing, Inc., Universal World Construction, Inc.,
Witkin Design Group, Inc., Andrew Michael Witkins, Empire
Electric Maintenance and Service, Inc., Ortega Grading, Inc.,
Shamrock Engineering Corp., Eric A. Shea, Southwest
Plumbing Services, Inc., Dixie Landscape, LLC, South Florida
Stucco & Exteriors, LLC, and Oscar Air Conditioning, Inc.,
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Lisa S. Walsh, Judge.
Ansbacher Law, and Michael Colin Feinberg, and Barry B. Ansbacher,
John Samuel Pairitz, Miguel Gonzalez, and Martin Stern (Jacksonville), for
petitioner Urbana at the Residences Condominium No. 3 Association, Inc.
Carlton Fields, P.A., and Dara Lynn Lindquist, Charlotte Warren, and
Jason Frederick Bullinger (Orlando), for respondents White Course Lennar,
LLC, Lennar Homes, LLC, Raisa Krause, Carmen Orozco, and Vanessa
Perez.
Conroy Simberg, and Albert Eugene Blair (Hollywood), for respondent
Capri Construction Corporation.
Law Office of Thamir A.R. Kaddouri, Jr., P.A., and Thamir Kaddouri,
Penelope Rowlett, and Elisabeth K. Eubanks (Tampa), for respondent
Crown Roofing, LLC.
Alexandra D. Salvador, P.A., and Alexandra D. Salvador; Kubicki
Draper, P.A., and Michael F. Suarez, Paola Solano Galindez, and Jaime
Alexander Garcia Montes, for respondent Horizon Windows Corporation.
Daniels Rodriguez Cruz, and Riley Nicole Richards, and Jeremy
Clarke Daniels, for respondents Miami Architectural Studio, LLC and
Jennifer Mallon Salman.
Daniels Rodriguez Cruz, and Jorge Luis Cruz, and Teresa Ann
Vazquez, for respondents Carlos A. Nodal and Nodal Structures, Inc.
VLP Copenhaver Espino, and Joseph William Lawrence (Fort
Lauderdale), for respondents Pascual Perez & Associates, Inc., and
Edgardo Perez.
Law Offices of Baumann, Gant & Keely, P.A., and Gary F. Baumann,
and Peri Rose Huston-Miller (Fort Lauderdale), for respondent Sunshine
Windows Manufacturing, Inc.
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Mombach, Boyle, Hardin & Simmons, P.A., and Joshua Francis Bautz,
and Stephen Joseph Simmons, for respondent Universal World
Construction, Inc.
Wolfe Pincavage, and Anna Dorkas Torres (West Palm Beach), for
respondents Witkins Design Group, Inc., and Andrew Michael Witkins.
Tyson & Mendes, and Haldon Louis Greenburg (Erie, CO), Melissa
Cassandra Jantaworn (Fort Lauderdale); Bartlett LLP, and Jorge Luis Cruz-
Bustillo, and Denise Marie Ibarra (Fort Lauderdale), for respondent Empire
Electric Maintenance and Service, Inc.
Kubicki Draper, P.A., and Vinod Rajesh Nirmal Bajnath and Ashley
Valido, for respondent Ortega Grading, Inc.
Zinober Diana & Monteverde, P.A., and Avery A. Dial, Alexa Rose
Rudnick, and Lauren Valenssa Ravelo (Fort Lauderdale), for respondents
Shamrock Engineering Corporation and Eric A. Shea.
Law Office of Jennifer Malamut, and Jennifer Gayle Craddock
(Orlando, FL), for respondent Southwest Plumbing Services, Inc.
Marshall Dennehey, and Matthew Joseph Wildner and Barbora
Skopalova (Fort Lauderdale), for respondent Dixie Landscape, LLC.
Kaufmann, Siegel & Maple, PL, and Haley R. Maple and Anthony
Davis Schall (Palm Harbor, FL); Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., and Robert H.
de Flesco, III, and Amanda Beth Pravder (Plantation), for respondent South
Florida Stucco & Exteriors, LLC.
Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., and Thomas A. Valdez
(Tampa), and John P. Keller and Stephanie Parrado, for respondent Oscar
Air Conditioning, Inc.
Before LOGUE, LINDSEY and GOODEN, JJ.
GOODEN, J.
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This case arises from the construction of a residential condominium.
White Course Lennar, LLC developed the condominium, and Lennar Homes,
LLC served as the general contractor. Petitioner Urbana at the Residences
Condominium No. 3 Association, Inc. filed suits against the developer,
general contractor, designers, subcontractors, and suppliers, alleging
construction defects. The developer moved to compel arbitration of the
Association’s claims against it. The Association agreed to arbitrate, and the
trial court stayed the litigation between those parties pending resolution of
the arbitration.
The Association filed an arbitration claim against the developer with
the American Arbitration Association. The developer, in turn, invoked the
subcontract agreements with the general contractor to demand arbitration
against most of the subcontractors.
Meanwhile, litigation proceeded against the other parties.
Respondents Sunshine Windows Manufacturing, Inc. and Oscar Air
Conditioning, Inc. moved to stay the entire action pending the outcome of
the arbitration. They contended that allowing the litigation to continue would
risk splitting causes of action, produce inconsistent verdicts, duplicate
discovery, and create competing deadlines. Several other defendants joined
the motions. The Association opposed the requested stay. It maintained
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that there was no arbitration agreement between it and the subcontractors,
a stay would not promote the efficient resolution of litigation, and a stay would
violate its right to access of courts and due process.
After hearing argument, the trial court stayed the case pending
arbitration—except as to a few parties. 1 Citing Hessen v. Schimmel, 182 So.
3d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), the trial court reasoned that a temporary stay was
warranted because the claims are “based on the same operative facts and
are inextricably inseparable from the claims subject to arbitration.” Upon
conclusion of the arbitration, the parties were to seek to return the case to
active status. One order required a status conference in six months to advise
the trial court as to the status of the arbitration and whether the stay should
remain in place. Meanwhile, the cases were consolidated.
The Association moved for reconsideration and challenged the
exclusion of a few defendants. The trial court granted reconsideration and
extended the stay to those parties as well. Again, the trial court ordered a
status conference in six months at which the parties will advise as to the
status of the arbitration and whether a stay should remain in effect. As
1
After the developer filed its third-party demand for arbitration, Witkins
Design Groups, Inc. and Universal World Construction successfully opposed
the arbitration demand. As a result, the developers’ claims against them
must be filed in civil court. They were initially excluded from the stay.
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before, the court directed the parties to seek return of the case to active
status upon the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings.
The Association seeks a writ of certiorari to quash the stay orders. It
characterizes the stays as indefinite in nature, thereby denying it access to
the courts, among other things. The Respondents counter that the stays are
temporary, and therefore, do not inflict the irreparable harm necessary for
certiorari review. Although the orders do not establish a date certain for lifting
the stays, they argue that the orders require the parties to report on the
arbitration’s progress and whether the stays should remain in effect. They
argue that the orders also contemplate the resumption of the litigation upon
the arbitration’s conclusion.
To obtain a writ of certiorari, a party must demonstrate a departure
from the essential requirements of the law that results in material injury that
cannot be corrected on plenary appeal. Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla.,
Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004); Kilgore v. Bird, 6 So. 2d 541, 545 (Fla.
1942). “Unless the petitioner establishes irreparable harm, the court must
dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.” Damsky v. Univ. of Miami, 152
So. 3d 789, 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). It is a condition precedent for this Court
to provide relief. Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1998).
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Because the challenged orders simply postpone the litigation pending
arbitration rather than foreclose its resumption, the Association has failed to
establish the irreparable harm necessary for certiorari review. We therefore
dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. See Alt. Glob. One, LLC v.
Feingold, 426 So. 3d 655, 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 2026) (dismissing petition for
lack of irreparable harm where the trial court only stayed proceeding pending
disposition of an earlier-filed action pending in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida); Kazakov v. Bourlakova, 425 So.
3d 1176, 1176–77 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (dismissing petition for lack of
irreparable harm where the trial court’s order allowed the parties to lift the
stay and try any remaining issues left after resolution of the international
litigation); Baute v. Crenshaw, 405 So. 3d 388, 390 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) (“Not
every stay causes a party irreparable harm.”); Flaig ex rel. Palmcrest Homes
of Tampa Bay, LLC v. Sullivan, 141 So. 3d 1274, 1276 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)
(“The order staying the proceedings properly provides that the . . . suit may
go forward if the issues raised therein are not decided in other litigation. Any
resulting delay or inconvenience to the parties would not suffice as the
irreparable harm that would permit us to issue a writ of certiorari.”); Cruz v.
Cooperativa De Seguros Multiples De Puerto Rico, Inc., 76 So. 3d 394, 398
(Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (“At most, the [arbitration] process delays litigation to
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promote an alternative method of resolution. Delay or inconvenience is
insufficient to invoke certiorari review.”); Perry v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.,
379 So. 2d 429, 430 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (“[A] stay simply postpones the
action until the happening of some contingency.”).
Petition dismissed.
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