Alfonso Leos v. Sara Hernandez
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledApril 15, 2020
Docket3D19-1665
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed April 15, 2020.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D19-1665
Lower Tribunal No. 15-1197
________________
Alfonso Leos,
Appellant,
vs.
Sara Hernandez,
Appellee.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, George A. Sarduy,
Judge.
Alfonso Leos, in proper person.
Sara Hernandez, in proper person.
Before LOGUE, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.
MILLER, J.
Appellant, Alfonso Leos, the father, challenges the post-decretal relocation of
his minor child to the State of Texas at the behest of appellee, Sara Hernandez, the
mother. For the reasons that follow, we are constrained to dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction.
Citing the availability of an ideal educational institution and an overall desire
for an improved quality of life, the mother petitioned in the proceedings below to
relocate with the child to Laredo, Texas. In furtherance thereof, she provided the
lower tribunal with the known particulars regarding all requisite “items of
information” under section 61.13001(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2019). Raulerson v.
Wright, 60 So. 3d 487, 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (citing § 61.13001(3), Fla. Stat.).
The court referred the parties to a general magistrate. The magistrate duly
convened an evidentiary hearing, and, at the conclusion of the proceedings,
determined relocation was provident. The father timely filed exceptions to the
recommended disposition. Shortly thereafter, the mother moved with the child and
her paramour to an undisclosed location in Del Rio, Texas. 1
1
“A magistrate’s report does not have any adjudicatory effect unless and until the
trial court adopts it as the order or judgment of the court,” thus, on the record before
us, the mother prematurely relocated to a different city other than that requested.
Seigler v. Bell, 148 So. 3d 473, 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (citation omitted); see
§61.13001(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (2019) (“Relocating the child without complying with the
requirements of this subsection subjects the party in violation to contempt and other
proceedings to compel the return of the child.”); Raulerson, 60 So. 3d at 489
(“Section 61.13001 delineates the requirements a primary residential parent must
2
The record on appeal is devoid of any indicia that the lower tribunal ever ruled
on the asserted exceptions. Moreover, and fatal to our jurisdiction, to date, no final
order of relocation has been rendered.
Accordingly, we hereby dismiss the appeal without prejudice to either party
seeking timely appellate review of a final order, once one is rendered by the trial
court.2 See Seigler v. Bell, 148 So. 3d 473, 477-78 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (“While a
magistrate’s report is more than a mere recommendation, it is not a final judgment,
as magistrates lack the authority to enter final judgments.”) (citation omitted);
Peacon v. Peacon, 578 So. 2d 781, 782 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (“The Order denying
the exceptions did not adopt or ratify the master’s report and thus clearly was neither
a final nor non-final appealable order.”) (citation omitted); see also Gutierrez v.
Gutierrez, 48 So. 3d 118, 119 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (“[T]he father was entitled to
receive a hearing on his exceptions to the general magistrate’s report because he did
timely file his exceptions.”); Yoxsimer v. Yoxsimer, 918 So. 2d 997, 998 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2006) (“Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.490(f) provides that if
exceptions are filed to a general magistrate’s report, they ‘[must] be heard on
reasonable notice by either party or the court.’”).
Dismissed.
follow before relocating with a minor child who is the subject of an order
determining the child’s time-sharing, residential care, kinship, or custody.”).
2
We express no opinion as to the merits of the appeal.
3