Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D19-2551 _____________________________ EARL M. JOHNSON, JR., Petitioner, v. JEREMY DAVID SNYDER and AIDA MARTA RAMIREZ, Respondents. _____________________________ Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction. May 13, 2020 PER CURIAM. In this petition for writ of certiorari, Petitioner seeks review of two nonfinal orders, the first denying his motion to strike the intervenor’s pleading and the second granting the intervenor’s motion to require a lis pendens bond. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner claims that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law, resulting in irreparable injury, when it denied Petitioner’s motion to strike the intervenor’s answer with counterclaim. Respondents counter that the certiorari petition is untimely under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(c)(1) because it was filed more than thirty days after rendition of the trial court’s order granting intervention on March 29, 2018. See Caldwell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 980 So. 2d 1226, 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding that the thirty-day time limit for filing a certiorari petition is jurisdictional and not merely a matter of procedure); Wibbens v. State, Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, Bureau of Driver Improvement, 956 So. 2d 503, 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (same). Although Petitioner claims that his petition was timely because it was filed fewer than thirty days after rendition of the trial court’s order denying Petitioner’s motion to strike the intervenor’s pleading, this assertion is incorrect because the thirty-day deadline ended on Friday, July 12, 2019, and the petition was not filed until Monday, July 15, 2019. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction as it relates to the trial court’s order denying Petitioner’s motion to strike the answer with counterclaim. Petitioner also claims that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law, resulting in irreparable injury, when it granted the intervenor’s motion to require a lis pendens bond. Again, Respondents assert that the certiorari petition is untimely under rule 9.100(c)(1) because it was filed more than thirty days after rendition of the trial court’s order denying the intervenor’s motion to dissolve notice of lis pendens but granting the intervenor’s motion to require a lis pendens bond. Petitioner counters that the filing of his motion for reconsideration tolled rendition of this order until the trial court disposed of the motion on July 2, 2019, which was fewer than thirty days before the filing of the certiorari petition. However, a motion for reconsideration of a non-final order is not an authorized motion that would toll the time for filing a certiorari petition. See Jones v. Pantry, Inc., 866 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Longo v. Longo, 515 So. 2d 1013, 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Accordingly, we also dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction as it relates to the trial court’s order requiring a lis pendens bond. PETITION DISMISSED. OSTERHAUS, JAY, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. 2 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Earl M. Johnson, Jr., pro se, Petitioner. Nicholas Martino, Jacksonville, for Respondents. 3